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Abstract 
What does it mean to be ‘at home’ in an uneven world? How is belonging performed in bodily, 
spatial, discursive and affective ways that materialise in physical boundaries of demarcation? 
This research sought to explore these questions in post-apartheid Johannesburg. The city 
landscape continues to bear the scars of racial segregation, as affluent spaces jarr abrasively 
and defensively against spaces of poverty (Murray, 2011). The critical scholarship on place 
identity has steered us in the direction of a performativities framework to understanding 
belonging, not as an ontological given, but as an achievement (Bell, 1999), structured by 
historically informed discursive iterations of power (Butler, 1993). The current research 
extends on this body of work; at the same time, addresses a lacuna in the scholarship. The 
latter has overlooked the role of desire to explain why we are ‘gripped’ by sociopolitical projects 
of belonging counterintuitive to the ideals of social transformation (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 
2008). The research, situated within critical psychosocial studies, aims to explicate how, in 
our ‘mundane’ everyday doings, we (un)consciously perform home as a psychosocial project 
of belonging. Specifically, a Lacanian-Žižekian framework is offered to map out how belonging 
is an intersubjective process that orientates us towards the trans-individual unconscious, our 
transferential relationship to the ‘big Other’ whom we look to for direction, purpose, meaning, 
love and approval (Žižek, 1989). The research aims to illuminate desire as a negotiated, 
fantasmatic transaction performed with others, but aligned to the ‘big Other’ (Hook, 2008b), 
an alienating and incomplete social system that prescribes the ‘rules’ for how to belong. 
 
To explore these subtle complexities, the research is set across two divergent ‘home spaces’, 
in proximal distance, yet contrasting in socio-spatial and material ways. These two sites are 
referred to anonymously as ‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated Community’. The research offers 
a ‘mapping’ of the affective topographies of belonging, using a combination of sit-down 
narrative interviews and go-alongs with participants in and through their home and communal 
spaces. Participants across both sites were held together in commonality through crime talk 
as an orienting narrative imaginary (Jackson, 2002) to ‘make sense’ of the violence and chaos 
of living in a broader environment perceived as dangerous. The privileged home as a 
fantasmatic construction offered ‘The Gated Community’ residents the promise of idyllic 
beauty, freedom and safety from the terror ‘out there’ – ‘the criminal’ – metaphorically and 
metonymically embodied in the figure of the ‘poor black man’. For ‘The Township’, the making 
of home was centred on narratives of ‘survival’, evincing a struggle to make meaning in a 
“place where meaning [has] collapsed” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 2-3). The clean and proper 
‘surviving’ body was set apart from ‘the place where I am not’; of dying, decaying or dead 
bodies in an abjected zone, designated as ‘dark city’, a reception area for criminals, foreigners 
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and other ‘outsiders’. The research highlights jouissance (a painful pleasure) as a 
transgressive ‘subtext’ that completes the fantasy of being ‘at home’ to provide the “ultimate 
support” (Žižek, 1994, p. 32) for racial ideologies that structure our desire to belong. The 
researcher’s complicity in fantasmatic constructions, alongside the surprising ‘ruptures’ to 
these imaginary and symbolic narratives, highlights the search for home as a process that is 
incomplete, elusive, perpetually shifting and persistently uneven. Our moments of attunement 
with the other make room for a comforting ‘mutuality’ in belonging, but they risk a painful 
alienation from the abjected ‘foreigner’ within ourselves (Kristeva, 1991). 
 
Keywords: Belonging; Home; Race; Desire; Fantasy; Abjection; Performativity; Psychosocial 
Studies; Critical Discourse Analysis. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
What does it mean to be at home in an uneven world? The notion of home features as a 
fundamental part of our humanity. Viewed as offering a sense of belonging and retreat from a 
world increasingly experienced as alienating, home is idealised as the site of authenticity and 
experience, safety and familiarity (Brickell, 2012). Feeling ‘at home’, whilst a valuable 
subjective experience is, however, a discriminating one that connects to sentiments about who 
belongs and who does not belong where (Duyvendak, 2011). Emotions play a central role in 
our collective life (Dixon & Condor, 2011). Despite the significance and relevance of this 
feeling dimension to research on home and belonging, a more critical approach to feelings 
has been neglected in scholarship. This neglect is due primarily to contentions around 
definitions and distinctions between ‘feelings’, ‘emotions’ and ‘affects’ (Duyvendak, 2011; 
McElhinny, 2010). However, to exclude ‘feelings’, ‘emotions’ and ‘affects’ is to ignore critical 
relations through which places and bodies become meaningful (Longhurst, Ho & Johnston, 
2008). This view is pertinent if we are to understand emotionality not as something confined 
to individual subjects, but as affective practices that “align individuals with communities – or 
bodily space with social space” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 26). Here, a collective sentiment reigns as 
affective practices are ‘scaled up’ and played out, what Berlant, 1997 (as cited in Wetherell, 
2012, p. 16) has referred to as “the national present tense”. The research explores how these 
affective practices are performed, talked about, embodied in the making of home across 
places of affluence and poverty, and what this might say about what it means to belong in 
post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
1.1 Background  
The loss of home, whether through natural disasters, political upheaval, conflict, forced 
migration, or personal circumstance, is a global and recurring theme. In South Africa, the loss, 
longing and struggle for the symbolic and material home resonate as historical. This history 
stirs up profound feelings that physically move us in complex ways, perhaps most poignantly 
captured by Antjie Krog (2003, p. 36): “My chest hurts with the indescribable intimacy of 
belonging and loss”. Meanings attached to the loss of home are rooted in previously 
segregated South Africa. Forced removals and dislocations have resulted in the loss of 
communities for the majority ‘black’ population (Field, 2012). Such loss and displacement 
evokes ontological insecurity of placelessness, and shakes the foundations of identity, being 
and belonging (Magat, 1999).  Thus, in the contemporary context, the questions of identity, 
place and belonging are complexly intertwined. As a country and society ravaged by such 
violence, these questions have mounting significance, particularly in how we continue to 
demarcate, confine and mark bodies to places of ‘belonging’ (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). This 
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research is concerned with reverberate through the collective psyche, the social body and in 
our everyday spaces and practices. Why the historical continues to reverberate through our 
collective psyche, the social body and our everyday spaces and practices is a question 
foregrounded in this research.  
 
Johannesburg, compared to other South African cities, arguably carries the spatial scars of 
apartheid most conspicuously and self-consciously. For architects of racial segregation, 
Johannesburg was the place where the apartheid vision of “separate development” was 
etched into the urban landscape and simultaneously the social fabric (Murray, 2011. p. xi). 
During the apartheid regime, ‘black’ townships were placed in reach of the central business 
district but far enough so that strict geographical boundaries between ‘black’ and ‘white’ were 
maintained. In this respect, “the racial boundary [was] the geographical emblem of apartheid” 
(Dixon, 1997, as cited in Long, 2002, p. 115). 
 
1.2. Rationale 
Post-1994, Archbishop Tutu’s Rainbow Nation the ideal of a non-racial and inclusive society 
was anchored in a new constitution, of which the preamble reads: “South Africa belongs to all 
who live in it, united in our diversity” (S.A. Const. ss 1-3). Previously segregated zones gave 
way to permeable boundaries, offering up spaces for mobility, transition and sense of place 
for all, irrespective of ‘race’, gender or creed. Indeed, post-apartheid has seen a dramatic 
growing black middle-class from townships to traditionally all-white suburbs, in one study, an 
increase from 9% (2007) to 31% (2013) in a Johannesburg and Pretoria East suburb (Roots, 
2013). Despite the deracialisation of public spaces, along with profound transformations at a 
policy and legislative level (Durrheim, Mtose & Brown, 2011), there is ever-present angst 
about belonging in the new South Africa. Post-apartheid desegregation has profoundly 
challenged conceptions of self, spatially and psychically displacing South Africans outside of 
what was familiar (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). For the white minority, alienation comes from 
being dislodged from a previous positioning of power and privilege. Here, Steyn (2001, p. 92) 
writes that “’home’ has become unfamiliar, even alien, now that it is no longer protected white 
space – the group areas of the mind are now more difficult to maintain”.  
 
I propose that these taken-for-granted agitations, both of unbelonging (alienation from feeling 
‘at home’) and non-belonging (exclusion from a community or home country) is manifest in the 
“social and psychic geography of space” (Jacobs, 2016, p. 97). These anxieties are evident 
most starkly as “socio-geographic forms of inequality” (Pettigrew, 1979 as cited in Durrheim 
et al., 2011), likened to what Murray (2011, p. 77) calls a “schizophrenic cityscape”.  In 
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Johannesburg, for instance, this is made up of strikingly divided landscapes and spatial 
juxtapositions. Places of affluence exist as high-security enclaves and are distinct from inner-
city decay, and cut off from impoverished and exposed informal township settlements where 
the dispossessed eke out an existence (Murray, 2011). 
 
Thus, formalised racial segregation have morphed and proliferated into new forms of 
separatism across the post-apartheid landscape, where access to rights, privileges and 
entitlements is a prerogative of class (Murray, 2011). The effect is a polarising of worlds, 
furthering the gap between wealthy and destitute and heightening racial suspicions/hostilities. 
Despite residential change patterns, the race/class nexus remains difficult to untangle, given 
the mutually reinforcing relationship between economic inequality and segregation (Durrheim 
et al., 2011; Saff, 2001). Nevertheless, the township, a significant place type of the apartheid 
legacy, continues as a site of contestation, with almost daily eruptions in violent protests. 
These residents’ struggles, while manifold (e.g., recognition within ‘white’ suburbs, relocation 
resistance, housing, service delivery), nevertheless cohere in the claim to a piece of belonging 
(Tselapedi & Dugard, 2013). The struggle for home is not merely a struggle against 
dispossession (fighting for resources, human rights or equal citizenship, etc.,) (Buur, 2009) 
but more fundamentally, seems to signal a quest for identity and the ground of being (Hill, 
2010).  
 
As Buur (2009, p. 27) illustrates, images of unruly mob violence (burning tyres, damage to 
vehicles and property, etc.) in rural, peri-urban and city spaces renew a collective fear that 
“continue[s] to haunt the imagination of the new democracy”. These defensive manoeuvres – 
whether expressed in violent agitations against ‘unrequited longings’ in marginalised spaces 
(Buur, 2009; Middleton, 2013), or in fortified enclaves, security aesthetics, surveillance rituals 
in spaces of affluence and privilege (Murray, 2011) – tend to (re)polarise difference on the 
basis of physical markers, instigating boundaries of skin, color and pigmentation as privileged 
sites of racial meaning (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000).  Belonging, therefore, becomes inscribed 
though the modality of visuality, an ‘optic’ (Žižek, 1994) that instigates and confirms racial 
difference on illusory and rudimentary distinctions. These become ‘solidified’ in repeated 
citations of discourse, narratives, bodily performances and spatial practices (Butler, 1993). 
This way of seeing is inherently informed by power relations that conform to a normative grid 
that sets out the coordinates of spatial, discursive and bodily belonging (Trudeau, 2006).  
 
Moreover, these spatialised asymmetries jarr against post-apartheid ideals of democracy, 
freedom and equality and point to urgency in questioning its resurgence. The persistence of 
this hidden power urges us to think beyond rationalist conceptualisations to explore its psychic 
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dimensions: the “unconscious repetitions of the colonial past in the present” (Hook & Truscott, 
2013, p. 156).  In this thesis, I attempt to explore home as a ‘narrative reality’ (Hill, 2010) and 
affective, embodied, interactive spatial and material practice to visibilise the taken-for-granted 
everyday doings of ‘being at home’ and making home. Of particular interest is how the 
(un)conscious, as a mode of discourse, produces an affective topography of belonging centred 
on fear, abjection and desire. To achieve this, I explore how we perform ‘home’ through 
language. The research explores the intersubjective exchange between myself, the 
researcher, and the participants as we walk through two contrasting home spaces: a 
residential ‘gated community’ and a formal ‘township’. 
 
1.3. Conceptual Framework 
I situate this research in the critical tradition, which attempts to problematise notions of home 
as a place of familiarity and safety based on feeling ‘at home’ (see Burman & Chantler, 2004; 
Brickell, 2012; Duyvendak, 2011; Gunder, 2014; Mallet, 2004; Rus, 2006). Place-identity 
scholarship has shown that the angst of belonging is not only managed in speech acts, for 
example, through territorial claims and justifications (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). It also takes 
forms of spatial control, such as semigration practices (gated communities, enclosed 
neighbourhoods, and high perimeter walls) (Ballard, 2004). In this research, I draw on 
developments in critical scholarship, namely the ‘turn to affect’ in critical discursive studies 
(Wetherell, 2012) and cultural theory (Ahmed, 2001; 2004a; 2004b). This research highlights 
the performance of hegemonic ideologies, not only in discourse, but also in lively, spatial, 
embodied and material ways to produce ‘feeling landscapes’ of (non)belonging (Durrheim, 
Rautenbach, Nicholson & Dixon, 2013; Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Trudeau, 2006; Wetherell, 
2013). The latter, with its view of affective economies as collectively and historically produced, 
offers a view of affective practice as a ‘movement of signs’, causing emotions to ‘stick’ onto 
some bodies, whilst ‘sliding’ over others (Ahmed, 2004a). I draw on these developments to 
articulate a view of belonging as performative (Bell, 1999; Butler, 1993).  
 
At the same time, I highlight the limits of this performativity frame, which places inordinate 
emphasis on power through which affective practices of privilege are maintained (Ahmed, 
2004a; Durrheim et al., 2013; Wetherell, 2012). Departing from this, I explore the place of 
desire – our longing to belong – that a performative lens overlooks. In this thesis, I highlight 
the dual quality of belonging – its yearning quality (‘be – longing’), and its beckoning, as 
phrased in Rowe’s (2005, p. 15) interpellative command, “Be Longing”. I situate the research 
within a critical psychosocial field that draws on a Lacanian psychoanalytic frame. In this 
respect, I argue for the place of desire to account for why we are ‘gripped’ into practices of 
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belonging that are counterinituitive to the ideals of social transformation (Glynos, 2001; Glynos 
& Stavrakakis, 2008). It is the relationship between affect and power, the ‘power-grip’ of 
ideology (Glynos, 2001) where this research on home and the asymmetries of belonging 
seeks to situate itself. Woodward (2002) proposes that identity is about difference – the 
marking of ‘us’ from ‘them’ that is dependent on a classificatory system to manage that 
difference.  
 
In this thesis, I draw attention to how we perform belonging and how we manage difference 
through affect. Why are we caught up in the grips of affect? How does affect become mobilised 
in (un)conscious ways in our performances of belonging, not merely as disciplined subjects 
but as desiring agents? Of interest is how affect is structured by fantasy (Lacan, 1977; 1998; 
2002; 2014; Žižek, 1993; 1994; 1989; 1996; 2006a; 2006b; 2008), and sustained by desire, 
abjection and enjoyment (Kristeva, 1982; Žižek, 2008) in the making of home as a 
psychosocial project of belonging. I argue that such affects register powerfully in the workings 
of ideology to demarcate places of ‘be – longing’ from “the place[s] where I am not” (Kristeva, 
1982, p. 3). 
 
Furthermore, the research aims to explore questions of home that transcend the materiality of 
space and place (Mallet, 2004) and the skin as a bodily surface (Ahmed, 2004b). For example, 
why do some emotions ‘stick’ to us or ‘move us’? How do they “hold us in place, or gives us a 
dwelling place” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 27)? The research also explores the ‘ruptures’ in affective, 
embodied narratives and experiences that disrupt the ‘fixity’ of categorical identity logic (‘us-
them’, ‘black-white’, for example). Of interest is how these (temporarily) break down, disturb 
or unsettle acts of boundary-making (Probyn, 1996; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). The conceptual 
shift from identity politics towards a politics of relation foregrounds the longing dimension of 
‘be – longing’ (Rowe, 2005). As Probyn (1996, p. 19) offers, this relational dimension 
underscores desire as “wanting to belong, wanting to become as a process fueled by yearning 
rather than the positing of identity as a stable state”. In this research, I formulate this longing 
in Lacanian psychoanalytic terms. I propose that ‘be – longing’ is an interpellative call that 
draws us to “the place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162), whom we look to for direction, 
purpose and completion (Bracher, 1993). Thus, belonging is complex and layered, desiring, 
anxious and ambivalent, intimate yet alienating, fluid and processual, momentary and 
unstable. Moreover, we perpetually slip ‘in-and-out of (racialised) belongings’ with others, as 
we align in some moments and disconnect in others. The master signifier of (racial) identity 
and belonging (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000), as I attempt to show in this research, works in 
surreptitious ways that are not confined to practices ‘contained’ by the skin or boundary walls 
in space. Attention to these ‘ruptures’ overthrows identity categories towards spaces-in-
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between our belongings. As Probyn (1996) writes, in a climate marked by polarisation, the 
desire to belong is “tenacious and fragile” (p. 8), a desire that is not innately ‘good’ or ‘bad’, 
‘left’ or ‘right’, but offers open-ended possibilities of becoming.   
 
1.4. Organisation of Chapters 
Below is an overview of the chapters that comprise the thesis: 
 
1.4.1. Chapter Two: Literature review – Performativities of belonging 
In Chapter Two, I provide a rationale for research on home and the asymmetries of belonging 
in the field of psychosocial studies. I argue that questions of home (where are you from? where 
are you going?) (Brah, 2012) are intimately bound with questions of identity (who am I?) and 
place (where am I?). I explore scholarship on how ‘emotions’, ‘feelings’ and ‘affects’ have been 
conceptualised and treated in research on home. I take as a starting point, Bell’s (1999) view 
of belonging, not as an ontological given, but as an achievement that is enacted as 
performance. Following Butler (1993), however, I adopt a more radicalised view of 
performance, one that views the rules or power scripts of discourse that we repeat or ‘reiterate’ 
despite our deliberate intentions (Parker, 2015a). More profound than mere self-conscious 
performance (Parker 2015b), subjects are disciplined in a Foucauldian sense to ‘cite’ the norm 
to qualify as a subject (Butler, 1993). In this respect, belonging is discursively performed, 
enacted in bodily ways and materialised in space.  
 
Despite the ‘turn to affect’, efforts to offer a psychosocial complexity to earlier formulations 
tend to treat the discursive, embodied, physical, visceral elements as separate rather than 
integrated domains of lived experience (Wetherell, 2012). The difficulty in investigating affect 
rests on a woeful state of affairs where researchers are left “trying to investigate the 
unspeakable” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 76). I explore various bodies of scholarship – broadly 
delineated as humanistic, discursive, non-representational, and affective economies – to 
examine questions of home and belonging. The review explores how each approach tackles 
the relationship between power and affect to understand home as a psychosocial project of 
belonging.  
 
In conclusion, I argue for an approach to researching belonging outside of a binary framework. 
Belonging tends to be conceptualised either in affective terms, as ‘inner’ feelings of being at 
home (place belongingness) (Tuan, 2004) or as discursive claims and spatialised practices 
(politics of belonging) (e.g., Ballard, 2004; Durrheim & Dixon, 2005) that downplay the role of 
affect. Moreover, the role of affect in informing practices of belonging cannot be reduced to 
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‘raw’, here-and-now unmediated experience (non-representational approaches) (e.g., Thien, 
2005; Thrift, 2004; Williams, 2001) that are divorced from its historical productions (Jones, 
2011; Tolia-Kelly, 2006). A more complex and layered understanding of belonging offered by 
discursive psychology (Di Masso, Dixon & Durrheim, 2014; Durrheim et al., 2013; Wetherell, 
2012) and cultural theory’s (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b) more critical deployment of the ‘affective 
turn’ proves fruitful in moving scholarship forward in a thinking about belonging as 
simultaneously psychic and social (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008) and rooted in historical power 
relations that govern practices of privilege, race, gender, class, etc. Although these recent 
developments provide a concrete approach to understanding the workings of affect and 
power, I argue that they do not fully explain why we are ‘gripped’ into particular projects of 
belonging (Glynos, 2001) that, at times, make ‘no sense’ (McMillan, 2017). In this respect, I 
propose that a psychoanalytic frame, precisely one that accounts for the role of desire in our 
subjective investments, is necessary to elucidate the (un)conscious dimensions of home as a 
psychosocial project of belonging. 
 
1.4.2. Chapter Three: Literature review – Towards a Lacanian psychosocial 
theory of belonging   
In this chapter, I offer a rationale for why a psychoanalytic framework is necessary to 
understand the affective topographies of belonging. I argue that the repetition of signs is not 
sufficient to explain the grip of particular emotional investments that sustain the rituals of 
belonging (Ahmed, 2004b; Wetherell, 2012). In this chapter, I ask why it is that we are drawn, 
at times in irrational ways, to particular positionings and how we might explain the force of this 
appeal?  I argue that power works in affective ways to manage difference by constructing the 
hated object. More than this, however, it also “transfix[es] subjects” and entices them through 
the workings of desire (Bracher, 1993; Glynos, 2001, p. 192). I situate the thesis within a 
Žižekian-Lacanian psychoanalytic framework (Lacan, 1977; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1993; 
1994; 1989; 1996; 2006a; 2006b; 2008), which offers a language to articulate the desire, 
fantasy and enjoyment aspects of home as a psychosocial project of belonging.  
 
The Lacanian scholarship reveals that ideological projects of ‘home’ (for example, nationalism) 
are structured as fantasmatic narratives. These narratives function to suture over the lack we 
experience as subjects of an incomplete social order (e.g., Gunder, 2014; Hirvonen, 2017; 
Hook, 2008b). These meaning frames guarantee the subject (and nation) a place in the 
symbolic order, simultaneously situating the ‘other’ (the intruding ‘outsider’ or ‘foreigner’) as 
an ever-present threat (e.g., Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013). Moreover, such meanings are 
‘pre-determined’ by histories of belonging produced through collective memory (Georgis, 
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2007). These studies, typically focused on the (narrative) form of fantasy, however,  tend to 
neglect the process dimension of ‘be – longing’ (Rowe, 2005). Furthermore, they overlook the 
‘moments of recruitment’ (Wetherell, 2012) through which we are interpellated as desiring 
subjects. The chapter formulates desire as a negotiated transaction (Hook, 2008b; 2008c). 
We continuously seek direction from the ‘big Other’ and anxiously seek to resolve our place 
in the social order: ‘What do you want?’ ‘What am I to you?’ ‘What must I be?’ (Hook, 2008b, 
p. 404). This address to the ‘big Other’, whom we look towards for love, approval and 
recognition, is an overlooked dimension in the research on belonging (Žižek, 1989).  
 
Drawing on this formulation, I highlight two main gaps in research. First, there is a lack of 
attention to the fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b), as spoken in and through the 
intersubjective space. Attention to this dimension could highlight fantasy as a relational 
construction created in response to the enigmatic question: ‘what does the Other want of me?’. 
Second, studies have not considered the role of abjection (Kristeva, 1982) in the fantasmatic 
transaction. I argue that the incoherences of speech (stuttering, stammering, whispers, 
pauses, etc.) alongside visceral bodily ‘ruptures’ (tremblings, poundings of the heart, 
agitations of the skin, etc.) can further insights into the materiality of abjection in fantasy.  
 
Addressing these gaps in research would offer a more cogent account that explains the force 
of fantasy. In other words, why and how it is that the ‘dry’ socio-symbolic domain latches onto 
“the ‘sticky’ affects of the subject” to create and sustain desire and enjoyment in ideological 
belongings (Glynos & Stavkrakakis, 2008, p. 263)? On both accounts, the researcher who, in 
turn, longs, desires, fears, loathes, abjects, etc. cannot be reduced to 
observer/facilitator/interpreter of the research experience. Out of ethical necessity, s/he must 
be included in the analytical frame to elucidate the relational, affective, embodied, discursive, 
material and spatial dimensions of (non)belonging performed in tandem with participants. 
 
1.4.3.  Chapter Four: Methodology  
In Chapter Four, I provide a rationale for a psychosocial methodology that recognises the 
irreducibility of the psychological and social and its inseparability (Emerson & Frosh, 2004; 
Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Although a Lacanian analysis specifically aims to unsettle meanings 
(Saville Young & Frosh, 2010), I situate the analytical stance to holding meaning and 
simultaneously disrupting sense (Saville Young & Berry, 2016). Such a stance is a necessary 
move in a project on home and belonging to elicit a mode of ‘listening’ to texts that is both 
sympathetic and critical.   In this chapter, I set out the co-ordinates of the research: objectives, 
questions, study location, participants and the research sites. In turn, I outline the data 
collection methods through which I explore various peformativities of belonging: space, talk, 
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embodiment, and affect. These include go-alongs as a form of mobile interviews (Brown & 
Durrheim, 2009) led by participants in and around their homes (the domestic interior and the 
broader community in which they live) and semi-structured narrative interviews (Wengraf, 
2001). In these exchanges, I draw attention to the body as a critical instrument in research 
(Longhurst et al., 2008). I show how bodies (the participants and my own) become emotionally 
aligned as affective performances of fear, desire and disgust in the making of home. In this 
manner, I argue that the skin, as a “border that feels” (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 39), is viscerally 
interpellated and co-opted in the fantasy frame.  
 
This chapter further outlines the procedures for data analysis, which occurs in two phases. 
The first phase draws on interpretation from “the line of the Imaginary” (Parker, 2005, p. 175) 
to explore the sense-making stance. Through a discursive reading to the texts, I explore the 
interpretive repertoires, the “threads of sense-making” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 12), through which 
dominant discourses (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) and subject positions (Edley, 2001) become 
articulated. Taken together, these form what Lacan (1995, p. 152) refers to as the “point de 
caption” (Lacan, 1995, p. 152) or knots of meaning (Parker, 2005) that are retroactively 
determined. The second phase draws on interpretation from the “line of the Symbolic” (Parker, 
2005, p. 175). Rogers’ (2007) interpretive poetics informs the ‘steps’ for interpretation of the 
texts. This approach draws attention to exploring narrative as an illusory construction and 
offers guidelines for discerning the subject's address to the Other in speech. Frosh and Saville 
Young’s (2010, p. 53) guidelines on “concentric reflexivity” are a useful supplement to Rogers’ 
(2007) Lacanian reading of the texts. This reflexive turn offers a lens to view how the 
participants and the researcher situate themselves and how they are themselves situated in 
the texts. In submitting to interpellative calls, the imaginary frame captures our gaze and 
promises fullness of being and belonging. The last section of this chapter highlights potential 
ethical concerns relating to the research.   
 
1.4.4.  Chapter Five: Findings – Crime talk as a narrative imaginary  
I present the findings of the research in three chapters, corresponding to the two research 
sites: ‘The Gated Community’ (Chapter Five and Six) and ‘The Township’ (Chapter Seven) 
that rest on notions of performativity and interpellation as an overarching frame. I argue that 
in doing belonging, discursively, bodily, affectively, spatially and intersubjectively, we perform 
the anxieties, fractures, instabilities, and uncertainties of our belonging(s) and place in post-
apartheid South Africa. I ‘visibilise’ these affective resonances in the ordinary, everyday doings 
of home that simultaneously hinge on fear, abjection and desire.  These rituals of talk and 
spatial practice alleviate – yet never fully subdue – the perpetual haunting of the excluded 
abject. Thus, they sustain – but never fulfil – our desire to ‘be – long’. I further argue that these 
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processes of desire, abjection and fear are simultaneously powerful operations that serve to 
racialise and class the spaces we inhabit as a direct implication of where we choose to place 
our bodies (Rowe, 2005).  
 
In Chapter Five, I focus on ‘The Gated Community’. In these accounts, I explore how crime 
talk is a narrative imaginary that offers coherence and a symbolic re-ordering of home in South 
Africa that we experience as dangerous, chaotic and unruly. I draw on critical discursive 
psychology as an analytical resource to examine the duality of language – how speech is used 
to achieve conversational ends; in turn, how speakers are used through discourses that 
structure thinking, feeling and talking. Therefore, I analyse the texts for interpretive repertoires, 
dominant discourses (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) and subject positions (Edley, 2001) to derive 
the ‘common sense’ or explanatory resource in accounts of belonging. 
 
1.4.5.  Chapter Six: Findings – The promise of being ‘at home in the world’ 
In Chapter Six, I argue that the privileged home functions to support an ideological fantasy 
that offers the promise but not the fulfilment of belonging. It sustains its grip on us by teaching 
us how to desire (Glynos, 2001; Žižek, 1992; 2008). This chapter foregrounds our 
(un)conscious address to the Other (Rogers, 2007). I explore the role of silences, disavowals 
and denials, as well as incoherences and emotionality (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010) as 
disruptions to the narrative imaginary of ‘crime talk’. In turn, the role of jouissance (‘painful 
pleasure’) as the transgressive underside of fantasy sustains its power-grip, locking us into a 
secret enjoyment of ideology (Martin, 2015).  The findings of this chapter highlight that we 
‘yield’ to jouissance to represent the repressed ‘Real’ of ourselves, expressed in ritualistic rule-
bound practices that guarantee a ‘complete’ social order. 
 
1.4.6.  Chapter Seven: Findings – Not belonging ‘at home’: Abjection, the  ‘place 
where I am not’  
In Chapter Seven, I offer an analysis of data drawn from ‘The Township’ site.  In this chapter, 
I show how the narratives of residents depict the township as a ‘zone of non-being’ (Gordon, 
2015), structured around fear and abjection. Resonating with Fanon’s (1967, p. 4) “native 
quarters”, ‘The Township’ is portrayed as a ‘place’ occupied by the dispossessed and 
dehumanised that is set apart from the superfluous colonial city. I draw on Kristeva’s (1982) 
notion of abjection as an analytical tool to show its operation as a visceral register in talk and 
as embodied experience. I argue that it is in ordinary, routine and covert ways that we collude 
to perform abjection. The abject is not so much what is perceived/experienced as strange (‘not 
me’), but what is perceived/experienced as too familiar (‘just like me’). I explore jouissance in 
the processes of abjection, whereby, ‘becoming subjects’, we as the “victims of the abject are 
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its fascinated victims” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 9). Returning to a Zizekian-Lacanian frame (Lacan, 
1989; Žižek, 2006; 2008), I argue that the be – longing we strive for (or taught to desire) rests 
on the co-ordinates of ‘Whiteness’. The Symbolic as a racialising order (Salih, 2002) requires 
we all repudiate the ‘Real’ (abject) of ourselves – symbolised in ‘Blackness’ – to secure an 
esteemed place in belonging. Thus, racialising imperatives, expressed in the material 
accomplishments of home in places of affluence, seem to structure  ‘be – longing’ in post-
apartheid South Africa. 
 
1.4.7.  Chapter Eight: Conclusion 
In this final chapter, I recapitulate the purpose and findings of the research, the main 
contribution and limitations. I reflect on possible ‘misrepresentations’ of the data and how 
these lend coherence and sense-making to the texts. I reflect on how such interpretations 
easily slide into psychoanalysis as a master discourse (Saville Young, 2014) that may conceal 
other ways in which the text might be read (Parker, 2014). 
 
Pulling together the various strands of analysis, I argue that the performativities of be – longing 
masks our very alienations that are covered over by the idyllic yet precarious fantasy of home. 
I reflect on what it means to be ‘at home’ in post-apartheid South Africa; where belonging is 
predicated on what is feared and desired, yet perpetually haunted by what is left behind. 
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Chapter Two: Literature Review – Performativities of Belonging 
 
“If anyone, anywhere, anytime, feels fully ‘at home’, they are not paying attention” 
(Clingman, 2004, p. 61). 
 
2.1.  Introduction  
Home connotes safety and familiarity. The search and longing for home has become pressing 
in an age of global uncertainty, profound change and displacement. As Duyvendak (2011) 
argues, the world is increasingly homesick (for the places of origin) and nostalgic (for the ‘good 
old days’). Home, therefore, reflects a desire to stabilise the disruptions of identity arising from 
the loss of place (Woodward, 2002). In a world we experience as increasingly alienating, it 
offers the promise of return, unity, fullness and stability (Brickell, 2012; Nichols, 2008).  It is 
through the trope of home that articulations of belonging come to be figured (Yuval-Davis, 
2006).  
The simplicity of the statement, ‘I belong here’, evokes an intuitive knowing that often requires 
little interrogation to understand its meaning (Antonsich, 2010). However, only when we 
deconstruct belonging, we become acquainted with its underside – the very anxieties, 
uncertainties, instabilities, and (pre)conditions upon which our ‘being at home in the world’ 
rests. The question of home and belonging, therefore, cannot stand outside questions of 
identity (Who am I? Who am I not?) and location (Where am I? Where am I not?). The spaces1 
we choose to place our bodies, spaces we desire to belong and spaces we feel ‘stuck’ in, 
have profound implications for how we belong (Rowe, 2005). When we begin to think through 
these uncertainties, instabilities and (pre)conditions of our belonging(s), perhaps we can draw 
on Kamala Visweswaran’s (1994, p. 111) pronouncement that “home, once interrogated, is a 
place we’ve never before been”. I borrow this statement, to suit the framing for this research, 
to show the alienations in our belonging(s). 
As a starting point in this chapter, following Bell (1999), I argue that belonging is not an 
ontological given but an achievement. I use this performative lens to navigate the literature to 
elucidate the conceptual coordinates that guide scholarship on belonging and home. Of 
specific interest to this thesis is the relationship between affect and power – how we perform 
belonging through affect and how we use affect to manage difference.  I discuss the limits of 
each approach to understanding the workings of power; how this produces an affective 
economy that governs collective relations of being, doing and becoming (Ahmed, 2001; 
 
1 Reference to ‘space’ here follows de Certeau (1984, p. 117) distinction: “space is a practiced place”, 
produced and meaningfully effected by an “ensemble of movements”, as spoken word, a written text, 
a system of signs, geometrically defined, envisioned and practically transformed.  
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2004a; 2004b). The purpose here is to examine broadly how various approaches explore the 
subject of ‘emotions’, ‘feelings’ and ‘affects’ concerning questions of home and belonging 
(Woodward, 2002). I explore the extent to which each approach gives insight into the 
questions of home as a psychosocial project of belonging; not simply elucidating how we 
perform belonging, but why we invest in belongings that are not always in our best interests.  
In other words, we submit to conditions of subordination (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008), yet 
partake in these investments as desiring agents (Bracher, 1993). Following Lähdesmäki et al. 
(2016), I argue for a performative approach that transcends the conceptual binary of belonging 
dimensions. Although not intended to be studied as such (Yuval-Davis, 2006), research on 
belonging tends to conform to a conceptual binary of feeling versus talk. The former, informed 
by phenomenology and existentialism, explores ‘place belongingness’ as an intimate, ‘inner’ 
feeling connected to ‘being at home’. The latter, as a discursive practice, informed by social 
constructionism and feminism, is evinced as a politics of belonging (Antonsich, 2010).  
2.2 Place-Belongingness: Feeling ‘At Home’ in the World 
Influences by humanistic geography in the 1970s and 1980s, home was often the idealised 
“site of authenticity and experience”. It offered joy, retreat, safety, belonging and sense of 
place from the outside world, perceived and experienced as alienating and anxiety-provoking 
(Brickell, 2012, p. 226). This body of work stood apart from positivist modes of inquiry. For 
example, behavioural geography and environmental psychology, two disciplines informed by 
positivist research, had offered a disembodied view of the subject. Positivist approaches have 
rendered a mechanistic view of the self-place relationship. Individual perceptions, attitudes 
and values were seen as measurable and capable of yielding statistical models of spatial 
decision-making, cognitive and mental mapping (Downs & Stea, 1973 as cited in Pile, 1996).  
Humanistic research was, therefore, influential on two accounts. It re-centred the subject and 
reclaimed the body as a site of knowing (Cromby, 2005). The focus was on humanising 
individuals’ unique relationships to place, seeing this as founded on emotional attachment as 
the basis of meaning and identity (e.g., Tuan, 2004). Relph (1976, as cited in Antonsich, 2010, 
p. 125), for instance, articulated that ‘home’ is “an attachment to a particular setting, a 
particular environment, in comparison with which all other associations with places have only 
limited significance”. This conceptualisation seemed to rest on a view of attachment as 
authentic, deeply rooted and internalised or as a superficial or fleeting connection (Di Masso 
et al., 2014). This research, framed from existentialism and phenomenology, viewed the body 
as a site of authentic experience and feeling. Here, Tuan (2004) offered a view of “how 
belonging happens” by Lorimer’s (2005, p. 86) recount:  
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Home that can be directly experienced – not just seen, but heard, smelled, and touched 
– is necessarily a small and intimate world. It is this direct experience that gives home 
its power to elicit a powerful emotional response.  
Studies in this domain elucidate the analytical dimension of place-belongingness, “a personal, 
intimate, feeling of being ‘at home’ in a place” (Antonsich, 2010, p. 644) grounded in perception 
and experience (Tuan, 2004). Feelings of belonging are viewed as intrinsic to the processes 
of self-formation (Antonsich, 2010). This scholarship is less interested in how belonging is 
used discursively to include or exclude others. Instead, belonging is expressed as a personal, 
intimate expression of being (Antonsich, 2010).  
The value of this body of work is that it privileges the ordinary experience of individuals’ 
conscious and situated meaning-making and tries to render this knowing in humanising ways 
(Dixon & Condor, 2011). However, the place-belongingness research assumes an ordered, 
simplistic and binarised world; thus reflecting a  decontextualised individualism (Antonsich, 
2010a; Brickell, 2012). Its inattention to the deeper social structures offered a depoliticised 
view of reality (Pile, 1996). The notion of ‘home’ as ‘belonging’ is problematic on various fronts. 
For one, it overlooks the potentially divisive relationship between ‘belonging’ and ‘identity’. 
Feeling ‘at home’, whilst a significant subjective experience, is, however, a discriminating one 
that connects to sentiments about who belongs and who does not ‘belong where’ (Duyvendak, 
2011). People may feel a sense of belonging to a place they call ‘home’, simultaneously 
knowing who else “rightfully belongs” but also who does not belong (Hedetoft & Hjort, 2002). 
To problematise this feeling dimension requires an expanded conceptualisation of belonging 
beyond the phenomenological/existential lens. This expanded lens entails exploring how “an 
integral part of feeling ‘at home’ may derive from the comforting realisation of others’ absence” 
(Dixon & Durrheim, 2004, p. 459). In this respect, an exploration of place belongingness by 
necessity must include a politics of belonging (Antonsich, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2006). 
 
2.3. The Politics of Belonging 
John Crowley (1999, as cited in Yuval-Davis, 2006, p. 204) defines the politics of belonging 
as the “dirty work of boundary maintenance” to separate ‘us’ from ‘them’. Distinguished from 
the politics of identity, the term ‘politics of belonging’ attempts to subvert the fixity implied by 
‘identity’ (Gerharz, as cited in Lähdesmäki et al., 2016). The notion of home as a political space 
overturned romanticised assumptions. It exposed home as a site of struggle (Johnston & 
Valentine, 1995), an assemblage of unequal social relations (McFarlane, 2011), and 
patriarchal oppression, violence and fear (Burman & Chantler, 2004). Foregrounded by 
second-wave feminism’s disruption of the personal-political divide, scholarship highlighted 
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ambiguities and complexities of home on various political fronts: gender, identity, community 
and empire (Blunt, 2005; Christou, 2011; O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010). Feelings of safety, 
intimacy, solidarity were derived simultaneously through oppressive acts of violence, 
exclusion and alienation (Blunt, 2005; Mallett, 2004). This movement instigated a new field of 
inquiry, a ‘critical’ geographies of home. The conceptual shift centred home as material site 
and imaginative practice interconnected with power and identity. More than merely a domestic 
location, critical scholars saw home in multi-scalar dimensions that ranged from the personal 
to the political (Brickell, 2012; Fenster, 2005), and local to transnational (Christou, 2011; 
Marcu, 2014; O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010). 
 
As Yuval-Davis (2006) showed, we perform boundary work through discursive constructions. 
Moreover, these are derived from our social locations, experiences, narratives and ideologies 
that inform our ethical values or political stance. Whilst emotional attachment is a major theme 
in constructions of belonging (Yuval-Davis, 2006), the place of emotions in a politics of 
belonging is less scrutinised (Lähdesmäki et al., 2016). Discursive psychology too suffers from 
similar limitations. Earlier scholarship, in particular, focused on the domain of talk as echoing 
a wider politics of belonging (Dixon & Durrheim, 2004; Dixon, Foster, Durrheim & Wilbrahim, 
1994; Dixon, Reicher & Foster, 1997) to the neglect of feeling dimensions. In the next section, 
I review some of this work and argue that discursive approaches to belonging are limited. With 
rhetorical constructions of belonging (and spatial discourses) as the primary interest, this 
scholarship offered a constraining perspective of emotions, mainly viewed as discursive and 
confined to the domain of talk (McAvoy, 2015). 
 
2.3.1 The rhetoric of belonging  
The idea of home as a discursive formation was a subversive move. According to Rus (2006), 
it ushered in questions pertaining to epistemology (i.e., where or what is represented in 
‘home’?).  The ‘discursive turn’ was a challenge to Cartesian perspectives that presupposed 
a unitary model of identity (Barcinski & Kalia, 2005). Discursive approaches turned to the 
arena of talk. These scholars saw talk as constituting mind and reality; not merely an 
expression of internal thoughts and feelings, nor as a transparent medium to represent reality 
(Di Masso et al., 2014; Shotter, 1993). This social constructionist view regards lived 
experiences and derived meanings as openly visible social doings or acts, actively created in 
the day-to-day of talk and interaction (Billig et al., 1988; Di Masso et al., 2014; Du Bois, 2012). 
From this more critical perspective, questions of home and belonging are integral to identity 
politics, which by and large, were viewed as “a politics of the creation of difference” (Cillia, 
Reisigl & Wodak, 1999, p. 5). This political lens opened an inquiry into the ideological traditions 
  
 
27 
spoken through ordinary language, dialogically with others or in conversations with the self 
(Dixon & Durrheim, 2000; Dixon et al., 1997).  
 
Indeed, different traditions of discursive scholarship have shown talk about belonging is itself 
a performance of power. This was seen as bound up in constructions of difference and/or 
sameness (Cillia, et al., 1999; Dixon & Durrheim, 2003; Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; Jearey-
Graham & Böhmke, 2013; Kraus, 2006; Skey, 2011) that, at times, leaned on essentialist 
notions of nation, ethnicity and ‘race’ in claims to citizenship (Cillia et al. 1999; Malhi, Boon & 
Rogers, 2009; Nordberg, 2006). A myriad of discursive strategies and/or positionings, 
including, constructions of ‘we’-ness and ‘other’-ness (Cillia et al., 1999; Jersey-Graham & 
Böhmke, 2013), accounting for ethnicity in ‘being’, ‘doing’ and ‘feeling’ (Malhi et al, 2009), and 
blaming, derogating, justifying, excusing (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000) was highlighted. This body 
of work showed how ordinary talk works to exclude ‘others’ and sustain power relationships. 
From this perspective, belonging could is a construction of identity, through which we 
positioned ourselves relative to others (Kraus, 2006). We need to legitimate how we belong, 
and we achieve this by showing ourselves as ‘insiders’ through actively articulating our social 
locations (Shotter, 1993; Torkington, 2011). This work has been particularly useful as it 
articulates identity “not [as] present in us but [as] ‘structured by, or constituted by difference’” 
(Currie, as cited in Kraus, 2006, p. 106). Talk here is understood as the primary avenue 
through which identity and belonging are performed and configured through adherence to the 
rules of discourse (Parker, 2015b). 
 
2.3.2 The ‘grounds of identity’ 
However, questions of home and belonging are not merely about identity politics – the 
question of ‘who we are’ is also inextricably linked to ‘where we are’ (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). 
Trudeau (2006, p. 434) similarly argues that the boundary between ‘us’ and ‘them’ is not simply 
an abstract division but is “articulated on the ground, in the construction, reconstruction and 
contestation of spaces”. Extending discursive psychology to the self-place relationship 
heralded a political understanding of belonging as the ‘grounds of identity’ (Dixon et al., 1997; 
Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). The emphasis was on the interrelationship between places and 
social identities, and how power geometries of place are spoken through discourse 
(Torkington, 2011). Increasingly, scholarship burgeoned in which spatial discourse became 
the explicit focus (Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002; Saff, 2001; Taylor, 2009; Torkington, 2011; 
Trudeau, 2006). Rather than viewing place as a static container for identities (i.e., 
environmental psychology), this body of work conceived of place-identity as socially created, 
and interactionally derived (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). Some of this work focused on how 
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individuals perform and negotiate their relationships to place, identity and belonging (Taylor, 
2009). The more critical discursive scholarship showed these performances as rooted in 
ideology (Di Masso et al., 2014; Dixon et al., 1997; Durrheim et al., 2013), and furthermore 
that such practices were spatialised (Dixon & Durrheim, 2000). Everyday talk, as ‘lived 
ideologies’ (Billig et al., 1988) were viewed as acts of self-location that sustain structural 
relations of inequality and oppression. At the same time, they secure long-established patterns 
of social privilege (Ballard, 2010; Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Durrheim et al., 2013; Hook & 
Vrdolijak, 2002).  
 
Discourses of place-belonging, for example, disguised underpinnings of racist, classist and 
xenophobic ideologies (Dixon et al., 1994; Dixon et al., 1997; Low, 2001). Saff (2001) showed 
exclusionary discursive practices employed by ‘white’ suburban residents against ‘black’ 
squatters. Racial prejudice was camouflaged through idealisations of ‘own’ space (in 
depictions of beauty, nature, and cleanliness), and vilifications of ‘other’ spaces in depictions 
of disease, dirt, and crime. Similarly, Dixon et al. (1997) found that the community rhetoric 
against desegregation was justified based on the ‘out-of-placeness’ of an emergent ‘black’ 
squatter community in an area previously designated as ‘white’. Through place constructions, 
the squatter community was depicted as ‘foreign’, or as visual pollution (“festering sore”, 
“sprawling blot on the landscape”, “eyesore”). These served to reinforce an “ideology of the 
(racial) slum” to govern space and exclude the other (Dixon et al., 1997, p. 338). These studies 
emphasise the banality of such depictions, such that they become naturalised properties of 
place (e.g., as unspoilt beauty). These depictions have the effect of fuelling ideological power 
in surreptitious and taken-for-granted ways (Billig, as cited in Dixon et al., 1997).  
 
These crucial contributions have broadened the lens of discursive approaches to place identity 
research.  The inclusion of non-discursive lived performances of belonging (Dixon & Durrheim, 
2003; Durrheim & Dixon, 2004; 2005) and Foucauldian discourse (Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002; 
Kern, 2010; Gold & Revill, 2003) has brought into focus previously taken-for-granted ways in 
which belonging is ‘written onto the landscape’ (Skein, 2009). In the next section, I briefly 
review this scholarship, appraising the extent to which it offers insight into affect and the 
performativity of belonging. 
 
2.4 Embodied and Materialised Belongings 
These studies foregrounded the territorialisation of physical space through an examination of 
the materialised boundaries and embodied practices that constitute a politics of belonging to 
produce exclusion by setting the norms and standards for belonging. Place-identity discursive 
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psychologists expanded their domain of inquiry to encompass a dual focus on linguistic activity 
and non-discursive domains (i.e., embodied spatial-temporal practices) (Dixon & Durrheim, 
2003; 2005). This paralleled developments by Foucauldian-inspired critical geography 
scholars (Ballard, 2004; England & Simon, 2010; Gold & Revill, 2003; Kern, 2010) who 
similarly focused on how spatial and material practices mould the external world.  
 
Here, the landscape itself was viewed as a lived practice, a medium through which ideology 
comes into full operation to regulate the aesthetic, moral and social order (Gold & Revill, 2003; 
Gold & Revill, 2014; Smith, 2010; Trudeau, 2006).  This body of work highlighted the symbolic 
structuring of everyday life through material sites and socio-spatial practices, such as 
shopping malls, public parks, business parks, and gated communities. Common to these 
spatial practices were aggressive forms of defensive architecture, for example, the 
deployment of security guards, gates, electrified fencing, walls (e.g., Ballard, 2005; Davis, 
1990; Grant & Mittelsteadt, 2004; Hook & Vrdoljak, 2002; Kuppinger, 2004; Murray, 2011).  
Therefore, both discursive psychologists and critical geographers were interested in how 
power was expressed in seemingly innocuous everyday lived experience and practice. For 
example, Durrheim and Dixon (2005) explored patterns of beach-going activity among 
holidaymakers engaged in ordinary activities, such as relaxing on the beach. Patterns of talk 
had a deictic quality in which interviewees made reference to visual happenings on the 
beachfront. These revealed an intergroup tension between holidaymakers that played out 
visually and spatially in segregated forms, for example, retreat (‘white flight’) and influx (‘black 
invasion’), showing racism to be “tangibly grounded in forms of life” (p. 458).  
 
Scholars from wide-ranging disciplines (e.g., Ballard, 2004; Gold & Revill. 2003; Hook & 
Vrdolijak, 2002; Lemanski, 2006; Low, 2001) explored how discursive and spatial strategies 
were used to recreate a ‘comfort zone’ in an unhomely post-apartheid space. Here, ‘white 
flight’ was explored as semigration (or partial emigration), the retreat of typically ‘white’ 
population groups into enclosed neighbourhoods and gated communities, policed 
architecturally in high perimeter walls, fenced-off roads, security booms, security checkpoints, 
etc.  These “physical statements” can, therefore, be seen as inscriptions of power onto space, 
pronouncing who belongs and who is excluded (Ballard, 2004, p. 63; Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002).  
 
However, these overtly spatial practices of exclusion are not explicitly racist as Ballard (2004), 
and others (Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002; Caldeira, 2000; Cock, 2008) have argued. The exclusive 
gated community as the space of ‘white’ achievement (Ballard, 2004) conspicuously displayed 
and announced in material symbols of affluence, wealth and distinction (e.g., state-of-the-art 
surveillance, paramilitary-style influx control mechanisms) (Rofe, 2006), at the same time, 
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disguise operations of racial exclusion. What is kept out through boundary discourses and 
practices is the criminal, the underclass, and shantytowns. These are depicted as spaces of 
visual disorder – as “a ‘scar’, an eyesore’ … and a ‘sprawling blot on the landscape’” (Dixon 
et al. 1998, p. 332). These signals of distinction, for instance, are viewed as disciplinary 
technologies to produce a normalising sameness within, while keeping deviations outside 
(Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002). Hook and Vrdolijak (2002) and others (Cock, 2008; Schein, 2009) 
argue that the rhetoric of crime prevention, advanced by security park developers and 
residents alike exceed their stated goals. They conceal a more powerful political rationale of 
(racial) exclusion, separation and privilege. Moreover, these modes of distinction cannot 
operate in singular autonomy, as Hook and Vrdolijak (2002) argue, but are constituted by what 
is left outside. Gold and Revill (2003, p. 41) highlight the inscriptions of power onto space: 
“landscapes that express power and privilege are always the flip side of landscapes of 
exploitation and disadvantage”. 
 
2.5 Belonging as a politics of the gaze 
However, the physical landscape itself is not only a lived practice (daily engagements with the 
world), or the outcome of material practice. It also presents specific ‘ways of seeing’ the social 
world. Critical geographers have explored the social patterning of society through the material 
arrangements of space (Gold & Revill, 2003; Rofe, 2006; Trudeau, 2006). These all-seeing 
architectural structures how daily experiences are lived. Gold and Revill (2003) argue that 
landscapes of privilege (gated communities, enclosed spaces) are extensions of a naturalised 
visual order that simultaneously produces exiled spaces of urban decay (shanty towns, 
ghettos). In this respect, the visual is another modality of performativity that, as Butler (1993) 
illustrates, is governed and constrained by the operations of race on “what it means to ‘see’ 
(p. 16).  What counts as normal or deviant, truth or fiction is contested in relation to the visual 
plane (Bell, 1999).   
 
Other scholarship explores how the boundaries of ‘white’ space – gated communities as 
“whitopias” (del Guadalupe Davidson, 2013, p. 34) – are policed and regulated (Havis, 2013; 
Onwuachi-Willig, 2016; Polizzi, 2013) through visual practices. For example, the out-of-place 
‘black’ body in ‘white’ spaces is depicted as “a falter in the visual field”, persistently constructed 
as the site of danger, threat and fear (Hillin, n.d., p. 2). The depictions of such bodies being 
out-of-place represent forms of geographical demarcation (Onwuachi-Willig, 2016; Polizzi, 
2013). Butler argues that the visual field, far from eliciting neutrally derived perception, is itself 
a powerful racial episteme governed by a mode of  seeing that (re)produces itself. This mode 
of seeing moreover rests on historically derived notions of blackness which become well-
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rehearsed through their ritualised (re)production. The link between racialised visual repertoires 
and the performativity of belonging is valuable (Bell, 1999), particularly in understanding how 
person-place slippages conceal the racist ideologies, for example, through references to 
visual pollution by squatter camps (Dixon et al., 1997). This body of work extends the study of 
self-and-other place relationships beyond talk to the site of visuality. Belonging, therefore, can 
also be viewed as ways of seeing ourselves and others that play out bodily, relationally, 
materially and spatially.  
 
The discursive scholarship has offered expanded views of place-identity to unveil the 
collective dimensions between people, identities and the material world and their ideological 
bases (Dixon et al., 1997; Dixon & Durrheim, 2000; Trudeau, 2006). Some of this work 
references the role of emotional attachments (e.g., Cillia et al., 1999) and feeling discourses 
(Malhi et al., 2009). Others highlight narratives of loss of place and identity that evoke 
nostalgia, alienation and displacement (Ballard, 2004; Dixon and Durrheim, 2004; Marcu, 
2014). Other scholars (Cock, 2008; Hook & Vrdolijak, 2002) look towards emotions as 
legitimating rationales (fear of crime, desire for quality of life) for segregationist practices that 
disguise ideologies of racism and privilege (Cock, 2008).  
 
In all these accounts, emotions are offered as the backdrop rather than foregrounded as a 
point of interest. Moreover, with its emphasis on emotions as discursive themes or part of the 
rhetorical work, the role of affect in the construction and constitution of difference remains 
somewhat under-explored. This narrowed inquiry means that lived experiences outside of 
discourse are overlooked (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005). Some of the Foucauldian-inspired critical 
geographies, while valuable in exploring boundary-making beyond the linguistic sphere to 
encompass the material, spatial and visual planes, tend to focus on the end-products or static 
effects of power. What remains overlooked is how affect and power conjoin to ‘affect’ the 
asymmetries of belonging — not merely as outcomes/effects or legitimising rationales, but as 
dynamic, fluid, situated and unfolding activity, practice and process in the making of home. 
These processes and practices include embodied action, relative to affective flows in ordinary 
exchanges through the bodies, words, gestures, gazes, etc. to constitute subjectivity and 
produce feeling landscapes of (non)belonging (Durrheim et al., 2013; Wetherell, 2013).  
 
Lähdesmäki et al. (2016, p. 7) argue that future scholarship needs to think through belonging 
in ways that transcend the dichotomy of place-belongingness as feeling from the politics of 
belonging. This requires a conceptual shift to thinking about belonging in critical ways, as 
embodied, affective and socially constructed practice (Lähdesmäki et al., 2016). The ‘affective 
turn’ in the social sciences signalled an attempt to rectify the seeming neglect of emotions in 
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place identity research and its treatment as a political matter (Clough, 2007). As I argue in the 
next section, non-representational approaches aim to centralise the relationship between 
power and affect more explicitly than earlier discursive studies on place-identity. The non-
representational model of affect in some ways offers a revised metaphor of “pipes and cables” 
(Thrift, 2004, p. 58) as opposed to container models of humanistic and phenomenological 
inquiry. This scholarship shows the how of affective practice as opposed to emotions as 
expressed feelings. However, as Wetherell (2012) argues, the non-representational model 
forecloses possibilities for thinking of how belonging is performed across integrated domains 
of experience: affect, talk, embodiment, space, and materiality. 
 
2.6 Non-Representational Theory: Spatialities of Affect 
Scholarship influenced by the ‘affective turn’ sought to differentiate affect from emotions. 
Emotions represent the bodily states that have been captured and organised by discourse, 
culture, consciousness and human subjectivity. Affect, on the other hand, is the obscure, 
autonomous, unreflective, unprocessed, chaotic and “out of mind” states (Massoumi, as citied 
in Wetherell, 2012. P. 57; Thrift, 2000). Thien (2005, p. 451; emphasis my own) argues that 
affect is the “how of emotion”; literally and communicatively the “motion of emotion” and how 
they attach themselves to “things, people, ideas, sensations, relations, activities, ambitions, 
institutions … and other affects” (Sedgwick, 2003, p. 19).  This perspective has some 
convergences with discursive social psychology.  Both view emotions as unknowable and, in 
accords with a Foucauldian-Butlerian view, does not take residence in a preexisting subject 
or doer behind the doing (Durrheim et al., 2013). This transhuman perspective renders the 
theory more politically relevant. Seeing emotions as external to bodies, and in the context of 
intersubjective relations, is a decidedly political move. Such a view is contrasted against 
humanistic accounts of subjective feeling as known and sensed “within” the individual body 
(Thien, 2005; Thrift, 2004; Williams, 2001).  
However, the non-representational model also presents affect as split entirely from the domain 
of speech. Affect, viewed as having a different site and logic, has translated the “turn to affect” 
(Clough & Halley, 2007, p. 2) as the turn away from discourse. The former attempts to capture 
the sensual that escapes speaking and discourse, and thinking and observation in 
representational forms (McAvoy, 2015; Wetherell, 2013). Specifically, non-representational 
theorists sought to overcome what the deadlocks in textual meaning and the categorical 
nature of identity politics (Lorimer, 2005). The proposal in this respect was to theorise and 
allow affective intensities to exceed the discursive frame as expressed in “everyday routines, 
fleeting encounters, embodied movements, precognitive triggers, enduring urges, 
unexceptional interactions and sensuous dispositions” (Lorimer, 2005, p. 84). 
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Like discursive approaches, non-representational approaches transcend phenomenological 
accounts of home. The emotional ambiguities of home as safety and retreat (Lorimer, 2005) 
are acknowledged, as well as the role of space as sites for affective belonging and emotional 
release (Darling, 2010). Moreover, credence is given to the embodied, spatial and material 
dimensions – for example, walking as a way of thinking and feeling attachment (O’Neill & 
Hubbard, 2010). However, there are two main limitations of non-representational approaches. 
First, although much conceptual effort is made to separate and capture raw affect from its 
mediated representations in discourse and narrative, on an empirical level, this body of work 
fails to show this neat separation. The use of methods (e.g., walking, cooking and place-
sharing) to capture sensuous ways of performing belonging (Johnston & Longhurst, 2012; 
O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010), reverts to mediated forms of representation that are reliant on 
descriptions of participants’ speech interpreted narrative.  
For Wetherell (2012; 2013), this not only highlights the impossibility of separating affect from 
talk in the flow of social activity but its attempts to do so fall back to a Cartesian logic of mind-
body dualism. Consequently, this disconnected view tends to overlook the workings of power 
through multi-faceted modalities of performative action (McAvoy, 2015; Wetherell, 2013). 
Second, its attention to situated affect in the presently unfolding moments (May & Thrift, 2001) 
of social life (Darling, 2010; O’Neill & Hubbard, 2010) tends to lose sight of the historical past. 
These past experiences, autobiographies, practices and habits, geo-memories and 
remembered landscapes are central to informing the moments of performativity and our 
affective becoming (Jones, 2011; Tolia-Kelly, 2006; Zembylas, 2016).  
The affective turn in discursive psychology has attempted to reconnect affect to thought 
(England & Simon, 2010; Kern, 2010; Wetherell, 2013; Durrheim et al., 2013) as a productive 
way out of this impasse. In some ways, it has attempted to introduce an ongoingness to social 
practice (Wetherell, 2013). In turn, Ahmed’s (2004) generative account of how the affective 
economy derived from circulation of emotions, offers a logic to the relationship between affect, 
value and power, as sustained by histories of production. In the following section, I draw on 
these frameworks as a fruitful way forward in thinking about the performativity of belonging 
that is simultaneously psychic and social. In doing so, however, I also point to their limitations. 
2.7 Affective Economies in Relations of Belonging  
Both discursive psychologists (Di Masso et al., 2014; Durrheim et al., 2013; Wetherell, 2012; 
2013) and cultural theorists (Ahmed, 2001; 2004a; 2004b) offer a way to reconnect affect to 
thought, but each offer diverging views on affect. I argue that both are needed to move the 
performativity of belonging in a direction that is explicitly affective and simultaneously 
psychosocial. Ahmed (2004a; 2004b) draws from a post-structuralist and performativity frame 
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to position affect as a form of cultural politics. Her main argument is that affect circulates; it 
resides neither within or without individual bodies but surfaces to “materialise characters, 
textual figures and social relations” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 156). Of specific interest to Ahmed is 
how affect circulates from words (e.g., in print media, speeches, narratives, etc.) and how 
these, in turn, build multiple social worlds in concrete and practical ways. The subject and 
nation are produced by reading (by extension seeing) the ‘other’ as the cause of the emotional 
response. For example, narratives that imagine the ‘white’ man whose livelihood is threatened 
by the presence of imagined others who will take the jobs, undermine security, commit crime 
etc., evokes an emotional response of hate (Ahmed, 2004b). By this account, objects of hate 
and love are not intrinsic but acquired and materialised their construction. Affect is, therefore, 
a relation that constitutes both its objects and subjects (Wetherell, 2012).  
 
These constructions, though appearing “cut off from its histories of production” (Ahmed, 
2004b, p. 36) are in actuality repetitions of past associations and performances (Butler, 1999).  
In this respect, emotions are performative, and at the same time, by Ahmed’s account, the 
performative is emotive. Each encounter re-opens particular histories that re-articulates and 
re-designates some bodies as being more hateful than others. Though emotions do not belong 
to bodies, they stick onto some bodies to produce fear, repulsion or hate, for example, while 
sliding over others. Each encounter moves us backwards, forwards, and sideways through 
“sticky associations” that operate metonymically (Ahmed, 2004a, p. 33). For example, 
immigration read as the invasion of the national body, or the ‘black’ body read as diseased 
and dirt-ridden (Ahmed, 2004a). Rather than psychologising emotions, Ahmed (2004b, p. 26) 
instead views emotions as doing things – specifically, as practices that work to “align 
individuals with collectives – or bodily space with social space”, what she terms the ‘affective 
economy’. The psychosocial nature of emotions is evident here in its effect of materialising 
social and psychic worlds (Wetherell, 2012).   
 
Ahmed’s (2004a; 2004b) account of emotions is an intriguing one that offers fruitful direction 
for a sophisticated understanding of belonging. Current scholarship tends to rely on a dualistic 
understanding of belonging along individual-feeling dimensions and social-political 
dimensions (Antonsich, 2010; Yuval-Davis, 2006). Although discursive studies emphasise the 
individual-collective relation, what they downplay is the role of affect in the realm of talk. From 
the discursive camp, however, Wetherell (2012, p. 160) argues that Ahmed’s “completely 
disembodied account” of affect relegates it to the realm of mystery, awkwardly suspended 
between the cultural and phenomenological. Wetherell (2013) instead argues for a more 
concrete view – not one that is defined by the movement of affect in abstract terms – but, 
following Butler (as cited in McNay, 2008) as embedded in situational activity. In this respect, 
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Wetherell (2012, p. 159) argues that we need to locate affect “in actual bodies and social 
actors” that do the work of communicating and relating. Thus, social exclusions in practice are 
not the outcome of signs per se that stick and slide over the other at various points, but the 
result of negotiation and practice where embodiment and discourse are entangled.  Seemingly 
dismissive of Ahmed’s theory, Wetherell (2013, p. 30) nevertheless accedes to a view of 
affective practice that encompasses a movement of signs. However, she adds further that “the 
moment of recruitment” is where the body states are drawn into synchronous composition with 
multiple modes of meaning-making activity to effect practice. These include thoughts, 
interactions, “narratives, interpretive repertoires, social relations, personal histories, and ways 
of life” (p. 14). 
 
By and large, these elements, particularly the emphasis on “articulation of talk and embodied 
practice” (Durrheim et al., 2011, p. 133) and affect as “at once spectral and embodied” 
(England & Simon, 2010, p. 205) have mobilised new interest in place-attachment and 
affective spatialities, particularly in how affect is mobilised and constituted in contexts of 
belonging. This scholarship offers an expanded view of emotionality as socially/culturally 
constructed, embodied, relational, situated, socially circulated and spatial (Askins, 2016; 
Christou, 2011; Di Masso et al., 2014; Durrheim et al., 2013; England & Simon, 2010; Kern, 
2010; Lewicka, 2011). Di Masso et al. (2014, p. 83) conceptualised place attachment emotions 
as the “emergent product of a complex interplay of bodily practices, material architecture and 
artifacts” that conjunctively work to “(re)create affective ‘experiences’ of place”. Durrheim et 
al. (2013) showed how ‘vibe’ as an affective register of clubbing as a performative site (e.g., 
through material displays, routines of behaviour and dress codes), reproduced privilege in 
gendered terms. The sense of (not) belonging (feeling judged, not dressing a certain way, 
being looked at suggestively, not fitting in) comprised embodied practices. This alignment of 
talk and feelings worked to constitute and derive an affective geography that excludes bodies 
that failed to perform the norms of the clubbing atmosphere. In broader geographical terms, 
Christou (2011) explored spatialised performativities among the Greek diaspora in Denmark 
to show how emotionalities, through narrations and embodiments in diasporic space, produce 
and constitute their own and others’ belongings and exclusions. In these studies, 
performances were entangled in structures of power to shape particular meanings of race, 
gender, culture and nation, that translated to dividing practices.  
 
Last, studies that emphasise the visuality domain in affective geographies explore how fear of 
the city is related to ‘others’ who perceived as threatening and how this elicits an “acting 
through fear” (England & Simon, 2010, p. 205). Moreover, as Smith (2010) argues, it is also 
one’s identity (race, class, gender, etc.) that ‘affects’ mobility, access, and belonging in the 
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city.  Kern (2010) elevates sight to a privileged position to show how pleasure and danger are 
commodified through images (pictorial advertisements) and experience. In particular, she 
reveals how these work to interpellate the female buyer, who is at once fearful and adventure-
seeking, towards new gentrification projects that exclude the dangerous ‘other’. In these 
studies, seeing and being seen are powerful performances of belonging that simultaneously 
produce affective responses. 
 
2.8 Be – Longing: From Power to Desire 
In all these accounts, power is the instrument through which affective practices of privilege 
are maintained over time.  These sustain an ongoingness through recitations of historically 
normed practices of privilege, of race, gender, class or otherwise (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b; 
Durrheim et al., 2013; Kern, 2010; Wetherell, 2012; 2013). This view is in line with other critical 
emotions scholarship (Zembylas, 2016) that views emotions neither as essentialised nor 
socially determined. These developments offer a conceptual shift towards a performativity of 
belonging as the ritualistic citation of norms that constitute its own making – its sense and 
materiality of belonging. Both Ahmed’s (2004a; 2004b) and Wetherell’s (2012; 2013) views of 
affect are valuable in making room for understanding the continuity of practices, so far not 
adequately considered in humanistic, discursive and non-representational approaches. By 
Wetherell’s (2012, p. 23) account, the ongoingness of affective practice is sustained by 
habitual practice or affective citation where we “endlessly plagiarise our own and others’ past 
practice”. Similarly, for Ahmed (2001, p. 347) it is the revoking of past associations in present 
encounters where a different future is imagined, for example, “where ‘they’ will not be ‘here’”, 
in turn producing hate as an affective economy. 
 
What these accounts miss, with their focus on disciplinary power, is the place and role of 
desire in the call to belonging. Although there are some exceptions (e.g., Kern, 2010), the 
burgeoning scholarship on emotional and affective geographies tend to emphasise the effects 
of exclusion, hate, repudiation, and fear (England & Simon, 2010). Rowe (2005, p. 15) writes, 
that “Be Longing” is an interpellative command in which we are hailed, not merely as 
disciplined subjects but as desiring agents. These accounts of affective circulation (Ahmed, 
2004a; 2004b) and affective practice (Wetherell, 2013), though immensely valuable in 
showing the historical repetitions of power and affect onto the present relational enactments, 
are not sufficient to explain hegemonic performativities of belonging. The “moment of 
recruitment”, the ‘capture’ of body states in participation with other modalities of performance, 
as Wetherell (2013, p. 30) argues, is overlooked in Ahmed’s (2004a; 2004b) account. At the 
same time, this ‘moment’ is not clearly elaborated in Wetherell’s concept of affective practice, 
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despite its more concrete approach to understanding the workings of affect and power. Both 
accounts, with their focus on citations, rituals, and repetitions, do not fully capture the ‘grip’ 
that beckons us and sustains us in how and where we choose to ‘be – long’. Perhaps this 
“moment of recruitment” might be further understood through an alternative perspective. If we 
are to conceive of interpellations of belonging, not merely as discursive and embodied but, 
more powerfully, as ideological fantasy (Žižek, 1989), we move beyond power as disciplinary 
to power as desire and unconscious fantasy. I argue that desire is what sustains the “grip of 
ideology” (Glynos, 2001, p. 191).   
 
A psychoanalytic frame proves valuable here to explicate why we invest in ‘being hailed’ to 
particular subject positions (Woodward, 2002). In the next chapter, I turn to a Lacanian-
Žižekian framework to explore affect in relation to desire, fantasy and enjoyment. Rus (2006) 
argues that the question of home cannot merely rely on the status of knowledge. Instead, it is 
a process of becoming that extends beyond identity politics to consider the structural dynamics 
of desire and affect. However, this is not due to the variable and mobile nature of identity that 
makes it impossible to capture in fixed categories (Butler, as cited in McNay, 2008). Rather, 
following Žižek (2005), I propose that the project of identity, as of home and belonging, is 
never complete because of the incompleteness of the social order itself. Thus, it is not merely 
how pernicious ideological power continues to sustain itself (i.e., through cultural ritual, 
circulation of affect or habitual practice) (Butler, 2000; Billig et al., 1988; Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b; 
Wetherell). Instead, it is why we are caught in the grips of ideological power through specific 
practices and regimes (Glynos, 2008).  In the next section, I shift the focus from ideological 
power in everyday practice (Billig et al., 1988) to the seductive force of ideological fantasy. To 
theorise aspirational belonging as ideological fantasy requires a shift from epistemology (how 
people come to know the ‘truth’ about society) to ontology (how the social order itself is 
constitutively lacking) (Glynos, 2001).  
 
In situating this, I draw from the limits of the performativity frame. In this review, I have been 
using performance and performativity synonymously and perhaps rather loosely. However, 
Butler’s (1993) use of performativity denotes a more radicalised view of performance, one that 
views the rules or power scripts of discourse to be repeated, reiterated despite our deliberate 
intentions (Parker, 2015b). By this view, the performativity of belonging is thus deeper than 
mere self-conscious performance (Parker 2015b). Subjects are disciplined in a Foucauldian 
sense to cite the norm to qualify as a subject (Butler, 1993). The interpellative command, “Be 
Longing” (Rowe, 2005, p. 15) offers the promise of subjecthood, and simultaneously the threat 
of exclusion or abjection by not heeding to the beckoning (Butler, 1993). Although Butler’s 
(1993) performativity is a psychosocial formulation, its main limitation is that it neglects the 
  
 
38 
disruptive ‘Real’. The ‘Real’ is the non-egoic aspects of psychic life that mediate the subject-
social relation beyond that of discourse and the limits of language (Dyess & Dean, 2000). In 
the next chapter, I turn to the Lacanian Real and its relationship to desire, fantasy and 
jouissance (enjoyment). I explore their implications for a study of home and the asymmetries 
of belonging.  
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Chapter Three: Literature Review 
Towards A Lacanian Psychosocial View of Belonging 
 
 
“If you have to think about belonging, perhaps you are already outside” 
(Probyn, 1996, p. 8). 
 
3.1. Introduction  
In the previous chapter, I argued that the discursive and performative lens to exploring identity 
work in the making of home does not fully capture how enjoyment is organized. This body of 
work does not account for why we are “gripped” towards particular modes of belonging through 
collective identifications (Glynos, 2001; Solomon, 2012). Rowe’s (2005, p. 15) formulation 
from a performative lens is that “Be Longing” is an interpellative command, which beckons us 
towards a particular place or location. There is an affective pull to this powerful hailing. From 
a Lacanian stance, the hailing itself bestows upon us the recognition that we are subjects 
worthy of love, admiration or approval (Žižek, 1989). In capturing the validating gaze, we 
reckon ourselves worthy of the invitation towards the “place of the other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162) 
with whom we desire to belong. 
 
In this chapter, I explore these aspects of belonging by applying a Žižekian-Lacanian (Lacan, 
1977; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1996; 2005; 2006; 2008) perspective. Why are we enraptured 
by particular social or political strivings to ‘be – long’? Moreover, how do these everyday 
ideologies exert their tenacious hold over us? (Glynos, 2001; Hook, 2008b). Furthermore, why 
is it that belonging slips from our grip, (re)fueling our anxieties yet paradoxically reassures us 
of our status as desiring subjects? I argue that‘be – longing’ is constituted by two aspects: the 
interpellative command that provokes a forceful pull of being hailed into a subject position, 
and our role as subjects seeking with an active intent to capture the gaze of the big Other 
(Wyatt, 2004). The Other (i.e., ‘big other’) is central in Lacanian theory to informing questions 
of desire, fantasy and enjoyment in our belongings. As Hook (2008c, p. 6) notes, our desires 
are entangled in the Other, but so too is our social being, status, purpose, location “of what I 
am to others”. Our relation as subjects with the Other therefore exerts its profound ‘affects’ on 
how we choose to belong – “where we place our bodies, and with whom we build our affective 
ties” (Rowe, 2005, p. 16). 
 
I review some of the Lacanian literature on social and political belonging, most of which has 
centred on its various fantasmatic identities. This includes nationalism (Ali & Whitham, 2018; 
Hage, 1996; Hirvonen, 2017; Kinnvall, 2018; Mandelbaum, 2016; McMillan, 2017; 
Papastergiadis, 2005), utopian societies (Gunder, 2014; Nichols, 2008) economic 
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subjectivities (Bloom, 2016; Byrne & Healy, 2006; Kingsbury, 2005; Rajbar, 2018) and 
organizational identities (Driver, 2009; Glynos, 2008). Whilst this body of scholarship is 
valuable in explicating how ‘ontological lack’ (desire) is articulated and structured in discourse, 
images and fantasy, they are limited empirically. They do not fully illustrate the active workings 
of desire (and abjection) as regimes in our ‘lived experiences’ (Žižek, 2008), not simply as 
constructs, but as explicit practices that (re)produces “uneven becoming[s]” (Rus, 2006, para. 
2) and hierarchical belongings (Back, Sinah & Bryan, 2012). I argue that the limitations of 
method do not fully capture belonging as lively, embodied, participatory processes of 
becoming, as mutually co-created, as implicated in talk, affect, embodied space and in the 
materiality of home. 
 
Moreover, the transference, as a bodily and affective process, is an important vehicle for 
subjectification that “transfers me to the place of the Other” (Kristeva, 1983, as cited in Oliver, 
1993, p. 74) is overlooked in the research. The transference as the “Other who is supposed 
to know” (Davidson, 2012, p. 15) is central to the Lacanian notion of fantasy, which I will outline 
below. Moreover, I argue that the transindividual dimension (our orientation as subjects to the 
structure of meaning in society – the big Other of the symbolic order) (Hook, 2008a; Hook, 
2008b; Martin, 2015; Žižek, 1994) is much overlooked in empirical research.  This aspect is 
crucial to a critical interrogation of home, as a powerful mode of subjectification (Probyn, 1996, 
p. 13), and as a historical process (Hook, 2008b) that affectively, discursively, materially and 
spatially reproduces asymmetries of belonging. To begin, I outline Lacan’s (1977) account of 
subjectivity and alienation, which I draw on as a conceptual grid to explore questions of 
belonging. 
 
3.2. An Ontology of Alienation 
Lacan’s (1977) mirror stage provides the basis for ego-formation that conjoins the bodily 
experience with the visual domain in what Winnubst (2004) ascribes as an ontological relation. 
The infant does not have an organised sense of itself and is a mass of uncoordinated 
sensations and impulses. Through sight, the infant orders its world. Its first encounter with its 
image as a unified semblance is significant as it signals a shift – from an experience of a body 
in fragments to an experience of the body as whole (Fink, 1997). The ego is dependent on 
these mirror reflections to give it coherence and consistency (Lacan, 1977). The foundational 
premise in Lacanian (1977; 1998; 2014) theory is that we are all symbolically castrated or 
ontologically constituted in lack. This symbolic castration originates from an original split from 
the primal home (the Real), a formless state of jouissance that the infant shared with its mother 
(Wardle, 2016). To become humanised as speaking subjects, we identify with a signifier – 
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initially a designated name, and subsequently other defining identity markers (‘male’, ‘wife’, 
etc.) and their associated scripts and practices (Eberle, 2017; Soler, 2016). These signifiers 
offer us direction, identity and purpose and a place in the social order (Bracher, 1993); 
therefore they latch onto the (unconscious) recognition of ourselves as empty subjects seeking 
completion (Glynos, 2001). 
 
Becoming a subject is, therefore, an effect of identification with the place of the (m)Other. The 
(m)Other is the mother as the first Other, as well as subsequent others, whose desire we wish 
to capture to feel loved and recognised. Žižek (1989, p. 105) defines this as a symbolic 
identification, the “identification with the very place from where we are being observed, from 
where we look at ourselves so that we appear to ourselves likeable, worthy of love”.  We take 
direction from what is outside of ourselves, acting in accords with what we think the big Other 
wants of us (Žižek, 2006). The desire of the Other foregrounds the trans-subjective dimension 
of the symbolic order. It provides a mapping of the individual to the community in relation to 
the discursive and sociohistorical co-ordinates “within which I find myself” (Hook, 2008b, p. 
279). The subject condenses this bombarding Otherness into a more digestible form as image; 
that is, the ego-ideal. The ego-ideal is “the unconscious adoption of the very image of the 
Other” (Lacan, 2006, as cited in Hodemaekers, 2010, p. 382) that provides the orientation for 
our identity work. 
 
Nevertheless, in finding ourselves as subjects, we also radically lose ourselves (Verhaeghe, 
2015). Our entry into the Symbolic Order (language, society, the paternal law), comes with a 
“primordial loss” (Žižek, 1997 p. 17) as these signifiers, social scripts and practices are alien 
to us. As Lacan (1977) argues, these aspects that constitute our subjectivity are not our own 
but generationally handed down. They are always ‘other’ to the subject who is required to 
adapt to it. We can only articulate who we are, by borrowing from the discourse of the other. 
 
Moreover, this articulation coheres around the absence or void that signals the primordial loss. 
Subjectivity is, therefore anchored in lack that is foundational to language and our social order 
(Wardle, 2016). We long for a stable subjectivity, which accords with the desire to fill the 
perpetual lack (Kinnvall, 2018). In this respect, there is always something more of our 
subjectivity (the bodily and affective aspects) that words cannot express. It is the Real body, 
our lost jouissance that escapes signification, but always makes its presence felt (Wardle, 
2016). Thus, identification occurs at the conscious (Imaginary level), but it also involves the 
Symbolic and Real (Hoedemakers, 2010) that seeks representation in (un)conscious ways.  
  
 
42 
We cannot escape this ontological lack. As Erberle (2017) notes, generally we are unaware 
of this lack as our immersion in ritualised practices of daily life guarantee some sense of 
ordered belonging. However, there are moments of encounter with this lack, typically when 
we are confronted with crises that disturbs our personal and social order, provoking much 
anxiety and shame at our destitution (Bistoen, 2016). For Lacan, such encounters as “what 
disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place” (Parker, 2015b, p. 250) are the eruption 
of Real into reality (Žižek, 2005). This traumatic kernel (the Real), its role in constituting the 
fundamental lack at the heart of the sociosymbolic order (Wardle, 2016), is central to 
understanding the power-grip of ideological belonging (Glynos, 2001). 
 
3.2.1. The optic of belonging 
Applying this Lacanian ontology to ideology, Slavoj Žižek (1989; 1994; 2013) approaches 
ideology not as something imposed top-down but as a spontaneous relationship to our social 
world. As Ali and Whitham (2018) summarise, ideology offers ways of seeing that infiltrates 
our reality in the banalities of our everyday experience. As a generative matrix, ideology 
“regulates the relationship between visible and non-visible, between imaginable and 
non¬imaginable, as well as the changes in this relationship” (Žižek, 1994, p. 1). In this account, 
ideology is not a myth that conceals universal truth, nor can it be reduced to representations 
of meaning. Instead, it is “both an illusion and social construction that makes reality 
meaningful” (McMillian, 2017, p. 216). Ideology is illusory, not because it is factually untrue, 
but as Driver (2009) notes, it is founded on an imaginary order which answers the questions 
of identity – who we are and what we want. Using Lacanian theory, Žižek (1994, p. 8; emphasis 
in original) thus reverses the Marxist position by instating ideology as a fantasmatic 
construction that structures, rather than disguises, the true nature of things: 
Ideology is thus not necessarily ‘false’: as to its positive content, it can be ‘true’, quite 
accurate, since what really matters is not the asserted content as such but the way this 
content is related to the subjective position implied by its own process of enunciation. 
The understanding here is that we never really experience ‘reality’ directly except in an 
“always-already symbolised” form (Žižek, 1994, p. 21). The trauma, from a Lacanian 
perspective, is an encounter with the Real. In a simplified sense, the Real is the senseless 
brutality of reality that remains unsymbolised and unarticulable. It traverses the symbolic and 
imaginary registers of sense-making. As Bistoen (2016) explains, trauma peels away the 
imaginary cover, which necessarily assures us of our sense of safety and certainty in the 
world. What becomes encountered as trauma is where the symbolic “bumps up against its 
own internal limit” (Bistoen, 2016, p. 59). Words fail to articulate the horror of the encounter, 
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making it assimilable to reality, yet it intrudes into reality as “spectral apparitions” (Žižek, 2005, 
p. 63). To be effective, therefore, ideology must conceal the very logic – of being structured 
by desire, rather than knowledge – that legitimates relations of power and domination (Žižek, 
1989). 
 
3.3. The Search for Ontological Security 
 
The literature on Lacanian fantasy offers a sociopolitical perspective of fantasy as the search 
for ontological security in the global world (Kinnvall, 2018). Scholarship on national 
belonging formulates social(political) insecurity less so as a physical threat, but as “a sense 
of fear and anxiety over [our] daily lives” (Kinnvall, Manners & Mitzen, 2018, p. 249).  This is 
captured variously as survivalist anxiety, ontological insecurity, or existential anxiety (Bloom, 
2016; Browning, 2018; Hook & Vanheule, 2016; Kinnvall, 2018; Mandelbaum, 2016; 2018; 
Papastergiadis, 2005), the struggle with lack (Driver, 2009) or anxiety over national 
disintegration, of (white) British citizenship, due to the ‘foreigner’ presence (Ali & Whitham, 
2018; Martin, 2015). In other instances, nationalist anxieties relate to economic decline 
(Johnson, 2013; McMillan, 2017), ecological or environmental crises (Davidson, 2012), or 
‘alien’ diseases (Ebola) threatening the bodily integrity of a nation (Shapiro as cited in 
Mandelbaum, 2016).  McMillan (2017), for example, proposed that the Trump appeal 
stemmed from the campaign’s ability to acknowledge the fractured myth of American 
exceptionalism. At the same time, the campaign provided compelling explanations (global 
economic crisis, 9/11 and the US-Iraqi invasion) and impending obstacles (Mexicans, 
Muslims, China, Hillary Clinton, “Rigged System”, “fake news”) to “Mak[ing] America Great 
Again” (McMillan, 2017, p. 206). As a fantasy construction, the campaign “sedimented a 
meaningful and coherent social reality out of fragmented human experiences” (McMillan, 
2017, p. 205). 
 
As illustrated in McMillan’s (2017) analysis, the central theme in these studies is the nation’s 
loss of place in the world. Johnson (2013) highlights the uncertain future for the Chang Mai 
middle-class, a loss of status, following impending crises – economic decline and violence in 
the city.  Papastergiadis (2005, p. 1) analysed media depictions of an “Asian invasion”, 
which showed Australia rendered homeless in an era of globalisation – as simultaneously 
excluded from a flourishing East Asian economy, and abandoned by its mother country 
(England). Thus, for Kinnvall (2004, p. 747), homelessness is the imagined loss of a nation 
or community, constituting an anxious condition marked by “impermanence and 
discontinuity” in response to globalisation. How is this “unbearable anxiety” (Žižek, 2005, p. 
255) resolved, and how does this structure social or political projects of belonging? Here, we 
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can draw on Lacan’s (2014, p. 214) proposal that through fantasy, anxiety “shifts over 
towards the question of desire” to explore how this structures ideology. 
 
3.4. Fantasy and the Promise of Being  
What the literature confirms is that desire is not a given. It is socially conditioned (Stavrakakis, 
2007); “something that has to be constructed” (Žižek, 1991, as cited in Hage, 1996, p. 129). 
The fantasy frame is created with words, as Gunder (2004, p. 300) notes, often competing 
“islands of meaning” stitched together by Master Signifiers (discussed below). Desire is 
moulded and perpetually sustained by fantasy, which, as Žižek (2008, p. 7) states, “teaches 
us how to desire”. Why might such a construction be necessary? As alluded to earlier, fantasy 
sutures the gap, providing a temporary screen that shields reality from the Real, and filters 
away anxiety or makes it more bearable (Erberle, 2017; Žižek, 1989). It orders “our emotional 
investment within a larger narrative of reconciliation and stability”, thereby covers over the 
fissures in our subjectivity and the social order (Bloom & Cederstrom, 2009, as cited in 
Gunder, 2014, p. 3). Central to the Lacanian formulation, anxiety is not situated at the level of 
personal struggle, as a Kleinian-inflected lens might suggest (see Hollway & Jefferson, 1997; 
2000). Nor can it be ascribed simply to the dynamics produced by the intersubjective 
encounter (Clarke, 2002) or the enactments between intersecting categories of social location 
(Brah, 2012; Lupton & Tulloch, 1999; Phoenix & Phoenix, 2012). All these domains are 
certainly ridden with anxiety, but more radically for Lacan (2014), the anxiety is profoundly 
existential and relates to the fundamental lack at the heart of the sociosymbolic order. 
 
3.4.1. What does the Other want of me? 
Pivotally, fantasy steps in to resolve the anxiety-provoking existential question: ‘What does 
the Other want of me?’. The Other’s desire remains enigmatic, elusive and forever changing. 
We can never be sure that we are adequate to the task of fulfilling the Other’s desire. This 
relationship is an unconscious one (Hook, 2008b), activated through the transference as the 
vehicle for subjectification, through which, as Kristeva (1983, cited in Oliver, 1993, p. 74) 
offers, in a bodily-spatial and affective sense, “transfers me to the place of the Other”. Through 
this transference, we lean onto the Other, the holder of power, knowledge and authority, as 
one “who is supposed to know” (Davidson, 2012, p. 15). The transference “designates the 
subject’s trust in meaning-to-come” (Žižek, 1996 as cited in Hook, 2008a, p. 63). 
 
We can see here that such a relationship arises in situations when we lose our bearings, when 
the meaning frame we once held is put to question, or even more tragically when meaning 
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has altogether collapsed. However, meaning is not a “balanced economy of exchange” (Žižek, 
1994 as cited in Hook, 2008a, p. 61). Specific ideas, “motifs” of ideology have a 
“disproportionate hold upon us” (p. 61). Why then is it that some meanings have a more 
dominant hold over others? Here, the Master (or ‘empty’ signifier, as Laclau would have it) 
emerges when meaning can never be entirely determined (Hook, 2008a). Through case 
studies, research has highlighted the role of nationalist fantasy in staging a symbolic and social 
existence for a community (Georgis, 2007; Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013). For example, Hage 
(1996) illustrates of the Maronite Christian community in Lebanon, some “anxious ideological 
work” performed in fantasy to stabilize the Muslim threat (Hage, 1996, p. 132). Hage 
highlighted editorial efforts in news pieces to focus on attacks on Lebanon by Syrian forces 
as events in repetition. The power of this repetitive discourse, as Hage (1996, p. 123) argued, 
allows “everything [to be] explained” readers. Key here is that the meaning frame offers in 
fantasy a low-level anxiety expressed in relation to the ‘other’ who presents as an obstacle to 
ever attaining the “totally gratifying nation” (p. 121). 
 
3.4.2. Anxious belongings 
The fantasy functions to support a belief about self and nation’s existence. The loss of this 
fantasy structure equates with a symbolic death, which instigates profound anxiety; that is, the 
loss of existence as a communal subject. In these instances, violence as a viscerally-
embodied survivalist rage against the threatening other emerges in response to unrequited 
longings (Hage, 1999; Middleton, 2013; Papastergiadis, 2005). Middleton (2013, p. 609) 
speaks of “anxious belongings” as the collectively embodied feeling structure melded by 
history, politics and society. Researching the subjugated Ghorka peoples of (post)colonial 
India, Middleton traces using archival data and fieldwork, the shifting of anxious belonging into 
desire. This Lacanian reading follows Brah’s (1996) notion of homing desire, as seen in the 
case of Middleton’s research, as a violent quest to attain an autonomous, sub-nationalist 
homeland; thus to be seen and recognised in belonging. As Žižek (1996) points out, however, 
even the most brutal acts of violence denote a symbolic deadlock – the inability to put 
something into words, or the failure of meaning. Thus, ‘The Nation’ as a powerful signifier 
redeems us from symbolic death as it represents those ideals that are perceived as worth 
striving for, living for or dying for (Bracher, 1993; Hook, 2008a; Žižek, 1996). It is the point of 
zealous investment that co-ordinates and lends vivacity to our actions as individuals towards 
solidarity. Key here, from a Lacanian perspective, is that anxiety is not only a discursive 
construction but also the point of rupture or fissure in the suturing of meaning (Parker, 2005). 
As Lacan (1993) proposes, the master signifier is convergence point around which discourse 
circulates and is organised. Master Signifiers are the ordering principles of a society or identity-
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bearing words that guarantee its coherence (Bracher, 1993), and thus stand in as the imagined 
identity of a subject or community (Hook & Vanheule, 2016). Meaning, therefore, pivots around 
these co-ordinates that in a sense, sutures the subject into narratives to ensure a relatively 
stable identity (McMillan, 2017). However, as Miller (2016, as cited in Hook & Vanheule, 2016, 
p. 2) notes, signifiers are unable to provide a guide to reality. They constantly slip and slide 
from meanings. As Miller (2016, as cited in Hook & Vanheule, 2016, p. 2) puts it “metonymy 
gets away from real objects”. Our only hope/strategy here is to “tie a knot in discourse” (Hook 
& Vanheule, 2016, p. 1) grounding meaning in a focal belief or authority. Through the creation 
of Master Signifiers, we act as if we are seen and heard. 
 
3.4.3. Anchoring representation 
When signifiers are repeated in the texts, they serve as nodal points that quilt knowledge and 
therefore serve as points of ideological meaning (Gunder, 2004; Parker, 2005). Strategies of 
anchoring representation involve ritualistic citation (Georgis, 2007; Hage, 1996; Kinnvall, 
2004; Mandelbaum, 2018) with the effect of producing forms of knowing that essentialise 
difference, for example, through stereotypes. As Bhabba (1983, p. 18) notes, the ‘other’ is 
produced not merely a byproduct of stereotype. From a psychoanalytic logic, as part and 
parcel of its operation, the stereotype is “a form of knowledge and identification that vacillates 
between what is always ‘in place’, already known, and something that must be anxiously 
repeated”. The object of fear is thus designated when signifiers of threat attached to specific 
bodies (Ahmed, 2003; Hirvonen, 2017). As Ali & Whitham (2018, p. 401) show, for instance, 
the “conceptual Muslim” holds the deep-seated angst of UK society through which 
sociopolitical problems are captured and resolved. 
 
Thus, ‘The Nation’ relative to other privileged signifiers (white, fraternity, European) give 
meaning to negative signifiers: illegal immigrant, ‘black’, terror, etc. (Hirvonen, 2017). In this 
respect, as Hirvonen (2017) argues, fantasy “parcels out our positions and forms of 
participation at the same time as it produces self-evident facts”. This appeal to facticity masks 
fears and conceals ambivalence (Martin, 2015). As points of desire in the text, these self-
evident ‘facts’ become the basis of plausible stories that “hide people from the truth of their 
desire” (Martin, 2015, p. 5). As Žižek (as cited in Ali & Whitham, 2018) asserts, “facts never 
‘speak for themselves’ but are always made to speak” through discursive networks. The 
concern here is not the truth status, but how it comes to appear as such. Anxiety, in this 
respect, is symptomatic of desire (Parker, 2005), pointing to what is lacking in the subject 
(Hook, 2008b). 
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In line with Žižek’s (1997) claim, the literature confirms the structure of fantasy, as supported 
by the beatific narrative (the ideal state of affairs, the promise of completion) and the horror 
(trauma) narrative (the obstacle to the fulfillment) (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008; Gunder, 2003; 
2014; Hirvonen, 2017; Žižek, 1993). Fantasy – whether this centres on the sustainable city 
(Davidson, 2012), state security (Mandelbaum, 2016), the “totally gratifying nation” (Hage, 
1996, p. 121), or socioeconomic plenitude (Kingsbury, 2005) – is, therefore, a story fused with 
desire and its frustration. The object of desire is unattainable because someone has stolen it 
from us. The “theft of enjoyment” (Žižek, 1993, p. 201) captures this sentiment of lack here, 
namely the fear that “our way of life” or our sense of home has been lost. The ‘other’ is viewed 
as a source of that loss onto whom all loathing, or blame for incompleteness, is projected 
(Clarke & Garner, 2005; Wardle, 2016). It is not just the other possesses the enjoyment but 
“the peculiar way he organises his enjoyment” (Žižek, 1991, p. 165), for example, rituals, 
myths, symbols connected to sexuality, religion and food (Ali & Whitham, 2018). Taken 
together, this body of work points towards Dupuis and Thorns’ (1998, as cited in Kinnvall, 
2004) view that home signifies ontological security. These studies illuminate how various 
political projects, in their fantasy construction, offer an imaginary promise to recapture the 
perceived lost enjoyment (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008; Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006). 
The main criticism with this body of work is its tendency to universalise ontological insecurity. 
The uncertainty is seen to arise in response to changing conditions or crises that disrupt our 
sense of place in the world (e.g., Bloom, 2016). However, as Kinnvall (2018, p. 10) argues, 
the role of trauma is central to questions of ontological anxiety, specifically as they in 
retrospect, become “authoritative representations” that give us our political and moral 
bearings. Like others (Georgis, 2007; 2016; Middleton, 2013; Papastergiadis, 2005), Kinnvall 
(2004, p. 763) views the “securitisation of subjectivity” as a defence against these traumas. 
This process is psychological, intersubjective and structural and invariably involves an ‘other’ 
that is expelled to derive “a coherent and stable collective identity” (Georgis, 2007, p. 244). In 
Kinnvall’s (2018, p. 14) account, the search for ontological security is associated with 
“occidental racism and postcolonial legacies”. These produce social imaginaries, constructed 
through emotional discourses and narratives, that create nostalgic longings and naturalise 
colonial fears (Kinnvall, 2018). The literature implicitly links fantasy construction to histories of 
belongings, for example, as Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras (2006) note, ‘The Nation’ is a historical 
construction, yielding its products of ethnicity and culture. 
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3.5. Histories of Belonging 
From this perspective, belonging can be seen as a narrative construction, made out of 
traumatic histories, produced through collective memory (Bloom, 2016; Georgis, 2007; Hook 
& Vanheule, 2016; Mandelbaum, 2018; Papastergiadis, 2005). The literature highlights some 
of these traumatic histories. Middleton (2013), for example, explores the Indian Ghorkas’ quest 
for sub-nationalist recognition stemming from an unsettling colonial history of unrequited 
longing. Hage (1996) offers a genealogical account of the colonial fantasy of the ‘backward’, 
‘pre-modern’, ‘barbaric’ Muslim invented to assuage the threats to a Christian communal 
existence. Last,  Hook & Vanheule (2016) reveal the anxieties of the South Africa citizenry, in 
particular, their struggle to sustain a sense of community. The Mandela Master Signifier, in 
this respect, functions to stitch together unrelated fragments that make up the nation to cover 
over a South Africa devoid of meaning.  Belonging is thus a form of group bonding in response 
to “the wreckage brought on by the wounds to identity itself” (Georgis, 2007, p. 256). It arises 
from the need to pin down identity (and the story itself) against a sea of forever changing 
currents. Georgis (2007, p. 252) offers that if the story is “‘a wound that cries out’ across time, 
then history is the narrative outcome of how survival is negotiated and settled”. 
 
These examples point to fear and anxiety as the affective structure of communal imagining 
that resonates as historical (Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013; Papastergiadis, 2005). Through 
traumatic collective bonding, the ‘other’ is rendered a threat to survival (Georgis, 2007, p. 253). 
The crux here is that the “chosen trauma” in these historical constructions is relative (Volkan, 
1997 as cited in Kinnvall, 2004, p. 755). Belonging narratives constructing heroes and villains, 
and its resulting invented traditions, come from a “usable past” (Paul, 2014 as cited in 
McMillan, 2017, p. 207). Thus, as McMillan (2017) notes, it is not the object (referent) that 
intrinsically denotes meaning, but that meaning arises from the interplay between signifiers 
and their relational history with other signifiers. 
 
Anxiety by Lacan’s account (2014) has no precise object. The object needs to be created, 
offering the conduit to displace unbearable anxiety. Fear, alternatively, along with its 
permutations as terror, fright, for example, always designates a precise object and involves a 
relationship to the specular or imaginary. As a function of identification, identity requires an 
external object (from which to constitute its separateness and affirm its likeness) (Kristeva, 
1982). Tangible objects of fear (Ahmed, 2003; Ali & Whitham, 2018; Hage, 1996; Hirvonen, 
2017; Johnson, 2013; McMillan, 2017) are therefore made from “histories of belonging” in 
response to trauma (Georgis, 2007, p. 244). As Papastergiadis (2005, p. 3-4) argues, the 
persistent fear of the other in discourses of Australian national identity can be “traced to lines 
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of earlier fears”, a trauma that “barely registers” yet continues to mould contemporary national 
identity. The perceived threat of the immigrant ‘other’, for example, relates to a nation’s loss 
of place in the global world. At the same time, this loss is bound to colonialism as the primal 
site of trauma (Hirvonen, 2017; Papastergiadis, 2005). As Papastergiadis reasons, the 
underside of extreme defensiveness against foreigners (distilled in speeches of John Howard) 
is the guilt attached to the displacement of indigenous peoples. 
 
These studies are valuable in showing how histories of belonging produce fantasmatic 
narratives as the outcomes of survival. However, what remains overlooked in the research is 
the role of our subjective location in the cultural-symbolic order (big Other), as informed by 
histories of belonging. It is proposed that these come to inform collective relations that 
reproduce “uneven becoming[s]” (Rus, 2006, para. 3). How is this played out in relational 
exchanges as a process dimension of ‘be – longing’? Probyn (1996, p. 13) notes that the 
“longing to belong” is an embodied and “profoundly affective manner of being, always 
performed … within and inbetween sets of social relations … and moves with that experience”. 
For example, how is it that some bodies come to be read and enacted as desired and others 
as feared, inducing spatial relations, whether of closeness or apartness? (Ahmed, 2003). If 
fantasy provides the co-ordinates that in a literal sense “teaches us how to desire” (Žižek, 
2008, p. 7), and simultaneously how to loathe, what is missing in the empirical literature is the 
very process relationality of social relations. In other words, how do these interactions evoke 
desire that to employ Lacan’s (1977, p. 162) spatial metaphor, draws us to the “place of the 
Other” as a mode of subjectification? Belonging is thus not an individual phenomenon but an 
existential emptiness that we cannot fill. 
 
3.5.1. Longing to belong: desire as a negotiated transaction 
Hook’s (2008a; 2008c) notion of fantasmatic transactions can prove useful here. Beyond the 
form of fantasy, the fantasmatic transaction explains the force by which the ‘dry’ socio-
symbolic domain links to “the ‘sticky’ affects of the subject” as desire and enjoyment (Glynos 
& Stavkrakakis, 2008, p. 263). In other words, the analysis of the structure of fantasy (rhetoric, 
metaphorical condensations, master signifiers, repetitions, etc.) accounts for investment in a 
particular phenomenon. However, these elements do not fully account for the embodied grip 
of ideology (Glynos, 2001). Given that (socio)political projects never really deliver on the 
promise of fullness, there must be something more that sustains desire, and thus the 
persistent hold that ideology has on us, enticing us to identificatory acts (Stavrakakis & 
Chrysoloras, 2006). 
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If, to adopt a Lacanian view of fantasy – not as a daydream, or hallucinatory escape from 
reality – but as “the very social reality as an escape from some real, traumatic kernel” (Žižek, 
1989, p. 45), then an analysis of fantasy must consider the relations that constitute it. What is 
conspicuously lacking in the empirical literature is the attention to this fantasmatic transaction 
(Hook, 2008b), specifically the transference as a vehicle through which as subjects, we are 
beckoned to the “place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162). As Hook (2008b, p. 285) 
emphasises, the fantasy is a “return-effect”, the subject’s response to managing the enigma 
of the Other’s desire. Crucial here is the transactional nature between the subject and Other. 
At this transferential level, we are perpetually seeking to resolve our place in the social order. 
‘Che voui?’ – a repeated anxiety-provoking question we address to the big Other: “What do 
you want?” “What am I to you?” “What must I be?” (Hook, 2008b, p. 404). This line of 
questioning is anxiety-provoking, given that we can never truly know what the Other wants of 
us. The Other’s desire remains forever elusive and enigmatic. 
 
As highlighted in the growing body of Lacanian scholarship, we manage this consternation 
through the creation of fantasy. Fantasy provides the edifice by which, as Lacan (2014, p. 
214) notes, the “dialectic on anxiety shifts over to the question of desire”. If we take the 
Lacanian assertion seriously that the aim of speech is not to communicate but to evoke desire 
in the Other (Chiesa, 2007), then tracing desire as a relational transaction offers a way to 
explore our affective investments. Tracing desire in this manner entails studying fantasy 
beyond the level of the signified, towards eliciting the “transaction of desire” (Hook, 2008b, p. 
4). Whilst the former explores the shared meanings that hold a community in belonging, the 
latter looks to the relational transaction between the subject and the Other. At this level, we 
may discern the workings of desire to explain the power-grip of nonsensical ideological 
belongings. Ideological dilemmas thus take on a more sophisticated level (Hook, 2008b; 
2008c).  
 
The complicating factor here is that relation between the subject and Other is an unconscious 
relationship in which the subject posits what the Other wants. For Lacan (1977, p. 37), the 
unconscious resides not in the unfathomable depths of the mind, but “is part of the concrete 
discourse, in so far as it is transindividual”. In other words, we are “always grounded in the 
transferential relationship towards the Other” (Žižek, 1994, p. 33). The unconscious is thus 
external, activated in the performances of speech. Through speech, the subject grapples with 
its place in the symbolic order, anxiously seeking to capture the desire of the Other. The 
unconscious is this trans-individual relation – beyond the individual-social binary – and one in 
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which we presume the Other as having authority to know, despite its non-existence or 
emptiness (Hook, 2008a). 
 
Given the enigmatic, unconscious nature of this relation, how is it that we can study these 
fantasmatic transactions in an empirically grounded manner? There are two possibilities here, 
both necessary if we are to open up spaces for resistance and re-signification (Hoedemakers, 
2010) to questions of ‘be – longing’ and homing desire (Brah, 2012). The first is tracing desire 
as a fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008a), and the second, exploring the interruption of 
identification (Hoedemakers, 2010). Attention to these aspects could inform belonging as a 
fantasmatic construction that is relationally mediated and informed by “histories of belonging” 
(Georgis, 2007, p. 244; Hook, 2008b). 
 
3.5.2. Tracing desire in the intersubjective exchange   
For Lacan, desire is bound up in language. The speech act, therefore, is not merely 
communicative; it is an act that seeks recognition, to evoke desire in the other. Through 
speech, the subject “(unconsciously) addresses the Other (subject) so that the truth about his 
speech—the specificity of his unconscious, repressed desire—may be recognised by the 
Other” (Chiesa, 2007, p. 40). As Martin (2015) notes, beyond the speaking encounter, we 
seek recognition from the big Other through our symbolic identification with a broader scenario 
or situation. Hook (2008a, p. 54) notes that the Other here is “a step removed from the 
dialectics of inter-subjectivity”, yet at the same time, it provides the co-ordinates or coherence 
to such encounters.  
 
As Martin (2017) illustrates, the affective strategy is to evoke desire in speech. Thus, whilst 
signifiers, images, and traumatic ‘enjoyment’ constitute the structure of fantasy, it is how these 
are offered up as sites of (dis)identification in the interlocutory context (Martin, 2015). Desire 
is bound in language, but in language, the subject is alienated. The subject always says 
something more than s/he consciously intends (Chiesa, 2007). Words cannot fully capture 
what s/he intends to say, and the interlocutor cannot fully grasp the meaning of what is being 
said. Desire is perpetually caught up in ongoing appeals to the Other – that “hovering 
interlocutor” that acts as a “the third in any dialogue” (Dolar, 1999 as cited in Hook, 2008a, p. 
60). We look to this ‘third’ for approval and recognition and therefore is part of the co-
determination of meanings. As Hook (2008b, p. 291) notes, these turn takings thus reveal the 
“oscillations of agency” between the subject and Other as an unconscious dimension to the 
workings of ideology. At this level, affect is mobilised as a strategy to provoke a symbolic 
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identification that transcends and yet is part of the relational exchange between speakers 
(Martin, 2015). 
 
To reiterate an earlier point here, our symbolic identification is the “identification with the very 
place from where we are being observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we appear 
to ourselves likeable, worthy of love” (Žižek, 1989, p. 105). This vantage point is the ego-
ideal—a virtual, “impossible gaze” which, as Martin (2011, p. 14) serves as the quilting point 
that “stitches together the discourse into fantasy”. The analytical strategy, therefore, is to go 
beyond pathos, the explicit, overt and intended emotional impact of speech in speech, towards 
the “libidinal forces” that amplify the emotional aspects provoked in speech. Here, affect is 
distinguished from emotion. Affect is the libidinal energy of the drives, while emotion is a 
discursive construct,  the outcome of capture by signifiers or ideas. In line with a Lacanian 
view, the analysis should not be lured by emotions in the text, but by how affect is displaced 
through enjoyment that structures fantasy (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). Drawing on Laclau’s 
formulation, Hook and Vanheule (2016, p. 3) insist that the Master Signifier “represents equally 
a nodal-point of affect, a point of passionate investment”. Not simply a linguistic operation, the 
Master Signifier “entails libidinal gratification” (p. 3). Its affective force lies in providing resolve 
of the fundamental deadlock – that the relations we have with one another are not naturally 
harmonious, and the limitations of speech to ever capture what we want to say. 
 
Martin (2015) illustrates this point in his reference to Enoch Powell’s Rivers of Blood political 
speech, which centres on UK immigration policy and the need for forced repatriation. The 
rhetorical symptom, argues Martin, lies not in the charged apocalyptic imagery, but in the 
implied ego-ideal around which the speech is organised to capture desire. Attention to this 
“third presence” (or “hovering interlocutor”) in and beyond the immediacy of the dialogic 
exchange (Dolar, 1998 as cited in Hook, 2008a, p. 60) reveals the “route towards ‘something 
else’ that is communicating” (Martin, 2017, p. 5).  Powell’s Rivers of Blood speech functions 
to evoke horror and capture desire. It provokes the nation’s attachment to the symbolic order 
by eliciting a secret enjoyment at the possibility of violence. The passionate investment in an 
ideal thus has a less glamorous underside – that is, of hatred and the Real violence of 
enjoyment provided by fantasy (Bistoen, 2016; Žižek, 1996; Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006). 
 
This enjoyment factor, as Hook & Vanheule (2016, p. 3) note, fuels the production of the 
Master Signifier, “a passionate attachment that simultaneously drives and yet defies 
communicability”. Similarly, McMillan (2017) argued for the materiality of language to mobilise 
  
 
53 
the bodies to act in a manner that defies common sense or counter-intuitive to transformation. 
Allegations of sexual assault against Trump during his presidential campaign, for instance, did 
not diminish public support. Instead, his “visceral subjects”, as McMillan (2017, p. 205) argues, 
remained loyally ‘stuck’ to old meanings constituted in the fantasy. Meaning, rather than 
shifting in response to these new and opposing signifying chains, remained unswayed and 
fixed in the body. Summed up as the “‘obscene supplement’ of official narration” (Žižek, 1997, 
p. 54), these transgressive acts function to ‘complete’ fantasy in ways that elude Symbolic-
Imaginary capture. As argued by others,  jouissance covers over the cracks in the national 
body, and incompleteness of the social order (Glynos, 2001; McMillan, 2017; Papasterigiadis, 
2005; Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006). It underscores the ever-present “something else 
speaking in the place of the subject” (Frosh, 2010, p. 8). 
 
As Martin (2017) argues, symptomatic beliefs are points of fixation in the text where 
unconscious desire is organised. The key affective strategy is “provoking symbolic 
identification” with the broader scenario, the gaze who offers a place of recognition and 
approval. Subjects are oriented beyond the situational context, “the characters named in 
speech or the relations between them”, to the expansive symbolic world of meaning (Martin, 
2017, p. 15). Thus, evocations of desire as a hidden configuration (in images, language and 
traumatic ‘enjoyment’) are masked by “plausible stories” that offer up sites of identification 
(Martin, 2017, p. 2). In this respect, “ordinary (white) citizens” as recipients of Powell’s speech 
(Martin, 2015, p. 15), or Trump’s campaign (McMillan, 2017) were able to envision a place for 
themselves in the symbolic order. 
 
We can appreciate how ideologies such as racism are, therefore “negotiated transaction[s] of 
desire between the self and Other” (Hook, 2018c, p. 20). It explains, more cogently, the grip 
of ideology that exerts its effects of power and truth on the one level (Hook, 2008b). On 
another, it offers modes of jouissance (excessive libidinal enjoyment) that entices and sustains 
desire (Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006). Collective identification is, therefore, the outcome 
“not only [of] symbolic meaning and discursive fullness but also ‘the libidinal organisation of 
groups’” (Freud, 1985 as cited in Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006, p. 149). The explicit tracing 
of desire in intersubjective exchanges and the broader cultural frame that informs power 
relations is a neglected domain in research (e.g., Hoedemaekers, 2010; Martin, 2015). To 
explore questions of home and the asymmetries of ‘be – longing’ requires an analysis not only 
of desire as a fantasmatic transaction, but also its underside – abjection, revulsion, horror and 
disgust. Neglected in research is the underside of desire, the Lacanian Real, that moves us 
away from others in visceral, bodily and affective ways. What Lacanian analysis moves 
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towards is a confrontation with two instances of the Real – the lack in the Other and the 
subject’s alienation from jouissance – both traumatic effects as it exposes the subject’s 
destitution (Bistoen, 2016). 
 
3.6. Traumatic belongings: Interruptions in Identification 
How does abjection feature in the fantasmatic transaction?  For Kristeva (1982, p. 2-3), 
abjection is “the place where meaning collapses”. The experience of abjection is much like a 
traumatic event, an encounter with the Real, an “unbearable nearness that does not allow 
distancing/separation” (Lacan (1978, as cited in Berressem, 2007, p. 21). The unspeakable 
as abject is relegated to the Real, thus outside the discursive realm (Berressem, 2007). To be 
represented, it needs to be symbolised as speakable or readable, whether this is in rhetorical 
or euphemistic ways. Thus, the abject is bodily/material in its origins becomes meaningfully 
negotiated in retrospect through language. 
 
As argued previously, belonging is the outcome narrative of survival, whereby the subject is 
sutured into the coherent story structured by the national myths, symbols and memories 
(McMillan, 2017). More than simply narrative constructions, history is also riddled with affect. 
In Michel de Certeau’s (1988 as cited in Georgis, 2007, p. 246) view, the narrative outcome is 
the “absence of understanding”; that is, the “after-effect of being affected by otherness”. As 
explicated in anxious belongings (Middleton, 2013), the point de capiton, the anchoring point 
of identity, is only readable through repetition (Lacan, as cited in Belau, 2001, para. 10).  The 
Real, is encountered as the “point of shock or trauma” (Parker, 2005, p. 176) is discerned in 
the unconscious interruption of ‘egoic’ logic. Despite our efforts to pin down identity through 
narrative coherence (i.e., the symbolic and imaginary aspects of texts) this is futile as it is 
always unconsciously interrupted (Driver, 2009; Erberle, 2017). Belonging as a narrative 
construction is therefore forever thrown into disruption, only to be intensely reinforced, re-
narrated, or revised as resistance following rupture. 
 
The point here is that what is left outside of a necessary narrative of symbolic survival is the 
Real that perpetually interrupts our understanding or sense-making. Given its negative 
ontological status, the Real becomes analytically impossible to locate it textually 
(Hoedemakers, 2010). However, Lacanian scholars argue that we can discern the Real in the 
failure of construction. It “irrupts” into language as affect (Berressem, 2007, p. 37), showing 
itself as interruptions and breakdowns to textual coherence: gaps, inconsistencies, omissions, 
slips, contradictions, distractions, defences, etc. (Parker, 2007; Hoedemakers, 2010). We 
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discover that our utterances, rather than conforming to an imagined coherence of the self, 
does not belong to us.  Jouissance is this perpetual struggle, of pain and pleasure, of how it 
is impossible to say who we are or derive what we want. This affective struggle nevertheless 
enlivens human desire; as Driver (2009, p. 56) offers, we experience ourselves as “intensely 
alive, to an experience of who we are as subjects … at our most creative and powerful”. The 
corporeal materiality of language as a “subtle body” (Lacan, 2001 as cited in Painter, 2008, p. 
177) is evident here. The speaking voice, with its variations of intonation, prosody, 
enunciation, accent, etc. accompanied by bodily gestures, are ways through which we as 
subjects “embody the social world” (Painter, 2008, p. 177). Our narratives are therefore 
embodied investments of meaning (Glynos, 2012), as the cited literature has alluded to 
(McMillan, 2017). Abjects are, consequently banished to the Real, where it is “enjoyed 
painfully and intensively” (Berressem, 2007, p. 25). 
 
In accord with this materialist view of language, something escapes symbolisation. While the 
research cited points toward a derivative of jouissance as joui-sens, the enjoyment of meaning 
(or enjoyed knowledge), what remains is a bodily jouissance that is outside of symbolic 
meaning (Soler, 2016). Martin (2015) and McMillan’s (2017) research alludes to this latter 
derivative, specifically exploring affect to communicate the critical message in political speech 
(for example, justifying violence against foreigners). What this overlooks are the processes of 
affective exchange that subjects, in experiential, visceral and bodily ways, become co-opted 
in the fantasmatic transaction. The difficulty here is this research has relied on ‘static’ forms 
of data: policy statements (Hoedemakers, 2010), public correspondence (Hillier & Gunder, 
2005), political speech transcripts (Martin, 2015; McMillan, 2017), or news reports (Ali & 
Whitham, 2018; Kingsbury, 2005). These less dynamic texts that do not allow for analysis of 
the immediacy of communicative exchanges. 
 
Such methods are not necessarily problematic from an analytic point of view, given that 
ideology is typically realised in textual or linguistic form (Ali & Whitham, 2018). These studies, 
however, take a distantiated stance towards ideological practices (racism, xenophobia, etc.), 
viewed as something performed ‘out there’ by those who come into its grips. They tend to 
situate the researcher/analyst as somewhat removed from its enactments and effects. 
Moreover, it fails to capture our inescapable part in ideological enactments as a way of ‘seeing’ 
and participating in our world at the most banal, ordinary lived experience (Žižek, 1994). What 
is needed is a sustained analysis of processes of (dis)identification as lively, affective and 
embodied participatory exchanges between interlocutors (participants and researchers alike). 
The intersubjective and trans-individual aspects are essential if we are to conceive of 
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(ideological) fantasy not merely as “imagined unrealities” or daydreams we escape to in our 
heads (Hirvonen, 2016, p. 256). Rather, fantasy is constituted in lively, embodied, visceral, 
sensed, felt modes of being and doing that constitutes the very reality we co-create with others 
that moves our bodies to action. 
 
This conceptual move allows us to view belonging, not as an outcome, but as a process that 
can never reach completion. This continual flow of identificatory practices through which we 
perform, intersubjectively and trans-individually, our desiring identities and our longings to 
become” (Probyn, 1996, p. 19) is yet to be explored in the research. This view is in line with a 
relationality logic where belonging is unstable and precarious. Therefore, the meaning of 
identity, as it is sutured into belonging in this respect cannot merely be viewed as outcomes 
of symbolic survival as denoted by some of the Lacanian literature. What scholarship 
overlooks is desire as a process; as a lived and embodied experience of ‘be – longing’, 
“profoundly affective [and] always performed … within and between sets of social relations” 
(Probyn, 1996, p. 13). Conceptualising belonging as processual offers possibilities for 
countless revisions. Here, Rowe (2006, p. 17) writes that we encounter collusion when “our 
belongings are stripped from us”, propelling us to rewrite the consciousness of ourselves, 
making room for “infinite unfoldings” and becomings. 
 
This process ontology is in line with Julia Kristeva’s (1982) view of subjectivity as ongoing, 
incomplete and discontinuous. This view is a departure from a Lacanian subjectivity. As 
Mansfield (2000) offers,  the Lacanian subject is attained upon entry into the Symbolic, 
resulting in a nostalgic and insatiable yearning (desire). For Kristeva (1982), subjectivity is 
never fully attained, but forever troubled by its unresolved origins – the physical flows of the 
body (urine, shit, tears, blood, vomit, sweat, semen, etc.). These perpetually threaten to 
collapse the unity and meaning of a full body. Kristeva’s (1982) refers to this as abjection and 
is a useful concept to build on from Lacanian abstraction. It opens up ways of thinking about 
matters of the body-in-space that is lacking in research on belonging (Berressem, 2007).  The 
abjected aspects – the Real trauma – of identity work is embodied as want and disgust, what 
Berressem (2007, p. 8) refers to as the “abject of desire”. 
 
3.6.1. Materiality of abjection 
For Kristeva (1982; 1991), the Other is not only a creation by the self but also formative of the 
self, captured in the abject. The abject is the “hidden face of our identity”, the unconscious 
aspect of ourselves that is neither subject nor object (Kristeva, 1991, p. 1). This repudiated 
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aspect of ourselves, recognised as ‘strangely familiar’, is a key feature of collective identity 
formation (Kinnvall, 2018). Those moments when self-other is ambiguous – “where one is 
other to oneself, and in recognising the other as like” – that the ‘stranger’ is experienced as all 
the more threatening (Norton, as cited in Kinnvall, 2004, p. 753). 
 
To continue from Lacan’s (1977) spatial metaphor, Kristeva (1982, p. 2-3) refers to the abject 
as “the place where meaning collapses”. Subjectivity is troubled in this experience and 
urgently seeks definition through boundary-making. It is not object, but abject. It stems from a 
place of ambiguity and an inability to distinguish ‘inside’ from ‘outside’.  Abject(ion) relates to 
the Real of bodily anxiety, the guises of objet a, of not knowing whether they belong or do not 
belong to the body (Harris, 2016). The abject’s non-object status, however, does not render it 
immaterial. To the contrary, they are “excessively material” (Berressem (2007, p. 21, 
emphasis in original). The impermeability rendered in the abject, pertains to physical 
materiality of events and things, the boundary of separation “tempting us to the point of losing 
our differences, our speech, our life; to the point of aphasia, decay, opprobrium, and death” 
(Kristeva, as cited in Berressem, 2007, p. 21). This unknown, vague and at the same time 
indelible impression, brings about “a crushing experience of ‘out of placeness’” (Hook, 2015, 
p. 48) or overwhelming bodily tension that exceeds comprehension (Harris, 2016). 
 
3.6.2. Abjection: traumatic bodily enjoyments 
The exclusion of the material realm in Lacanian psychoanalysis overlooks the pre-symbolic 
dimension (Kristeva, 1982). The Lacanian logic holds that in the process of ego formation, 
psychic reality is siphoned off from material reality. Kristeva’s abject is an attempt to 
reconstitute the material back into the psychoanalysis. The conceptual difficulty here is that 
the “speaking body” always comes before the “living body” (Lacan, 1988, as cited in 
Berressem, 2007, p. 40). Thus, abjects remain the after-effect – the outcome of abjection – 
subjected to and disrupted by the representational logic. How then can we discern abjection 
in operation beyond the materiality of the speaking body? 
 
Hook’s (2013, p. 254) analysis draws on the ‘turn to affect’ in critical social theory, exemplified 
in the work of Clough and Halley (2007) (see previous Literature Review chapter). The 
analysis explores horror images, as part-and-parcel of the apartheid fantasy of the “the black 
body-in-pieces” (Hook, 2013, p. 254). A key focus is not the content of representations, but to 
the affective force of such texts, the felt resonances and experiential intensities that the 
disturbing images (of bodies) evoke. As Hook (2013) argues, the Rapport newspaper‘s image 
of a ‘terrorist’ figure (a commander of Umkhontu we Sizwe) in the late 1980s, served as 
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spectacle, whereby the feared ‘black’ body of the apartheid imagination was reduced to a 
mutilated body. The image, rather than engendering sympathy in its readers (mostly white, 
Afrikaans), created forms of dis-identification in its elicitations of disgust. The jouissance 
elicited by the image, according to Hook’s reading, is one that invites relish. Moreover, aligns 
with an ideological message that deters further acts of terrorism, while pronouncing the 
inviolability of the white body. This work is valuable as it draws attention to bodily logic. The 
resonances and experiences produced in the body, as a potent site of identity work, as  Hook 
(2013b, p. 263; emphasis in original) argues, “prioritizes affect over signification, sense over 
meaning and direct experience over processes of reading”. At the same time, however, these 
are not purely subjective bodily reactions. To follow a Lacanian understanding, they aligned 
to the symbolic coordinates of apartheid that make such responses legitimate and legible. 
 
This scholarship overviewed here offers a critical and interrogatory account of racist ideology 
through visual and bodily regimes. However, the researcher in these accounts (e.g., Hook, 
2013a; Martin, 2015; McMillan, 2017) is nevertheless safely ensconced outside the analytic 
frame, removed from an interrogation of his/her own lived experiences of desire and abjection. 
If we take the process ontology of becoming seriously, then the researcher’s lived experiences 
(of desire, fear and loathing) is very much implicated in processes of ‘be – longing’ to which 
s/he forms part, and which s/he perpetually performs “within and between sets of social 
relations”  (Probyn, 1996, p. 13; Rowe, 2005). Parker (2007, p. 175) notes here that the ethical 
position is always to be “reflexively positioned in relation to the text”. Such a position entails 
situating analysis in relation to the Other; that is, viewing communication as an appeal to 
recognition (Lacan, 1992, as cited in Parker, 2007). 
 
The body as a research instrument (Longhurst et al., 2008), to borrow from critical 
geographical research, proves useful here to supplement efforts by Lacanian scholars towards 
a ‘turn to matter’ (Glynos, 2012). Longhurst et al. (2008) propose that bodies are always 
located, and interpellated by ideology, to produce knowledge and space. Within the research 
space, participants and researchers alike perform varied, and often contradictory, embodied 
subjectivities. Longhurst et al.’s (2008) research, for example, sought to explore the relations 
between identity, place and power, focusing on migrant women’s visceral experiences of food 
sharing and eating. Disgust resonated as ‘real’ bodily reactions, for example, unease, or 
gagging sensations in response to particular food traditions. According to this research,  
aversions structure forms of oppression and racism, distinguishing “raced-abject-Other 
bodies” from “clean white eaters” (Han, 2007, as cited in Longhurst et al., 2008, p. 214). 
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3.7. Conclusion: Interrogating ‘Home’ 
The empirical scholarship has shown, the workings of desire are traceable through discourse 
(Eberle, 2017; Martin, 2015; McMillan, 2017). Moreover, the boundary work of self-other 
differentiation and (dis)identification of self-from-other, is shown to achieve securitisation of 
identity (Kinnvall, 2018) and belonging. However, belonging cannot be reduced to the 
narrative outcome of symbolic survival. Subjectification is perpetually interrupted by the Real, 
abjected aspects of our being. ‘Be – longing’ is an affective, bodily process forever seeking to 
re-narrate and redraw new boundaries of the self. Drawing on a critical social psychology, 
therefore, opens up possibilities for a lively and interactive analyses. Moreover, (traumatic) 
‘be – longings’ are always historicised. These are performed in bodily, affective, and 
intersubjective spaces as modes of enjoyment that play out with ‘small others’ and ‘the big 
Other’ (Hook, 2008b; Kingsbury, 2005; Kinnvall, 2008). These constituting domains inform our 
fantasmatic transactions, offering the symbolic, visual and affective co-ordinates of belonging.  
From an ethical stance, the researcher’s place within the cultural-symbolic co-ordinates of 
meaning must be considered, including his/her place in “histories of belonging” (Georgis, 
2007, p. 244) relative to the broader context and the intersubjective space between researcher 
and participants. 
 
Of ethical necessity here is the implication of the role of the researcher beyond that of mere 
witness to unfoldings. As an active and willing participant, the researcher’s longings, desires, 
anxieties, fears and abjections inevitably features part of the embodied doings of ‘Be Longing’ 
(Rowe, 2005, p. 15) as it is played out with participants. Thus, the researcher’s subjective 
place in the socio-symbolic, informed by a “history of belongings” (Georgis, 2007, p. 244), is 
part-and-parcel of the lively unfolding of fantasmatic transactions that cannot be relegated to 
the postscript of analyses. This critical reflexivity is not an act of self-indulgence, but an ethical 
necessity to documents the researcher’s dynamic and shifting positions relative to 
participants, settings, interactions and positions in dialogue. Through these momentary shifts, 
the surprise openings of the unconscious become apparent that as Parker (2015b, p. 250) 
notes “disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place”.  This research focuses on home 
as a psychosocial project of belonging across two contrasting socio-material spaces that have 
come to define (post)apartheid living in South Africa. I explore how these are lived, 
experienced, narrated and performed with myself and the participants. In the next chapter, I 
outline a methodology to examine the dimensions of home and belonging as a narrative reality 
and performativity. I consider how this might structure a method of research that is bodily, 
spatial, discursive and affective, and at the same time foregrounds the researcher’s 
subjectivity as an instrument and data source (Hollway, 2009; Longhurst et al., 2008). 
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Chapter 4: Methodology 
 
4.1. Introduction  
I situate the research within the psychosocial studies field. Broadly defined, psychosocial 
studies is a critical approach that aims to theorise and study subjectivity by ‘suturing’ the 
psychological and the social, while not articulating these as distinct domains (Frosh & 
Baraitser, 2008). There seems to be general agreement amongst contemporary psychosocial 
scholars that psychoanalysis should be employed in a manner that recognises the constructed 
nature of subjectivity. However, what is remains a subject of fierce debate is precisely how the 
relationship between the psychological and social should be conceived. Those sympathetic to 
the ‘depth’ model of psychoanalysis, in particular, Kleinian-based approaches (Hoggett, 2008; 
Hollway, 2008; Jefferson, 2008; Rustin, 2008), is polarised against the more critically-inflected 
language-based Lacanian approaches (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hook, 2008a; Parker, 2014). 
I situate the research within a Lacanian psychosocial framework to explore how and why we 
invest in home as an ideological fantasy of belonging. Such a psychoanalytically-inflected view 
of reality offers a way of theorising “the ways our deepest commitments bind us to practices 
of domination” (Dean, 2001, as cited in Gunder, 2005, p. 179).  Lacanian notions of desire, 
fantasy and jouissance, offers in my view, the most productive psychoanalytic account of 
‘suturing’ the individual to the social, as articulated, felt, embodied and materialised in home 
as a psychosocial project of belonging.  
 
Home can be viewed as the point of origin (where are you from?) or the outcome of symbolic 
narrative survival. However, to adopt a process logic, home is also a process of becoming, or 
‘be – longing’ (the longing to belong) that eludes capture, metonymically expressed as a 
moving signifier (Brah, 2012).  Brah (2012, p. 173) recognises home as “constructed and 
transformed in and through social practices, cultural imaginaries, historical memories and our 
deepest intimacies”. A psychosocial analysis, therefore, needs to explore subjectivity across 
its constituting and multifaceted dimensions. Home as the narrative construction of the subject 
is, by extension, psychic and social, experiential and political, fluid and processual.  In this 
chapter, I articulate a method for investigating home and belonging that affirms its 
psychosocial complexity. On one level, such a method would illuminate home as a fantasmatic 
narrative construction. On another, it would highlight the processes of ‘be – longing’ as 
relational, affective, embodied, material and spatialised. 
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4.2. Discursive Psychology and Psychoanalysis  
The psychosocial studies field draws on the resonances between psychoanalysis and 
discursive psychology respectively to articulate a view of subjectivity as both psychological 
and social (Emerson & Frosh, 2004; Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Saville Young & Frosh, 2009). 
While discursive psychology and psychoanalysis diverge on the nature of subjectivity 
(Sullivan, 2011), there are also potential points of convergence. For instance, both emphasise 
the variability of meaning in language and its constructed nature (Di Masso et al., 2014; Saville 
Young, 2013). However, for psychoanalysis, talk is primarily mediated by relational dynamics 
and unconscious processes, while for discursive psychology, it is the availability of social and 
political discourses that mediate talk (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008). Psychoanalysis may 
contribute to discursive work by offering an analytic lens that goes beyond talk. Such a lens 
potentially yields a rich affective account of how subjectivity is performed (Saville Young, 
2014).  
 
Hook (2008, p. 401) cautions, however, that to locate theory within a psychoanalytic 
framework requires a critical and reflective stance toward the “position of mastery from which 
psychoanalysis has traditionally spoken from”. In this light, psychoanalytic theories need to be 
employed, not as an expert-driven, meta-theoretical and individualising tool to make sense of 
the text or “explain the subject to itself” (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009, p. 13). To the contrary, 
its critical potential is to disrupt or fragment the texts, and in the process, open up multiple 
interpretations (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009, p. 13). A Lacanian psychosocial stance offers a 
critical use of psychoanalysis that is focused on disrupting rather than pinning down meaning 
(Saville Young & Frosh, 2010; Saville Young, 2011). Such an analysis of texts offers a way to 
explore the ritual of storytelling as a third space. The third space is the crossing points that 
transgress opposing categories: us-them, visible-invisible, inside-outside, ourselves-unknown 
others. 
 
Moreover, there a contrast between what can be symbolised in words and that which eludes 
language (Jackson, 2002; Kraus, 2006). The Foucauldian project, for example, can be 
understood as situated on this precipice in its speaking of “a discourse on non-discursive 
practices” (de Certeau, 1984, p. 61). The aim of employing a psychosocial analysis of selected 
texts is similarly to explore the tensions between what is explicitly said and what is unspoken 
or unsayable (Rogers, 2007). To do so is to recognise the fluidities, processes and silences 
in constructions of belonging and subjectivity. Rather than adopt a stance that it is possible to 
“reveal areas where participants are not transparent to themselves” (Hollway, 2011, p. 8), a 
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Lacanian psychosocial analysis rests on the logic that some things cannot be fully known. It, 
therefore, aims to interfere with or unsettle meanings (Saville Young & Frosh, 2010). 
 
4.2.1. Holding and disrupting sense 
I argue, however, that before disrupting sense as Lacanian psychoanalysis would, it is 
necessary for the research on belonging, to hold an analytical stance that is at once critical 
and compassionate. Such a ‘both-and’ stance is needed to explore belonging as a narrative 
construction and process. From a compassionate attitude, belonging is made out of traumatic 
histories and produced through collective memory (Bloom, 2016; Georgis, 2007; Hook & 
Vanheule, 2016) to allow us to be ‘at home’. At the same time,  a critical stance challenges 
the jouissance in our belongings, where our desires (re)produce hierarchical belongings (Back 
et al., 2012). The ethical and political task, as Kristeva (1987) argues, is to discern the fantasy 
construction, to understand how meaning is (provisionally) held together to effect sites of 
identification. On the critical level, listening to the text also requires a mode of disruption (to 
inform the political task). In terms of a politics of meaning, it involves challenging or breaking 
down, opening up spaces for revolt and re-signification necessary to reconstitute the 
imaginary co-ordinates of society (Hoedemakers, 2010; Kristeva, 1982; Sjöholm, 2005). 
 
4.2.1.1. Meaning making in discursive construction 
The initial task in this research is to explore the discursive performances of talk and how these 
are materialised in home.  Discourse, as Fairclough (2013, p. 3) proposes, is “itself a complex 
set of relations”. We can conceive of these relations on many levels: between people (as 
conveyed in talk, writing, etc.), communicative events (i.e., news articles), and discourse and 
complex objects, be they persons, institutions, power relations, etc. in the physical world. 
Discourse is, therefore, a “relational form of research” that can only be defined and understood 
through an analysis of the relations that comprise it (Fairclough, 2013, p. 3). In this respect, 
we can appreciate the workings of discourse by analysing the relations that constitute meaning 
and constructions of belonging. 
 
4.2.1.2. Transferences of meaning in psychoanalysis  
We can link meaning-making from this discursive frame to the psychoanalytic project.  
Departing from its clinical origins, the transference, by Kristeva’s (1987) account, is the 
preliminary relation that is created for meaning to be effected. The intersubjective space, 
therefore, functions as a process rather than an object; in other words, as “two subjects-in-
process” (Oliver, 1993, p. 120). For Kristeva (1987, as cited in Sjöholm, 2005), the subject 
comes into being when desire is transferred onto something. This understanding reiterates 
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the Lacanian notion that “a subject’s desire is known only through an other” (Oliver, 1993, p. 
120). The transference is a metaphor. As Sjöholm (2005) offers, it stands as the gap between 
the thing and the word, as represented by a dialogue between speaking beings. More than 
merely linguistic, the transference is bodily and affective. Whereas metonymy conjoins the 
chains of linguistic signifiers, metaphor is the creation. Kristeva’s understanding of meaning 
as embodied, displaced and transferred (Sjöholm, 2005), is subsumed in her notion that the 
transference “transfers me to the place of the Other” (Kristeva, 1983, cited in Oliver, 1993, p. 
74). I argue that this view informs a psychosocial reading that is both critical and empathic, as 
distantiated and affectively experienced in the text and the intersubjective exchange. Such an 
interpretive lens allows us to give meaning to texts and simultaneously to disrupt it. 
 
4.3. The Researcher’s Knowing: Subjectivity as an Instrument    
Making use of the researcher’s subjectivity in research presents some challenges.  Any 
attempt to reflect on the sense made of data (or even to disrupt such sense) is a hindsight 
process, inevitably involving “a process of representation or construction of experience” 
(Hollway, 2009, p. 472). As such, the researcher’s knowledge always remains provisional. 
However, there is some “psychoanalytic ‘sensibility’” (Hollway, 2009, p. 463) that is useful to 
assist in understanding the processes of belonging that plays out in researcher-participant 
interactions. The ontological stance adopted here, in line with relational psychoanalysis 
(Chodorow, 1999 as cited in Hollway, 2009, p. 264), seeks to understand “the effects of affect, 
dynamic conflict, unconscious intersubjective processes and embodied practices” of identity. 
Hollway (2009, p. 462) proposes two modes of listening: on one level, attuning to the gestalt 
of the text (the lived, sensuous, dynamic and “conflictual wholeness”); on another, discerning 
how we emotionally resonate with it. The former mode attends to the voice of the text and 
embodied practice, and the latter, the researcher’s “own relationship to the scene”. This 
“intersubjective action of emotion” is embodied (Hollway, 2009, p. 463) and is an important 
vehicle for the researcher’s subjective meaning-making of a particular interaction. Following 
Hollway (2009), experience-near field notes were written and included in transcriptions to 
reflect on the unfolding scenes of interaction.  
 
Whilst using the researcher’s subjectivity is useful for the intended purposes of the research, 
it potentially elevates the researcher to ‘expert’ status who provides the grounds for 
formulating ‘unformulated experience’ (Bradfield, 2012). Hollway’s (2009, p. 464) account of 
“unconscious dynamic intersubjectivity”, though useful to explore participant-researcher 
exchanges, requires a more critical focus. What is needed is an analysis that conjoins the 
“affective traffic within relationships” (Hollway, 2009, p. 465) to the broader domain of the 
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socio-symbolic Other. Lacan’s (1977, p. 44) notion of trans-individual unconscious offers a 
view of the unconscious as “structured like a language” is useful here. The trans-individual 
unconscious is conceived not as internal representations of self/other or intrapsychic 
defensive processes (Bradfield, 2012), but as external, as activated in performances of 
language upon which it is reliant (Hook, 2013b). The researcher’s experience-near field notes, 
alongside interactions with the participants, were used as data sources. An analysis of these 
texts was used to explore how we, as subjects grapple with our place in the symbolic order 
(Hook, 2013b). The researcher’s subjectivity, therefore, cannot be known in advance. Instead, 
to follow from Parker (2015b), consciousnesses come to be thought of and ‘knowable’ through 
the process, emerging at times as surprise. The central point is that the researcher’s unfolding 
subjectivity is included in the critical analysis, as opposed to being subsumed in the expert 
position from which interpretations are made.  
 
4.4. The Researcher’s Social Location 
At the outset, I situate myself as an Asian woman of Chinese descent born in South Africa. 
During my young adult years, I was both witness to and participant in the country’s post-
apartheid transition. While I occupy a privileged status as an educated, employable middle-
class citizen in the contemporary space, my ‘racial’ status has been subject to historically 
shifting classifications, as well as systemic and informal discrimination. These have included 
impermanent designations as ‘Asiatic’ foreigner, ‘coloured’, and ‘honorary white’ during 
apartheid (Park, 2008). In post-apartheid spaces, the Chinese have continually occupied a 
shifting peripheral ‘racial’ status.  In 2008, fourteen years into democracy,  this racialised 
collective was reclassified “black” and as legitimate beneficiaries of BEE (Broad-Based Black 
Economic Empowerment). The outcome followed an eight-year legal battle to contest 
exclusion from crucial pieces of legislation governing employment equity and economic 
empowerment (Harris, 2017).  
 
I am conscious of these historically indeterminate social positionings that continue to inform 
my  ‘racial’ identity in uncertain and tenuous ways. As part of this racialised collective, I have 
(historically) reaped the ‘benefits’ of ‘honorary’ privilege during apartheid. On the other hand, 
my ‘race’ group has been historically marginalised, yet not considered consistently 
marginalised in terms of the “the degree of suffering” (Matavire, 2000 as cited Harris, 2017, p. 
4). In the context of this research, I situate myself as highly privileged, relative to the materially 
and socioeconomically disadvantaged residents of ‘The Township’ setting. While not having 
the same material privileges as the residents of ‘The Gated Community’, my social positioning 
as an educated researcher and psychologist places me in a position of power relative to these 
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participants. At the start of this research, I was a cluster homeowner living in a neighbourhood 
considered middle-class. Due to unanticipated losses, my status shifted to that of renting a 
home. Though conspicuously smaller, it is ensconced in a security village situated in a 
privileged neighbourhood.   
 
4.5. Research Objectives  
The research seeks to explore the affective topographies of belonging as a relational process, 
as historically informed, embodied, talked about and materialised in space. The study has a 
threefold aim. The first is to explore the (intersubjective) processes of belonging as a narrative 
reality and spatial practice enacted between me as the researcher and participants residing in 
two contrasting socio-material spaces. Of interest is how meaning is anchored through 
discursive resources to construct identity as the narrative outcome of belonging, a fantasmatic 
construction that is materialised as home. Second, the research further aims to show the 
ruptures to identification, revealing the very instabilities in ‘be – longing’ as a shifting process 
constituted simultaneously as (bodily) anxiety and desire. Interrelated is the third aim, which 
explores homing desire (Brah, 2012) as a fantasmatic transaction that transcends the 
intersubjective encounter. Of interest is how participants and researcher, respond to the call 
to ‘be – long’ to the “place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162). Moreover, the research draws 
from the analysis to ask what is at stake in our strivings to belong. 
 
4.5.1. Research questions 
To guide these objectives, the research asks the following questions:  
1. How do residents living in spaces of affluence and poverty make meaning of 
‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in an affective, discursive, spatial and bodily sense? 
2. What are the affective coordinates of this narrative imaginary that structure it 
as ideological fantasy? 
3. How do the affective coordinates of fantasy ‘grip’ us into ‘be – longing’ that 
(re)produce asymmetries relationally, socially, spatially and materially in ways 
we make home? 
4. How do unexpected encounters (surprises) in intersubjective encounters signal 
the ‘repressed’ of the texts? How do these (unconscious) ruptures disturb the 
narrative frame in ideological fantasy? 
 
4.6. The Study Location 
Given the research focus on home and the asymmetries of belonging, two contrasting sites 
were purposively selected: ‘The Township’ and the residential ‘Gated Community’ both 
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situated in Johannesburg, unnamed for anonymity. The ‘Township’ site is made up of mixed 
house types, including government-subsidised houses, brick-type homes built by owners, and 
shacks. A community of approximately 23 000 families live in the settlement with an estimated 
73% of its people living below the poverty line (Harber, 2011). The site is considered a post-
apartheid township, initially a transit camp in 1994, for squatters who were removed from the 
privately owned land to make room for the expansion of a luxury housing estate (Bénit, 2002). 
As the municipality developed more formal stands, it attracted migrants from various parts of 
the country in search of job opportunities (Harber, 2011). ‘The Gated Community’ site is an 
800-acre site that comprises a golf estate, country club, and private school amongst other 
luxury amenities. The settlement consists of approximately 1250 residential sites consist of a 
variety of dwellings: standalone homes, semi-detached townhouses and distinct urban villages 
(Murray, 2011). Its residents comprise middle to high-income earners, with approximately 10% 
of households earning more than R2.45 million a year (Burger, 2013). The gated community 
was built to address concerns of safety and crime and prides itself in its sophisticated security 
system and strictly controlled access (Murray, 2011). 
 
4.7. Procedure 
A snowball sampling method was used to recruit participants. Issues of safety and legitimacy 
for both the researcher and participants were important considerations informing the approach 
(Berg, 2001). Given that the research necessitated a lengthy interaction with participants in 
their private home spaces, specific cautions were be taken to ensure the researcher’s safety. 
In turn, potential participants also had to be assured of the credibility of the research(er) to 
establish safety and trust, given that the researcher may be invited to enter their domestic 
spaces. For these reasons, the snowballing approach provided the means for access to these 
sites with the help of guides. Guides are individuals who are indigenous to a research setting 
and, in the case of the present research, are people who have existing relationships with 
individuals personally known to the researcher. They are potential participants but also provide 
the means of guiding safe access to other participants. Such a strategy has been used in 
ethnographic research, mainly where the nature of data collection or site raises issues of 
researcher safety (Berg, 2001). Snowballing, in this context, refers to “using people whom the 
… guide(s) introduces to the ethnographer as persons who can vouch for the legitimacy and 
safety of the researcher” (Berg, 2001, p. 146). Before contact with potential guides and 
participants, full ethical approval for the research was granted by the Humanities and Social 
Sciences Research Ethics Committee, University of Kwazulu-Natal (see Appendix 1). 
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4.7.1. Negotiating access 
Access was negotiated via persons (guides) personally and professionally known to the 
researcher, whose relatives, friends or colleagues live at either of the two sites. The researcher 
made telephonic contact with each potential participant once s/he had given the referral 
source permission to be contacted. The research was guided by the ethical principles of 
autonomy and beneficence. According to the principle of autonomy, participants have the right 
to be informed about the study and to make decisions concerning participation and withdrawal 
(Orb, Eisenhauer & Wynaden, 2001). Potential participants were briefed about the research 
and provided information allowing them to make an informed decision. Participants were an 
option to participate, decline participation or withdraw from the study at any stage without 
negative consequence. Participants were informed that their participation would involve a time 
commitment of between 2,5 to 4 hours, which comprises a guided walk through their home 
and community, and a face-to-face sit-down interview. Participants were provided with an 
Information Sheet (See Appendix 2), and given the opportunity to ask questions relating to 
participation. 
 
The principle of beneficence promotes the notion of doing good or preventing harm (Orb et 
al., 2001). The participants were assured that their responses would remain confidential and 
their identities anonymous. In this respect, the pseudonyms of participants’ choosing were 
utilised in the analysis and write up of the findings. Participants were assured that their 
identities would not be matched to the site of their residence. Participants were also informed 
that any audio files and interview transcripts would be encrypted, securely stored and 
destroyed within five years after the research write-up. They were informed about the 
participation benefits (self-awareness, stress relief, self-expression) and risks (feelings, 
discomfort or vulnerability elicited by story content).  
 
Participants were informed that they would be debriefing following the research and, if 
necessary, referred for counselling at the Emthonjeni Centre at no cost. Participants were 
compensated for their time with a grocery voucher. Participants were asked to complete the 
Consent Form (see Appendix 3). Suitable dates were negotiated with each participant for data 
collection. 
 
4.7.2. Navigating access challenges 
 
As highlighted, the identified study sites were ‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated Community’. 
The intended number of participants was limited to ten, five from each of the two respective 
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sites chosen. However, despite the use of a snowball sample, there were continual challenges 
gaining access to participants from the identified ‘Gated Community’ site. Initially, the site only 
yielded two participants. Further consent was granted from the Ethics Committee to include 
three additional housing estates adjacent to the original site that formed part of the same 
community (see Appendix 4). The additional estates occupy differential status relative to the 
original ‘gated community’ site, offering rich data to explore the hierarchies of privilege that 
govern the community. Inclusion of these additional sites also provided a point of contrast with 
the heterogenous ‘class’ structures in the township site. 
 
4.7.3. Participant data 
In total, nine participants were recruited comprising four participants from the gated community 
site and five participants from the township site. No secondary referrals were yielded from the 
gated community site, whereas in the township site, two referrals were yielded from primary 
participants.  
 
Table 1: Demographic information  
Pseudonym Gender Age Residence Occupation 
Township site  
Madala Male 45 Shack 
owner (Ext. 
11) 
Gardener 
Khuras Male 35 Rents brick 
room on 
RDP 
property 
(Ext. 6) 
Videographer  
Mamakgowa Female 38 Rents shack 
(Ext. 1) 
Collects 
recyclable 
bottles 
Mlandy Female 34 Rents shack 
on RDP 
property 
(Ext. 6) 
Librarian 
(NGO) 
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Mmbatho Female  40 Rents brick 
home 
(Tanagani 
suburb) 
Unemployed  
Gated community site 
M Male  42 Home owner 
in estate 
Attorney 
Malik Male  42 Rents 
cluster 
home in 
security 
estate 
Executive 
sales head 
Meryl Female 56 Home owner 
in golf estate 
Estate agent 
Sophia Female  60 Home owner 
in golf estate  
Housewife   
 
  
This small sample is deemed appropriate, given prolonged engagement with participants to 
derive localised interpretations (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007), and the multiple-source data 
collected via go-along and narrative interviews. Generalisation is not the goal. Instead, an in-
depth case-orientated analysis offers unique narratives of ‘home’. For this reason, the focus 
was on variability rather than homogeneity in sampling. This variability within the parameters 
of a snowball sampling approach was expressed in terms of gender, ‘race’, and home type 
(e.g., shack, brick house, standalone house, townhouse). Given that conversational 
exchanges between participant and researcher would be central to the analysis, recruitment 
was limited to participants conversant in English. 
 
4.8. Collection Methods 
Data collection proceeded in two phases. The first phase comprised ‘go-alongs’ with 
participants as a form of mobile interviewing method. The second involved a sit-down narrative 
interview to elicit life stories.  
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4.8.1. Go-alongs 
A go-along is a qualitative interview method where the researcher accompanies informants 
on their day-to-day outings in their familiar environments. These outings may take the form of 
a walk-along or ride-along, or a combination of both (Kusenbach, 2003). The method attends 
to perception (personal relevances) that guide everyday experience. These include spatial 
practices, life histories and place, social architecture, and social realms (how reality is shaped 
by interaction). Kusenbach’s (2003) go along method was used to explore the home spaces 
of participants. The go-along departs from a traditional ethnography. With its anthropological 
roots, this involves sustained immersion in a culture where the researcher becomes 
acquainted with the language, social conventions and rituals (Silverman & Marvasti, 2008).  
 
The approach adopted in this research, however, explores the particular milieux in which 
home is being co-constructed. Of interest is how home is performed in lively ways between 
participants and the researcher, as opposed to neutrally observing home that is already made, 
Home spaces denote the inner domestic space and the space between home (house in a 
literal sense) and the surrounds that make up everyday doings (e.g., shopping, eating, 
walking, taking children to school, etc.). Engaging in a relationship with place (walking, talking 
about and spending time at a location) represents the lived spaces of Lefebvre (1991). 
Emerging from this are different forms of knowledge that cannot be captured by traditional sit-
down interviews (Moles, 2007). The go-along method foregrounds the meanings of place and 
spatial practices, exploring with participants their experiences and practices as they move and 
engage with their physical/social environments (Kusenbach, 2003). However, Kusenbach’s 
go-along method is a ‘street phenomenology’ that emphasizes participants’ stream of 
perceptions, emotions and interpretations. As such, the researcher’s participation in the 
contents of the narrative is avoided and overlooked. This remiss not only introduces an 
element of ‘artificiality’ to an intended “natural everyday trip” (Kusenbach, 2003, p. 457); it also 
overlooks the conversational context in which knowledge is co-produced.   
 
Therefore, the research drew on Kusenbach’s go along method but drew attention to the 
relational dimension of meaning-making. Rather than eliciting ‘neutral’ forms of knowledge 
through observation, the knowledge co-produced is conversational, as it spontaneously 
unfolds in the researcher-participant exchange. Moreover, the conversational exchange is 
situated; that is, contingent on the sights and sounds that are part of the surrounding place 
(Brown & Durrheim, 2009). This method is participant-led. The researcher is guided by the 
participant on a tour of their home spaces. Alongside a conversational mode of interaction 
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elicited by place, this mode of interaction shifts the power imbalances inherent in traditional 
question-and-answer interview modes, producing more relational forms of knowledge 
construction (Brown & Durrheim, 2009).  
 
Following each go-along, experience-near field notes were written to detail observations 
(Hollway, 2009). A psychoanalytic-informed observation informed these field notes. The focus 
extended beyond the ‘talk’ to noticing the unfolding non-verbal, embodied practices and 
affective states in the research relationship and participants’ immediate sociospatial world. 
Also, the researcher recorded her affective impressions and interpersonal dynamics arising 
from these participant observations. The researcher’s subjectivity thus forms an important 
source of data as an instrument of knowing. Here, the “intersubjective action of emotion” as a 
source of meaning is highlighted (Hollway, 2009, p. 463). The mobile interviewing method, as 
the first phase of data collection helped to build rapport with participants, provided the means 
for opening up for further in-depth interviewing to elicit life stories. 
 
4.8.2. Sit-down narrative interviews 
The second data source was derived from in-depth interviews with participants. These took 
place in the home space of the participant’s choosing. A semi-structured sit-down interview 
was conducted to elicit participants’ personal stories, as guided by the central research 
question(s) and informed by theory (Wengraf, 2001). The interview schedule (See Appendix 
5) design was guided by Hollway and Jefferson’s (2000) critique of the research subject that 
has dominated much of qualitative research. Here, the subject was viewed as one who has 
access to knowing his/her experiences and in the context of trusting space, tells it like it is, 
thus rendering a faithful account of ‘reality’.  
 
In reaction to this, Hollway and Jefferson (2000) draw on a Kleinian psychoanalytic view of the 
human subject as anxious and defended against anxieties. The subject’s anxious response to 
often threatening life events, present and historical, elicit unconscious defensive responses 
and manoeuvres. Such defences align with particular discourses (meaning systems) that in 
turn, affect and are affected by the social world. In this respect, the subject is simultaneously 
psychic and social. The idea of the defended subject provides a cohering narrative of the 
participants’ investment in particular subject positionings and their accounting practices that 
come from available discourses. At the same time, it is the culturally unspoken and 
unspeakable aspects of experience on which our subjective investments hinge (Frosh, 
Phoenix & Pattman, 2003). From a Lacanian perspective, subject positioning affords a 
tentative exploration of possible ‘enjoyment’ created by taken up positions (Frosh et al., 2003) 
  
 
72 
and how anxiety in the text signals the narrative breakdown of egoic coherence (Rogers, 
2007).  
 
Conceptual differences aside, the key is that rather than disguising intersubjective anxiety and 
the interviewee’s defences against it, the semi-structured interview in this view must explicitly 
cater for anxiety and defensive responses (Wengraf, 2001). The design of the interview 
schedule integrated guidelines from Wengraf (2001) and Hollway and Jefferson (2000). An 
active listening stance, guided by Kvale’s (1996) process ontology provided the structure and 
orientation to eliciting data from participants. In this respect, an initial open-ended question 
was used as the opening prompt to generate a spontaneous narrative. During the unfolding 
story, the researcher merely offered (non)verbal gestures to encourage the narrative flow. 
Follow-up questions were employed to illuminate self-contradiction, provoke self-reflexivity or 
encouragement of alternative views (Potter & Wetherell as cited in Wengraf, 2001). Direct, 
indirect and structuring questions encouraged reflection and steer the conversation, and the 
use of silence offered a way to cater to anxieties in the text. Following Kvale’s (1996) process 
ontology, these follow-up questions unfolded spontaneously in the interview exchange, guided 
by unique responses of each participant.  
 
Participants were debriefed at last contact. Participants reflected on the research process and, 
in turn, the researcher screened participants for any emotional discomforts experienced during 
the research. None of the participants indicated the need for counselling. In a gesture of 
appreciation, each participant received a grocery voucher. Following each interview, I wrote 
up experience-near field notes (Hollway, 2009). These notes extended the analytic frame to 
include my own lived, visceral responses to particular interactions as the researcher and how 
I became co-opted in the fantasy frame.  Interviews were transcribed to reflect the texture of 
talk and its intersubjective co-constructing quality, for example, paying attention to laughter, 
crying, false starts, pauses, silences, interruptions etc. that intersperse verbal exchanges 
(Saville Young & Frosh, 2010). 
 
4.9. Data Analysis 
Interviews were audio-recorded and carefully transcribed to depict conversational markers 
(including pauses, interruptions, tonal variations, etc.) and contextual data (notable spatial 
locations, visual markers etc.) (Brown & Durrheim, 2009) (see Appendix 6 for transcription 
notations). The design of the interview schedule followed the Hollway-Jefferson model of 
subjectivity. However, the approach to listening to the data followed a Lacanian view of the 
unconscious as trans-individual, activated within performances of speech (Hook, 2013b). The 
  
 
73 
Lacanian view of the self as non-essential, as constituted in language supports a 
poststructualist view of subjectivity (Rogers, 2007). 
 
The go-along and sit-down interviews formed the data corpus as a whole. It is acknowledged 
that the sample size is small. However, the methodological approach taken is not to view the 
individual as the basic unit of analysis, but rather to discern patterns in speech through which 
we might understand the macro social world (Talja, 1999). The transcripts were read for 
interpretive repertoires as the basic unit of analysis. Using Nvivo qualitative analysis software 
programme, these were coded into nodes. The data analysis then proceeded in two phases. 
The first phase drew on interpretation from ‘the “the line of the Imaginary” (Parker, 2005, p. 
175) to explore the sense-making stance. A discursive reading was used to explore these 
interpretive repertoires as “threads of sense-making” (Wetherell, 2012, p. 12) to identify the 
quilting points of the text (Parker, 2005), dominant discourses (Wetherell & Potter, 1988) and 
subject positions (Edley, 2001).  
 
The second phase drew on interpretation from the “line of the Symbolic” (Parker, 2005, p. 
175). Below, I outline the ‘steps’ for analysis of the texts based on Rogers’ (2007) interpretive 
poetics. This approach explores narrative as an imaginary construction and offers guidelines 
for discerning the subject’s address to the Other in speech. I draw from Frosh and Saville 
Young’s (2010, p. 53) guidelines on “concentric reflexivity” to supplement Rogers’ (2007) 
Lacanian reading of the texts, as outlined below. Although described as ‘steps’, the approach 
to analysis was by no means sequential, but rather involved a recursive layering process of 
“making sense” and “disrupting” sense (Frosh & Saville Young, 2009, p. 3, 14).    
 
4.9.1. Story threads  
On this level, I approached the data from a stance of listening to story threads. This stance 
involved discerning the story content, not to attach to it as narrative, but to illuminate how the 
texts unwittingly censor or repress what is unsayable (Rogers, 2007). I proceeded with a 
discursive reading of the texts to analyse how speakers use language to derive structure, 
credibility and meaning in their narratives. Parker (2005, p. 175) refers to this sense-making 
stance as interpreting on “the line of the Imaginary”, which seeks to render seeming coherence 
of the text, yet misrecognises a construction for reality itself (Rogers, 2007). True to a Lacanian 
discursive analysis (Parker, 2005), the ethical imperative is to resist interpretation at this level, 
which assumes that we can interpret from outside the text. To interpret on “the line of the 
Symbolic” (Parker, 2005, p. 175) is to work within the domain of the text; that is, to disrupt it 
to show its functions.   
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Departing from Parker’s (2005) model, the analytical stance adopted in this research is both 
holding and disrupting sense (Saville Young & Berry, 2016). The aim is to yield an account 
that is both critical and compassionate of our performative strivings to belong. Following Frosh 
and Saville Young (2010), I performed a discursive reading to highlight the dominant 
discourses and the subject positions they offered. In turn, interpretive repertoires as “threads 
of sense-making” were identified in familiar tropes, metaphors, and recurrent patterns 
(Wetherell & Potter, 1988 as cited in Wetherell, 2012, p. 12). These meaning-making threads 
are used to derive the ‘common sense’ or explanatory resource of a community that organises 
its accountability (Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998). In identifying these dominant elements or 
quilting points in the texts, the analysis proceeds to query what might be repressed by these 
operations of language (Parker, 2005). Related to the next layer of analysis,  this focused on 
how subjects are divided to represent themselves. 
 
4.9.2. The divided ‘I’ 
At this level, the analysis focused on emotionality or breaches. These emotional registers may 
be evidenced as chronological disruptions, false starts, long pauses, laughter, silences, 
incoherences, contradictions or conflicts (Emerson & Frosh, 2004; Frosh & Saville Young, 
2010). As Rogers (2007, p. 112) offers, these are disruptions to the voice of the imaginary ‘I’ 
(the romanticised and conscious guide to the ideal identity and story). They reveal “the voice 
of the faltering ‘i’” (the opposing voice of the real that splits the subject). Attention was drawn 
to the contradictions – “how story threads play against one another” in the texts to discern the 
subtle traces of the unconscious (Rogers, 2007, p. 110). The speaking subject, therefore, 
becomes divided to represent itself (Rogers, 2007), always saying something more than s/he 
intends to say, thus signalling something more than the coherent story (Chiesa, 2007; Frosh 
& Saville Young, 2010). Closely related to this idea is the notion of address. 
 
4.9.3. The address 
At specific points in the texts, analysis drew attention to the small other and big Other whom 
the speaking subject seeks to address (Rogers, 2007). The Lacanian point that speech is an 
act, not merely to communicate, but to seek recognition and evoke desire in the other (Chiesa, 
2007). Attention was drawn to both the intersubjective exchanges and the (unconscious) 
address to the ‘Other’ so that “the specificity of this unconscious, repressed desire” may be 
recognised (Chiesa, 2007, p. 40). Therefore, the analysis considered the possible ‘symbolic 
identification’ with a broader scenario or situation which participants and researcher alike 
oriented towards in their speech (Martin, 2015). 
  
 
75 
 
4.9.4. Languages of the unsayable  
Foregrounding the unspeakable in speech, this layer of analysis focused on the negations 
(invoking opposites), revisions, ‘smokescreens’ (diversions from discomfort) and silences in 
the texts (Rogers, 2007).  
 
4.9.5. Signifiers of the unconscious  
At this level, the analysis traced the recurring words and phrases to derive the unintended 
meanings or the unconscious of the text (Rogers, 2007). Evidence of this may be discerned 
in linguistic work – recurring words with shifting meanings – suggesting how language uses 
the subject in ways unintended by the interlocutor (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010). 
 
4.9.6. Reflexivity  
Reflexivity is “an interactively critical practice that is constantly reflecting on itself”, and is 
central to psychosocial research (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 350). This critical gaze is not 
limited to the researcher, but the discipline itself, its claims to knowledge and its methodology 
(Frosh & Saville Young, 2010). Field notes, self-debriefing notes, transcription memos, 
feedback from participants, discussions with supervisors, and detailed transcriptions 
comprised the reflexive practices. These were scrutinised for their contributions to the 
research processes and outcomes. In this manner, subjectivity was deliberately drawn upon 
as a resource to critically consider the researcher’s (un)conscious investment in the research 
(Frosh & Baraitser, 2008). Moreover, reflections on what structures the researcher-subject 
relationship, what the researcher brings to the research processes, social differences (‘race’, 
class, gender, etc.) between researcher and participant were treated as important sources of 
information to account for analytical transparency. Intersubjectivity in the research process 
was the site of interpersonal interactions (e.g., Wetherell & Potter, as cited in Frosh & 
Baraitser, 2008). It also opened up as ‘surprises’ emerging in (inter)actions that exceed 
coherent narration, sense-making or interpretation (Nasio, 1992 as cited in Frosh & Baraitser, 
2008).  
 
The analysis drew attention to the researcher’s efforts at sense-making of the texts, drawing 
on both field notes and socio-historical positionings that provide the lens to arrive at 
interpretations (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010). What is highlighted here is the researcher’s 
relationship to the texts to produce knowledge (Saville Young, 2013), as well as the ways that 
desire is co-constructed and negotiated with participants oriented towards the Other. This 
reflexive angle highlights the ‘ruptures’ to the sense-making of texts, which give clues as to 
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how the researcher is, in turn, lured by particular approaches to sense-making. Thus, there is 
always a risk of over-interpretation, and that meaning is impossible to pin down (Rogers, 
2007).  
 
Here Saville Young and Frosh (2010) stress that the text must always be explored to ‘open 
out’ interpretive possibilities, rather than ‘closing down’ to a finality. The Lacanian focus is on 
“how language works in and around the researched and the researcher, focusing on absences 
and incoherences in the text” (p. 519). In other words, subjectivity may be examined through 
discursive positionings, embodied ‘investments’ in discourse, and the social context in which 
the research relationship is situated. However, the endpoint of analysis is never complete but 
is rather a process of moving to other emerging meanings in the text (Frosh & Saville Young, 
2010). Concentric reflexivity may be likened to the moving signifier of ‘home’, the “conflicting 
‘site’ of belonging and becoming” (Rus, 2006, para. 4). It remains an elusive and unfinished 
process of  and. In this light, a psychosocial reading of the texts was explored through a 
Lacanian lens to disrupt subjectivity (both participants and the researcher) (Saville-Young, 
2013).  
 
The employment of a psychosocial research methodology in the proposed research is one 
aligned with the stance of interactive critical practice that “constantly reflect[s] back on itself 
and is always suspicious of its production of knowledge” (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008, p. 5).  In 
adopting this approach to analysis, the broader aims of the research are always borne in mind. 
To reiterate, these relate to experiences of ‘home’ and (spatial) belonging for participants 
situated across contrasting sociospatial and material contexts. At the same time, it is 
recognised that what can be knowable is interceded (perhaps enriched and/or clouded) by the 
intersections of ‘race’, culture, gender, class, etc.. This plays out in intersubjectivity between 
researcher-researched in the multiple spaces of engagement (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009). 
 
4.10. Ethics   
Ramos highlights (1989, as cited in Orb et al., 2001) three areas of ethical enquiry in qualitative 
research. These are the researcher-participant relationship (discussed in ‘Negotiating Access’ 
section), the researcher’s subjective interpretations of the data, and the research design. In 
this section, I focus on how the latter two concerns were addressed in the research. 
 
4.10.1. Data interpretation  
The traditional notions of reliability (the consistency of findings across time and contexts) and 
validity (the accurate correspondence between concepts/conclusions and the real world) are 
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challenged in qualitative research (Golafshani, 2003). The study is situated across the 
interpretive and critical social science paradigms. Meanings cannot be controlled across 
contexts when a standardised question is applied, as would be in quantitative research. A 
critical qualitative research paradigm challenges the idea that ‘truth’ is separate to knowledge 
and the conditions/practices that give rise to it (Frosh & Baraitser, 2008; Hollway & Jefferson, 
2012). The research interview/situation cannot be viewed as the medium to extract ‘truth’ 
about people. Nor can ‘truth’ be seen as existing independent of the encounter. Rather, what 
can be ‘known’ is viewed as contingent, provisional and temporal as it shifts in the 
intersubjective space between researcher, participant and the surrounding environ (Frosh & 
Baraitser, 2008).  
 
In this respect, traditional notions of reliability and validity rooted in objectivist assumptions 
are misleading.  It is, therefore, more appropriate to assess the quality of the research in terms 
of its paradigm (Golafshani, 2003). To do so is not without difficulty, particularly when the 
notion of ‘truth’ as provisional within qualitative research. As a challenge to a positivist view of 
reliability, qualitative researchers assert that the quality of the research needs to be appraised 
on its terms. Cogency, therefore, rests in its power to explain the ‘truth’ about people’s lives 
(Golafshani, 2003). In the research, I instead adopted a hermeneutic interpretive stance, 
partially at least, to recognise meaning-making through ‘narrative truth’ (Frosh & Saville 
Young, 2008).  
 
However, given that psychosocial research draws upon psychoanalytic concepts as a frame 
of reference, interpretation extends beyond the hermeneutic task of generating meanings. The 
reliability of qualitative research may be assessed by the quality of its findings to generate 
understanding (Golafshani, 2003). A psychosocial research study, guided by a “hermeneutics 
of suspicion”, is concerned with going behind/beneath the face value of the text. It draws 
centrally on psychoanalytic concepts in this interpretive task of “unravelling unconscious 
conflicts” (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008, p. 117). However, what counts as valid psychoanalytic 
claims within the parameters of psychosocial research needs to be carefully scrutinised. In 
particular, we must guard against reproducing an expert account based on pre-determined 
theoretical assumptions (Frosh & Saville Young, 2008). As Frosh and Saville Young (2008) 
note, asserting a psychoanalytic claim as valid requires a critical reflexive gaze, while 
recognising that it is impossible to pin down psychological meaning/reality as this changes 
contextually, temporally, interpersonally. At the same time, acknowledging that some readings 
of the unconscious may offer more compelling, resonant or cogent analyses than other frames 
is also due.  There is no conclusive ‘truth’ or finality to interpretations derived. Nevertheless, 
rigour and caution were exercised in the analysis through reflexivity and triangulation of data 
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sources. Experience-near field notes were documented and cross-referenced with go-along 
data and sit-down interview data. 
 
4.10.2. Research design 
Triangulation in qualitative research was used to enhance the quality, rigour and 
trustworthiness of the proposed study (Golafshani, 2008). Recognising the limits of research 
when the study of the social world is confined to the linguistic modality, in-depth narratives 
were supplemented with a ‘go along’ mobile interviews to explore embodied, spatial ways of 
knowing (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Hollway, 2009). The aim was not to present diverse 
perceptions on a single reality as in positivist research. Rather, triangulation was used to 
increase the reliability and validity of interpretations. Engaging various forms of knowing 
(spatial, bodily, affective, intersubjective) generated multiple and diverse realities of 
participants.  Analyses of data highlighted these performance dimensions belonging and 
making home.
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Chapter Five: Findings 
Crime Talk as a Narrative Imaginary 
 
“The truth or falsity of a story cannot be decided by measuring it against some outside 
reality, for what matters is how stories enable us to regain some purchase over the events 
that confound us, humble us, and leave us helpless, salvaging a sense that we have some 
say in the way our lives unfold … Storytelling is a coping strategy that involves making 
words stand for the world, and then, by manipulating them, changing one’s experience of the 
world” (Jackson, 2002, p. 17-18). 
 
5.1.   Making Home in a Dangerous Place 
A common thread that runs across the data (go-alongs and story interviews) from the two 
sites, ‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated Community’, is the idea of making home in a dangerous 
place.  The central organising principle of these narratives and practices is the talk about 
crime. These constructions of danger seem to take hold of the participants across both 
contexts.  In this chapter, I explore the selected texts derived from ‘The Gated Community’ 
site.  Through the organising structure of crime talk, as I will show, participants constructed 
‘The Gated Community’ as an ‘enclave’, a place that strives for normality amidst the lurking 
dangers ‘out there’.  In a viscerally real sense, the participants position themselves as 
enveloped in a climate of fear and insecurity.   
 
The Lacanian logic holds that the gestalt of the narrative is illusory, an imaginary construction 
that offers coherence and meaning to our social worlds (Rogers, 2007). In this chapter, I focus 
on the first phase of analysis. I explore the ‘story threads’ with a view to ‘holding sense’ (Saville 
Young & Berry, 2016). The aim is to derive a ‘common sense’ understanding or explanatory 
resources that knits ‘The Gated Community’ in belonging. As noted in the Methodology 
chapter, the initial aim is to discern the quilting points of the texts (Parker, 2005), showing how 
they weave a coherent narrative of belonging. Subsequently, the aim is to disrupt this meaning 
frame, to reveal the interruptions to this coherent narrative. In this chapter, I perform a 
discursive reading, highlighting subject positions, dominant discourses (Frosh & Saville 
Young, 2010) and interpretive repertoires as the “threads of sense-making” (Wetherell & 
Potter, 1988 as cited in Wetherell, 2012, p. 12).  Before turning to the analysis, I explore how 
the texts are aligned to a ‘narrative imaginary’ (Jackson, 2002). 
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5.2. The Narrative Imaginary 
The research adopts the view that stories function to produce dominant narratives about the 
way the world is as well as our place in it.  As forms of symbolic restructuring, they offer a 
meaningful safety to a world experienced as unpredictable, overwhelming and disorderly.  A 
‘both/and’ stance, one that is at once empathic and critical, is needed to examine the function 
of narratives in a project about home and belonging. Jackson (2002, p. 11) highlights the “dual 
potentiality” of stories. They can blur, question and transgress boundaries between ourselves 
and others, but they can also cement existing boundaries, fuel discord, and “do violence to 
lived experience”.  Storytelling implies a “politics of experience” (Jackson, 2002, p. 11).  As 
the “subjective in-between” (Arendt, as cited in Jackson, 2002, p. 11) of personal and social 
worlds, it is the site of power relations where meanings and interests are played out.   
 
Following Caldeira (2000) and Ochs and Capps (as cited in Jackson, 2002) I propose that 
‘crime talk’, the stories, conversations, commentaries, and jokes topicalised around crime and 
fear, symbolically reorganises an arbitrary and perplexing world.  As a specific type of 
narrative, crime talk offers a particular kind of knowledge. It undoes the disorder of violence 
by providing a simplistic, static – often stereotypical re-ordering – binary of ‘good’ versus ‘evil’. 
In this manner, it “resignifies not only the individual experience but also the social context in 
which it occurs” (Caldeira, 2000, p. 20).  This categorical re-ordering alongside its fragmentary 
and repetitive quality gives crime talk its function as ritual, one that imposes a kind of narrative 
order (Caldeira, 2000; Jackson, 2002).  Like ritualised embodied acts (e.g., ceremonies, rites, 
sacraments), crime talk as a ritualistic practice, is akin to the operations of the Symbolic order. 
It maintains its borders by purging waste from a healthy body, or the abject from a healthy 
society (Kristeva, 1980).  
 
Jackson (2002, p.15) argues that to reconstitute events in a story involves an active reworking 
of ourselves intersubjectively and intrapsychically. This narrative imaginary is a co-
construction, emerging in conversational dialogue with others and oneself through the inner 
monologues “private reveries, fantasies, daydreams, and undeclared thoughts”.  Stories are 
more than acts of cognitive sense-making,  or merely telling about events that have happened.  
Rather, they serve a pragmatist and redeeming function, one which may or may not reconcile 
with reality ‘out there’.  The act of making/telling re-orders reality becomes a form of ‘mastery 
play’, a reversal of the intersubjective encounter in “making words stand for the world” 
(Jackson, 2002, p. 18).  Words then offer a supplement to action when action seems 
“impossible or confounded”.   This critical, yet empathic stance, to understand our place 
(personal, intersubjective, social) in relation to others is the lens through which I will attempt 
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to both disrupt and make sense of the findings (Saville-Young & Berry, 2016). The story might 
be conceptualised as a Winnicottian ‘transitional space’ or bridge to connect to the world in 
the search for and creation of useful objects.  This intermediate space offers a re-presentation 
of lived experience, its telling comprising that which is known, imagined or not yet known 
(Brushwood Rose & Granger, 2013).  
 
Rituals are ‘cleansing’ acts that symbolically divide the world into Us and Them. Citing the 
data as evidence, I argue that storytelling as a ritual “defines one of the most vital of these 
crossing points, these sites of defilement and infringement” (Jackson, 2002, p. 25). I focus on 
the talk-in-interaction elements of crime talk and their correlative effects in the productions of 
space, particularly in making home and performing belonging. I propose that crime talk offers 
a form of symbolic re-ordering of society. In effect, it produces hierarchies of belonging and 
types of social presencing where the ‘other’ is visibilised (Polizzi, 2013). The aim here is not 
to question whether participants’ fear of crime or perceptions of danger is disproportionate to 
reality.  Rather, the purpose is to explore and disrupt the articulated patterns of the ‘collective 
psyche’ in speech, as they unfold in particular moments and encounters with the participants. 
 
5.3. Rituals of Crime Talk: A Symbolic Re-ordering of Worlds 
In ‘The Gated Community’ accounts, none of the participants indicated having experienced 
crime directly.  These residents constructed crime as something ‘out there’, nevertheless 
having reverberating effects, literally disturbing the footings of their place, spatially and 
psychically.  The trope of terror, a dominant interpretive repertoire structured their accounts.   
 
Extract 1: Go-along with Meryl (female, estate agent, resident of ‘The Golf Estate2) 
1. Meryl:  FORTUNATELY I haven't been exposed to any cri::me.  
2. UL:  Mm. 
3. Meryl:  .hh a lot of people, not a lot, but a perce/a percentage of people, about, probably 
4.              about ten percent of people who choose to live in gated communities .hh are  
5.              victims of violent crime. They've had a very bad experience an::d um (1.0) they  
6.             either leave the country. That's quite common  
7. UL:  Mm [ h m 
8. Meryl:  when] somebody's had a bad uh experience with/with uh crime .hh or they  
9.             decide to move into a community like this=I have because I'm in the real estate  
10.             business. I’ve been exposed quite a lot to people who say, 'I've got/I'm (.) we've  
 
2 Participants designate ‘The Golf Estate’, the forerunner of all estates in the area. The other estates 
assume other titles (anonymously referred to as ‘The Ravine, ‘The Dune’’), which designate them as 
separate from ‘The Golf Estate’. 
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11.             had >TERRIBLE experience of burglary in our house (in Atholl) a week ago.  
12.   We've MOVED out. We staying in a/in a residential hotel. I can't bear to  
13.   sleep/sleep there for one more night 
14. UL:  Mm 
15. Meryl:  feeling this< .hh fe::ar uh and >w/we won't even wait to sell our house. We  
16.   just want something else< We'll RENT, we'll BUY in a hurry,' um (.) they just  
17.   don't want to ever be exposed to that (.) >type of thing< and this is the only  
18.   .hh WAY that you can continue living in Johannesburg (.) u:m: (1) because  
19.   your children are at school here, because you go/y/y/your/your job is here,  
20.   etcetera etcetera [that 
21. UL:        Mm] 
22. Meryl:  (1) you can, you, that you can feel security doesn't uh you know the THREAT  
23.   of uh of your security being breached is not um (1.0) i/the/it's taken away  
24.   from you, that concern is OUTSOURCED. 
 
As an estate agent of gated communities in the neighbourhood, Meryl speaks in an 
authoritative voice (‘because I’m in the real estate business’ [lines 9-10]; ‘been exposed quite 
a lot to people’ [line 10]), rendering her account as credible.  Her account offers justification 
(‘when somebody’s had a bad uh experience with/with uh crime’ [line 8]) for spatial practices 
of flight (‘leave the country’ [line 6]) or retreat (‘choose to live in gated communities’ [line 9]).  
Structurally, the latter part of the account (lines 10-24 in particular) plays out as panic in the 
aftermath of crime, depicted as a violent intrusion into the confines of one’s intimate 
being/space (‘we’ve had >TERRIBLE experience of burglary in our house’ [line 10-11], ‘I can’t 
bear to sleep/sleep there for one more night’ [lines 12-13]).  This dramatic and traumatic, 
irrational, profoundly agitating and almost hysterical quality is conveyed in rhetorical ways. 
This includes the rushed speech (denoted by > … < in lines 11-15, 17); the first-person voice 
(’I’ve got/I’m (.) we’ve had’ [line 10-11], ‘we’ve MOVED out’ [line 12], ‘I can’t bear’, ‘w/we won’t’, 
‘we just’ [lines 12-16]); stammering and hesitations (‘’I’ve got/I’m (.) we’ve had’ [line 10-11], 
‘w/we won’t’ [line 16], ‘go/y/y/your/your job’ [line 19]); increased volume of emotion and action 
words (‘TERRIBLE’ [line 11], ‘MOVED’ [line 12], ‘RENT’ [line 16], ‘BUY’ [line 16]) and the 
drawn-out emphases on the consequences (‘fe::ar’ [line 15], ‘ever’ [line 17]).   
 
This account of crime is not Meryl’s own (‘FORTUNATELY I haven’t been exposed to any 
cri::me’ [line 1]).  Rather, it is a second-hand rendering of her client(s)’ experience. 
Nevertheless, it powerfully captures the profoundly disorienting effects of violent crime.  
Confined living (line 4) is governed by panic and urgency (‘w/we won’t even wait to sell our 
house. We just want something else< We’ll RENT, we’ll BUY in a hurry’ [line 16]) and sheer 
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terror (‘I can’t bear to sleep/sleep there for one more night feeling this< .hh fe::ar’ [lines 12-
13]) rather than an outcome of planned and rational decision making.  In this portrayal, “victims 
of violent crime” (line 5) are displaced from their homes (line 12) with their ordinary lives are 
shaken by the intrusions of crime.  The reference to “your children” (line 19), moreover, has a 
dual effect.  It furthers the vulnerability of the “victim” subject position, and situates crime as 
an assault on normality and the ordinariness of daily life where people work and have children 
(‘your children are at school here, because you go/y/y/your/your job is here’ [lines 19]).  To 
this effect, gated community living is justified as the only viable alternative to shield one’s 
family from the lurking dangers of a chaotic city (‘this is the only .hh WAY that you can continue 
living in Johannesburg’ [line 17-18]).  These ‘boundary’ discourses, in turn, perform the 
spatial/performative function of separating Us from Them (Saff, 2001). 
 
The structure of Meryl’s account in Extract 1 provides some initial co-ordinates around how 
crime talk structures ideological fantasy for residents of ‘The Gated Community’.  Noticeably, 
the form of her account shows how the “dialectic of anxiety “shifts over towards the question 
of desire” (Lacan, 2014, p. 214). In a large portion of the text (lines 1-20), the anxiety is 
rendered palpable in the materiality of speech and becomes displaced into something made 
‘tangible’, namely “violent crime” (line 5) or “burglary” (line 11). This anxiety (or ‘terror’ [line 
11]) gives way to (a justification of) desire in the latter part of the text (lines 22-24), articulated 
as the need for “security” (line 22) that too becomes transferred’ or “OUTSOURCED” (line 24). 
 
By deconstructing Meryl’s account in this manner, the intention is not to belittle what she 
experiences as viscerally real and profoundly intrusive.  To the contrary, it provides a critical 
yet sympathetic interpretation of how such accounts function to justify participants’ verbal and 
spatial practices of belonging. It offers the narrative co-ordinates that orientate our 
intersubjective relations with others and the broader home in post-apartheid South Africa.  The 
aim here is to show how crime talk,  by designating the ‘safe’ from the ‘unsafe’, symbolically 
restructures the world. In so doing, it restabilises the self and one’s co-ordinates in the world 
disturbed by crime (Caldeira, 2000; Jackson, 2002).  
 
In Extract 2, this division is spatially marked out by M., who juxtaposes the safety, serenity 
and natural beauty – earmarks of exclusive estate living – against a presupposed and 
immediate danger outside. 
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Extract 2: Go-along with M (male, attorney, lives in ‘The Dune’, a lifestyle estate comparatively 
smaller in size to ‘The Golf Estate’) 
 
1. M:  This gives you a sense of uh (1.0) especially in/in Spring and Summer, the  
2.   lawn (.) is lush, the trees are green, the flowers are (1.0) blossoming and, you    
3.   know, you have (.) families walking around. You have that sense of .hh this is a  
4.   really safe neighbourhood  
5. UL:  Mm.  
6. M:  ((smacking lips)) but the problem is that soon as you (.) exit (1) the boom  
7.   gates, then you very much on your own .hh I think one of the reason I think I  
8.   mentioned it to you that [I moved 
9. UL:              M m : : : ] 
10. M:  here was that so my mother, my family could you know, walk around, take a  
11.   stroll or do whatever they want to when I'm not home (2.0) but then we/we we  
12.   are becoming so (1.0) secluded in this little (.) estate 
13. UL:  Yes. 
14. M:  that uh we don't want to go anywhere. I mean this is the same (.) sentiment  
15.   that's shared by people that's living in ‘The Ravine’, ‘The Dune’ and ‘The Brook’,  
16.   EVERYBODY (would) say, 'okay w/as long as we  
17.   get home into our .hh estate, then we are fine, but you know a/as soon as you  
18.   (.) exit that boom gate, there's a, it's a different story. 
 
In M’s portrayal, the lifestyle estate is likened to a container, a protective sanctuary (‘you have 
that sense of .hh this is a really safe neighbourhood [lines 3-4]) that encloses nature in all its 
luxuriance (‘the lawn is lush, the trees are green, the flowers are blossoming’ [lines 1-2]).  As 
in Meryl’s account, the familial discourse structures M’s depiction of everyday life in a gated 
community, for example, of “families walking around” (line 3).  This feature of estate living is 
pronounced in M’s repetition of the same idea in lines 10-11 (‘my family could you know, walk 
around, take a stroll’).  Far from being a mundane aspect of day-to-day living, “walking 
around”, to the contrary, is shown to be something of a privilege – simply because you “could 
[my emphasis] … walk around, take a stroll or do whatever” (lines 10-11).  This permissive 
quality contributes to a construction of life “in this little (.) estate” (line 12) (but also in other 
more exclusive estates, as I will show) as normal or ordinary, demarcated against a deviant 
or abnormal ‘outside’.  M repeatedly emphasises (lines 6-7, 17-18) that the safety and peace 
of mind can only be ‘assured’ within the confines of the estate (‘as long as we get home into 
our .hh estate, then we are fine’ [lines 16-17]). Safety is juxtaposed against the construction 
of a dangerous outside (“as soon as you (.) exit that boom gate, there’s a, it’s a different story” 
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[line 17-18]).  In a similar way that the gated community functions to “outsource” Meryl’s 
concern of security (Extract 1, line 24), the secure estate functions as the ‘guardian’ in lieu of 
M’s absence as family protector or head of the household, granting his family the ‘freedom of 
safety’ to “do whatever they want to when I’m not at home”.  In the context of M’s line of 
reasoning, leaving the protective enclosure would mean that “you very much on your own” 
(line 7).   
 
Like Meryl’s and M’s convincing justifications for gated community living, Sofia’s account also 
reads as particularly persuasive.  I argue that the account gains rhetorical force in its collusive 
nature.  Sofia does not speak alone here, but as the interviewer who is participating in a go-
along, I am actively contributing to the talk of crime, moulding a particular version of reality.   
 
Extract 3: Go-along with Sofia (female, housewife, resident in ‘The Golf Estate’)  
 
1. UL:  So in many ways then, from what you're saying, it sounds like this is becoming  
2.   the NEW NORMAL. 
3. Sofia:  Yes, I think so. Everybody wants to live in estates, no matter how small. They  
4.   want the SECURITY you know.  
5. UL:  Right. 
6. Sofia:  I mean [my son] travels. He wants to know that [his wife] is fine and  
7.    she's=No one's gonna BREAK IN and [you know 
8. UL:       Yes yes] 
9. Sofia:  (.) >Not that EVERYONE'S gonna break into your HOME< 
10. UL:  Mm hm. 
11. Sofia:  It's just, you've got that (1.0) um (1.0) like that you've got that um (3.0) ((smacking   
12.   lips)) sense of um (.) BEING SAFE in a/in a estate. 
13. UL:  Mm. 
14. Sofia:  I mean we/I lived outside for many many years but things have got LOT MORE  
hectic in South Africa, DON’T YOU THINK?  
15. UL:  ((smacking lips)) Yah: [    u    m          a    b    s    o    l    u    t    e    l   y   ] 
16. Sofia:               THINGS HAVE BECOME A LOT MORE HECTIC] ((car  
17.   driving past–[you know 
18. UL:                        I t   h a s ] it has become)). 
19. Sofia:  And/and you have to have live in a=<<let me cross>>=It's/it's just, it has become  
20.   more violent and faster [and 
21. UL:     Mm] 
22. Sofia:  (.) than sixteen years ago. 
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23. UL:  Right. 
24. Sofia:  And there is more violence. 
25. UL:  Yes. 
26. Sofia:  There is/it is, just like (.) so many more people are unemployed and I think out of  
27.   desperation there's more violence and  
28. UL:  Right, right. 
29. Sofia:  Yah. Don't know when it will stop ((golf cart roaming past)). You think how many  
30.   people left South Africa BECAUSE OF THE SITUATION. 
31. UL:  Right. 
32. Sofia:  The violence and the (.) I don't know. 
 
My opening reflection in the opening line draws from my observations as a researcher (‘from 
what you are saying, it sounds like this is becoming the NEW NORMAL’ [lines 1-2]).  In other 
instances, Sofia invites me into her responses in a manner that demands my weigh-in (‘DON’T 
YOU THINK?’ [line 14]).  In these instances, my responses (‘yah: um absolutely’, ‘it has, it has 
become’ [lines 15, 18]) categorically affirms Sofia’s statements about how “THINGS HAVE 
BECOME A LOT MORE HECTIC” (line 16).  While still holding to the sense of texts at this 
stage of the analysis, I want to highlight the imaginary dynamics in this piece of text. Sofia’s 
questioning to me (‘DON’T YOU THINK?’ [line 14] stands out characteristically as an attempt 
by the interviewee to seek assurance from the other (myself as the interviewer who ‘demands’ 
particular responses). From a Lacanian stance, these moments in the text are meaningful. 
They show our proclivities (as interviewees and as researchers alike) to measure ourselves 
against some ideal, Imaginary other from whom we seek recognition (Hoedemakers, 2010). 
At the conscious level, it seems apparent that Sofia’s address to me is in this context of the 
‘you-me relationship’ (Rogers, 2007). In turn, my hesitating affirmation (‘um absolutely’) [line 
15] is in acquiescence to Sofia’s question. As the analysis proceeds towards ‘disrupting 
sense’, I will draw attention to instances in the texts where the participants’ (and researcher’s) 
address transcends the ‘you-me’ relationship and orientates towards a fantasmatic transaction 
with the Other of the unconscious (Hook, 2008a; Rogers, 2007).   
 
Aside from these interactional dynamics, the exchange is structured as a system of contrasts, 
similar to M’s account (Extract 2).  A discourse of normality (‘it sounds like this is becoming 
the NEW NORMAL’ [lines 1-2]; “everybody wants to live in estates” [line 3] permeates the text 
and intersects with interpretive repertoires of ‘feeling safe’. This is repeated in different 
variants (“BEING SAFE” (line 12); “is fine” [line 6]; ‘they want the security’ [line 4]).  Normality 
is juxtaposed against a discourse of deviance, one that constructs the invasion by a 
threatening other (‘gonna BREAK IN’ [line 7] as an almost predictable eventuality if one were 
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living outside of an estate.  In this exchange of crime, talk takes on an alarmist quality.  Using 
temporal deixis, Sofia contrasts “THE SITUATION” (line 30) in South Africa with an earlier 
time when she first moved into the estate: “things have got a LOT MORE hectic”, “it has 
become more violent and faster … than sixteen years ago” (lines 19-20, 22).  The estate “no 
matter how small” (line 3) therefore is constructed as offering a haven, a “safe” buffer from the 
maddening chaos of the outside.  Similar to Meryl’s account, Sofia also offers a ‘flight or 
retreat’ response (‘many people left South Africa’ [lines 29-30]. 
 
5.4. Rituals of Space: The Boundaries in Making Home  
As Extracts 1, 2 and 3 have shown, crime talk functions to reverse the social order that is 
perceived to be disrupted by crime by creating polarities of deviance and normality, unruliness 
and order, danger and peace of mind.  However, this function is not confined to talk as a 
linguistic/discursive resource.  It effects social practices in sociospatial ways, such that home 
is performed and etched into the landscape (Murray, 2011) and materialised in spatial 
boundaries of belonging and exclusion (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005; Saff, 2001).  Home in this 
manner is a literal construction, a spatial practice of homemaking, and social construction, a 
language-based practice (Manzo, 2003). Analysis should therefore not be limited to textual 
practices (imagery and assertions), but also include material and symbolic practices that may 
“escape human intentionality and specific ideological content” (Miles, as cited in Hook, 2006, 
p. 7).  
 
The ritual of crime talk symbolically draws lines of distinction between categorical oppositions 
(‘good’ and ‘bad’, ‘safety’ and ‘danger’, ‘normal’ and ‘deviant’, ‘order’ and disorder’). However, 
these contrasts/differences are systematised materially in spatial boundary practices, such as 
gating, walling, and policing through security and technologies of surveillance (Caldeira, 
2000).  In the following extracts I examine the functions of these technologies as “meticulous 
rituals of power”, to borrow Staples’ (1994, p. 654) phrase, and explore how their presence is 
legitimated to enforce safety and counteract fear. 
 
Extract 4: Go-along with Meryl (female, estate agent, resident in ‘The Golf Estate’).  
[We have entered the Golf Estate in Meryl’s car and several minutes into the drive, we pass 
under another prominent ‘entrance’ gate that bridges across both sides of the road and looms 
as a towering presence at least over this section of the Estate] 
 
1. Meryl:  This is now, this has become the new gate (2.0) so when we first moved here,  
2.   this was the only entrance to ‘The Golf Estate’=There wasn't even an entrance on  
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3.   [name of road]=There 
4. UL:                 M m ] 
5. Meryl:  was only this entrance 
6. UL:  Yes. 
7. Meryl:  and you entered it through here. THAT (.), now it's part of the Estate. That is now  
8.   our security (.) office [pointing to the structure forming the old gate]. There ar::e  
9.   (1.0) about fourteen (.) television screens in there (.) of cameras positioned (.) on  
10.   the perimeters. [It's 
11. UL:                Mm] 
12. Meryl:  cemented a metre down. It's double electric fencing. It's got sensors, cameras  
13.   and it's patrolled. 
14. UL:  Impressive hh [I find myself in awe as if the context (Meryl? her words? the  
15.   structure itself? the situation?) commands both admiration and cowering respect.  
16.   I feel awkward in not saying anything, so I say something to acknowledge the  
17.   grandiosity of it all]. 
 
In the tail end of Extract 1 (lines 23-24), Meryl highlights a particular feature of gated 
community living, namely that the “THREAT of uh of your security being breached is … taken 
away from you, that concern is OUTSOURCED”.  Extract 4 above makes apparent how these 
security functions are carried out.  The militarised nature of the structure itself, along with the 
matter-of-fact manner in which Meryl enumerates each feature underscores the solemnity of 
its purpose. This is evinced in surveillance technologies (‘fourteen television screens’ [line 9], 
‘cameras positioned on the perimeters’ [line 10], ‘sensors’, ‘cameras’ [line 12]), defensive 
architecture along perimeter boundaries (‘cemented a metre down’, ‘double electric fencing’ 
[line 12]) and security guards on foot (‘its patrolled’ [line 13]). The Panoptic effect of this 
surveillance structure is one of looming visibility, its intimidating presence marked by its sheer 
size and positioning over the estate.  At the same time, the gaze is ‘invisible’ – one has no 
way of knowing if one is the focal point in its visual field.  The effect of this intimidating security 
presence brought to life by Meryl’s “matter-of-fact” commentary is one that commands 
respect/fear and admiring awe (lines 14-17), prompting some response (‘impressive hh’ [line 
14]).  This sterile and austere depiction of gated community living, however, is but one 
dimension that coexists paradoxically alongside constructions of freedom and normality. I 
argue that these incongruencies, rather than counteracting one another, work together to 
legitimate a discourse of privilege.  The encounter below precedes a drive-around on the 
estate when we encounter her partner, Tim, who offers his perspective of gated community 
living. 
 
 89 
Extract 5a: Exchange with Sofia and Tim (both residents of ‘The Golf Estate’) 
1. Tim:  You know what this place does, you'll see when you drive around a little   
2.   bit. 
3.  UL: Yah. 
4.  Tim:   It brings a sort of a sense of normality to (1.0) to an ABNORMAL situation, you  
5.   know[=The kids  
6.  UL:           O  k  a  y ] 
7. Tim:   are all on their bicycles and they doing  
8. Sofia:  and walks 
9. Tim:   what kids SHOULD be doing, 
10. UL:   Yes. 
11. Tim:    because it's totally free and there's no/no issue with security. So the kids   
12.   are out fishing and they playing golf and they riding their bicycles, and  
13.   they (.) walking and they, and they .hh playing at the river and doing all  
14.   these [things which 
15.  UL:                 R  i   g  h  t] 
16.  Tim:  these days are [you know, 
17.  UL:      Y  a  h  ] 
18.  Sofia:  You can't do 
19.  Tim:  they can't really do. 
20.  UL:   It's interesting uh wh/that/that what you just said, it brings security to  
21.   an ABNORMAL [situation. 
22.  Tim:        It does] >It's exactly what it is, because I mean that's  
23.   what we all should be doing< 
24.  UL:   Right. 
25.  Tim:  This is [DAFT.  
26.   UL:   Right] right. 
27.  Tim:  I mean to give you some idea ((clearing throat)) that/they had a security   
28.   consultant come and do (.) and look at the security here=They jacked it  
29.   up a couple of years ago, and the security HERE was regarded as   
30.   BETTER (1.0) and determined that the security was HIGHER, was  
31.   BETTER here (.) than at Leeuwkop Prison. I mean how DAFT IS THAT? 
32.  UL:  Right. 
33.  Sofia:  We almost living in a PRISON surrounded by fences and [security and 
34.  UL:                    Right, right] 
35.  Sofia:  Yah. 
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Extract 5a, offers a justificatory account of estate living, co-constructed by Sofia and Tim (and 
supported by my affirmations). The text is structured around powerful affects of desire and 
fear in intriguing ways. Rather than undermining the other, each seems to bolster the necessity 
for its opposition.  The goings-on of everyday life, of childhood innocence and spontaneity, is 
seamlessly intermingled with the serenity of nature (‘the kids are all on their bicycles’ [lines 5, 
7], ‘kids are out fishing’ [line 12], ‘playing at the river’ [line 13]). This fearless spontaneity is 
juxtaposed jarringly against the stern, a defensive and militarised posture of the estate. 
References to “security” (lines 11, 20, 27, 28, 29, 33), for instance, pervade the text. In a 
paradoxical sense, repertoires of freedom (line 12) and normality (line 4-5) depicting a 
carefree lifestyle slip into uncomfortable characterisations of confinement. Tim’s depiction of 
the estate security as more sophisticated than the state prison at “Leeuwkop” (line 31), is 
echoed further by Sofia: “we almost living in a PRISON surrounded by fences and security” 
(line 33). The absurdity of such a situation presented here by Tim in a stupefying tone (‘I mean 
how DAFT IS THAT?’ [line 31]). The strange reversal is pronounced in what Tim offers as 
materially and structurally crafting “a sense of normality to an ABNORMAL situation” (lines 4-
5). This negotiated account between Sofia and Tim (again supported by me) works to 
construct a reality that is at once ordinary (after all it is “what kids SHOULD be doing” [line 9]) 
and abnormal (‘doing all these things which these days are, you know, they can’t really do’ 
[lines 13-19]). This co-construction supports and extends crime talk as a narrative imaginary 
highlighted in earlier accounts by Meryl and M.  
 
Across all these accounts, the making of home as a defensive space (discursively and 
materially) seems to premised on terror, fear and the need for safety. This narrative structure 
confirms what Žižek (1997) refers to as the organising principles of fantasy. The beautific plot 
(the ideal state of affairs) is juxtaposed against the horror plot (obstacle to fulfilment), both 
which are needed to sustain the imaginary construction. Revealed further in Extract 5b below, 
is the securitisation of privilege premised on the exclusion of an identified criminal other. In 
line with the fantasy construction, the creation of the deviant other is needed to sustain a 
community’s social, symbolic and material existence (see Georgis, 2007; Hage, 1996; 
Middleton, 2013). As illustrated in my continued exchange with Sofia and Tim, a narrative of 
crime and violence, both undercuts and sustains the privileged home as an idyllic fantasy 
construction. What may be experienced as ‘traumatic’ as Georgis (2007) suggests, returns as 
affect in fantasy. In this respect, stories offer a “collective consoling” (Georgis, 2007, p. 251), 
but these are easily mistaken for reality itself (Rogers, 2007). 
 
Extract 5b: Exchange with Sofia and Tim (both residents of ‘The Golf Estate’) 
1. Sofia:  [The river's beautiful, 
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2. Tim:    V E R Y,  V E R Y ] nice way to live. 
3. Sofia:   Very relaxing. It=is/it's really is nice. It really is. 
4. Tim:  It's a lovely way to live, [  b   u   t , 
5. Sofia:       Of course], you know if Tim's out 
6. Tim:   but we LUCKY, you know, we're fortunate. And you'll see I mean there  
7.   are no burglar bars. NONE of the houses [here. 
8. UL:              M m. 
9. Sofia:             Yah] it's just 
10. Tim:  Nothing. It's just not on and the security is VERY JACKED UP 
11. UL:   Mm. 
12. Tim:   very jacked up. I mean they, they in and around all, you know, if you get  
13.   up at three in the morning, they're up and about and they patrolling and  
14.   they, 
15. UL:  Right. 
16. Tim:   and they take a VERY hard line on anybody whose uh=I mean MANY,  
17.   MANY years ago when we used to have a squatter camp across the road  
18.   down where that Steyn City is ((birds chirping)) 
19. UL:  Yah. 
20. Tim:   there used to be a couple of, a couple of people who have TRIED to get  
21.   in (.) 
22. UL:   Is that  [  u  m  :   :   : ]  
23. TIm:   and they shot] them stone dead. 
24. UL:  /…/ they were (.) they were shot dead? 
25. Tim:  Well, they LITERALLY. I mean this=we going back (.) twelve years but they just  
26.   let it be known in the, in the (.) in/in the/in the location there, in the/in the/at  
27.   Zevenfontein, >'hey, if you try and come into this Estate, we not asking  
28.   questions<[UL: Mm] We not gonna arrest people=If we see you, we gonna shoot 
29.   you< 
30. UL:  Mm. 
31. Sofia:  The guy had actually climbed over the wall. 
32. Tim:  And there was a guy. There was uh two guys who climbed over the wall 
33.   and they shot them. 
34. UL:  Mm. 
35. Tim:  And that sent a §VERY STRONG MESSAGE§ and we/we simply haven't had 
36.              any problems since. 
 
In Extract 5b, descriptions of immense beauty (‘the river’s beautiful’ [line 1]), 
tranquillity/serenity of nature (‘very relaxing’ [line 3]), and freedom (‘no issue with security’ 
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[Extract 5a, line 11) offer something of an ideal, a ‘paradise’ that is materially manifest in ‘The 
Golf Estate’. Against this idyllic construction, replete with Edenic symbolism, is the threatening 
and unreasonable brutality of violence (‘we not asking questions’ [lines 27-8], ‘if we see you, 
we gonna shoot you’ [lines 28-9], ‘they shot them stone dead’ [line 23], ‘that sent a §VERY 
STRONG MESSAGE§’ [line 35]).  The severity of the punishment is depicted as 
commensurate with the transgression of a sanctimonious ideal.  At the same time, the “VERY 
hard-line” (line 16) softens with an appeal to the aesthetic, the pastoral imagery denoting 
serenity, leisure and play. Sofia and Tim’s iterations throughout the text (‘we are very 
privileged to be able to live like this’ [not in quoted extracts], ‘‘we’re very lucky’ [not in quoted 
extracts], ‘we LUCKY, you know, we’re fortunate’ [line 6]) underscore their privileged social 
position. These positionings have the simultaneous effect of cultivating social distinction while 
eliciting desire in the addressee. I will explore this idea in subsequent analyses. Here, I 
highlight the defensive nature of these accounts, typically in response to threatened privilege.  
At the same time, these defensive manoeuvres seem to be undergirded by fear mingled with 
desire.  
 
This account illustrates the inseparable link between privileged freedom and oppression; the 
former state is achieved in the subjugation of the “underprivileged Other” (Žižek, 1999, as 
cited in Dean, 2005, p. 170). Žižek (1999, as cited in Dean, 2005) highlights the psychoanalytic 
point that universality, like empty categories such as whiteness or normality, excludes the 
other as its founding condition. Thus, the underprivileged Other is not merely rendered abject 
in these universal categories. Rather, “its own permanent founding gesture – a set of 
unwritten, unacknowledged rules and practices” – though publicly disavowed, is the very basis 
of its power structure (Žižek, 1999 as cited in Dean, 2005, p. 170). This aspect of the 
‘unsayable’ is hinted in Extract 5b and will be explored further in the next chapter. For now, I 
highlight the presence of opposites (safety/danger, order/disorder, serenity/intrusion, 
freedom/imprisonment). These boundary discourses effect a self-other distinction that points 
to the workings of privilege in speech (Hagey & MacKay, 2000) by masking the unsayable of 
‘race’ (Rogers, 2007).  In effect, they produce an apartness of bodies as materialised in space 
(Ahmed, 2003). 
 
5.5. Regimes of Visibility: The Optic of Belonging 
Thus far, I have explored the narrative imaginary of ‘The Gated Community’ that seems to 
pivot centrally on crime talk as the organising principle that holds the community together in 
belonging. Its content, in the form of subject positions, discourses and interpretive repertoires, 
offers anchoring points that function collectively to justify the material, social and symbolic 
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existence of making home.  Moreover, as a ritualised feature of exclusive gated communities, 
performances of security become the necessary buffer zone to mechanise and materialise the 
radical contrasts between the estate’s boundaries of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, as revealed in 
Extracts 4 and 5b.  In this section, I argue that belonging is cemented spatially and materially 
through technologies of surveillance. Belonging thus becomes a mode of looking that 
manages bodies in space. For Lacan (1977), the visual domain constitutes the Imaginary form, 
rooted in our relationship to images (our own and others) to effect a self-other relation. I draw 
on this dimension to show belonging is more than a narrative and spatial construction; it is 
also constituted through the domain of visuality. Thus, the workings of desire are not limited 
to discursive performance. Boundary work is regulated via the gaze to effect differentiation 
and (dis)identification of self-from-other, thus effecting a “securitisation of identity” (Kinnvall, 
2018, p. 763).  
 
These regimes of visibility, here “OUTSOURCED” (Extract 1, line 24) as a securitised 
mechanistic function of gated community living seems to effect a set of discursive oppositions 
that materialise a binary world, allowing little room for manoeuvre.  For M., a naturalised South 
African citizen, identifying as “NEI:THER black nor white” (sit-down interview) straddles the 
boundary lines of belonging. While a resident of a “little (.) estate” (Extract 2, line 12), as a 
visitor seeking entry into the adjacent Golf Estate, his belonging is placed under scrutiny. In 
Extract 6, the limits to belonging are circumscribed in ritualised functions of surveillance 
technologies characteristic of gated communities: 
 
Extract 6: Drive-along with M (male, attorney, lives in ‘The Dune’) 
 
1. M:  I understand that uh it/it's a, there's a protocol. You are visiting, you know, the  
2.   private estate you know so obviously comply with the=But, the SNOTTINESS  
3.   (2.0) that you have to put up with the (inaudible) of security guards at ‘The Golf  
4.   Estate’ 
5. UL:  Mm hm. 
6. M: . hh makes me LAUGH because, you know, I'm thinking, I'm visiting a friend. I'm  
7.   coming here as a guest, 
8. UL:  Mm. 
9. M:  but you are SO UNWELCOMING that I feel like, you know, I'm SO WORTHLESS 
10.   coming here /…/ They: they've got this (2.0) preposition [sic] that um (3.0) you  
11.   have to be (1.0)  THOROUGHLY CHECKED before you enter this SAFE  
12.   environment. They want to take (.) your ID number. They put this handheld  
13.   scanner that scans your: driver's license or your ID book. So once that's done, all  
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14.   your details, you know, recorded. 
15. UL:  Yah. 
16. M:  I (1.0), of course as a resident, I would (.) feel safe but as a, as a visitor I would 
17.   feel you know my privacy is being intruded .hh coming to visit, but you know, you  
18.   want my life stories with all the details before I can enter. This is even WITH 
19.   YOUR friend's uh, your/your, the person that you visiting's PERMISSION to  
20.   COME IN. 
21. UL:  Right. 
22. M:  They will still want all the/those details .hh It's (.), so they they/they are  
23.   creat/creating (.) a society that (2) if you don't belong here (.) you will have to be 
24.   SCREENED before you enter. 
 
In Extract 6, M. underscores the efficiency and precision of surveillance. As a screening 
function (‘THOROUGHLY CHECKED’ [line 11] ‘they put this handheld scanner that scans 
your: driver’s license’ [line 12-13]), it regulates visitor entry based on risk status (‘before you 
enter this SAFE environment’ [lines 11-12]). As “rituals of power” (Staples, 1994, p. 654), 
surveillance technologies perform the “OUTSOURCED” function of ‘worrying’ about safety on 
behalf of its residents (Meryl, Extract 1). These ritualistic practices of panopticism s confirmed 
in scholarship exploring these prohibitive forms of spatial control (e.g., walls, watchtowers, 
technological surveillance, biometrics, profiling, etc.) (Murray, 2011; Kuppinger, 2004; Low, 
2008; Zureik, 2016). However, as Hook & Vrdoljak (2002) highlight in their research on 
Dainfern as heterotopia, these security features seem to be excessive of their stated function 
of crime deterrence. The gated community surveillance appears to function as a form of 
“interpassivity” (Žižek, 2006, p. 25). The discriminating gaze is materialised as a function, 
performed on behalf of the privilege of society, who “can sit back comfortably in the 
background, while the Other does it for me”. Thus, surveillance functions as delegated forms 
of enjoyment. At the same time, it allows distance from the raw and brutal horror of materiality 
(Jagodzinski, 2018). As Žižek might argue, what is given away in these instances, is not one’s 
passivity, but interactivity as emotions become transferred to objects. The panopticism of 
gated communities is therefore given charge as the “big Other looking after things for me” 
while I go about my usual business (Jagodzinski, 2018, p. 278).  
 
Through an optic of belonging, they offer grounds to legitimate practices of exclusion and 
privilege, and as M’s account suggests, such privilege is relative. As a form of social control, 
belonging is regulated based on characteristics fitting of a Golf Estate resident. Against these 
criteria, M. is positioned “as a visitor” (line  6), deemed “SO WORTHLESS” (line 9) relative to 
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‘The Golf Estate’ residents. In this respect, ‘The Golf Estate’ first-tiered status is dependent 
on the smaller estates in the neighbourhood that help to constitute its ranking. 
 
What then does it mean to belong if the status of privilege is uncertain and conditional even 
by M., a resident of an exclusive estate? M. straddles between belongings. As a resident of a 
gated community, he enjoys the privileges of outsourced worry about security (see Extract 2, 
lines 11-12). Although he is reduced to ‘visitor’ (‘outsider’) status in the preceding extract, he 
nevertheless comfortably escapes anticipated judgements by a researcher exploring home 
and the asymmetries of belonging. M.’s belongings (like mine as I will show) seem precarious, 
situational and conditional. This conditionality is determined by whose gaze we seek to 
capture to ‘be – long’. The Lacanian (1977) gloss that our desire is not our own, but is always 
imbricated in the desire of the Other is a useful departure point here.  
 
Probyn (1996, p. 8) writes of “outside belonging”, that the desire to belong places us on the 
outside; that “if you have to think about belonging, perhaps you are already outside”. M’s 
account explicitly points to anxious belongings. In having to “put up with” (line 3) their 
surveillance tactics, he is reduced to the status of “WORTHLESS” visitor (line 9-10). Anxiety, 
effected through mechanised security technologies, offer limited mobility between “traditional 
hard line[s] of linguistic separation” (Probyn, 1996, p. 3). However, there is a reversal of this 
Panoptic gaze. M. ‘stares’ back in laughter (line 6) in mockery at the “security guards at ‘The 
Golf Estate”. The anxiety of not belonging, therefore, seems to shift to a desire to belong, one 
that turns over as aggressivity. The gaze intervenes at the point of anxiety “not to annihilate 
the subject [but] to sustain, constitute it in a function of desire” (Ma, 2015, p. 127). Making 
home, as evident in these accounts, seems to be bound up in shifts between anxiety and 
desire. 
 
Moreover, aspirational ‘be – longing’ is mediated by regimes of visibility. As a visitor to the 
estate, I too am caught up in these transitions and shifts. In a sit-down interview with Meryl, 
the issue of security becomes a dominating issue in our exchange. 
 
Extract 7: Sit-down interview with Meryl at her home in ‘The Golf Estate’ 
1. Meryl:  If you don't have a valid driver's license, you can't get into the Estate=You must  
2.   have experienced that. 
3. UL:  Yah. 
4. Meryl:   And that also that/that also eh/and you/in their code system I sent you, [ i  s  
5. UL:             Yes] 
6. Meryl:  that proves you're the PERSON entering the Estate is linked to your driver's  
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7.   license 
8. UL:  <<Mm>> 
9. Meryl:  and/and the permission's granted to you. So there's a lot of uh AVENUES to  
10.   TRACE if you misbehave on the Estate, who you are, and BAN you from coming  
11.   back here. 
12. UL:  Right.  
13. Meryl:  It's quite regimented really. 
14. UL:  S/yah, so, so in a sense your/your s/how do we say, your STAMP or your .hh  
15.   your IDENTITY STILL CIRCULATES on the  
16. Meryl:  Mm. 
17. UL:  property even though you're a visitor= 
18. Meryl:  Yah in some ways. Yah, it DOES. Um you/you know and/and if you have/if you  
19.   visit and you don't exit (.) after a couple of days=I mean ther're questions would  
20.   be asked, 'what's this person still doing here?' 
21. UL:  Yah. 
22. Meryl:  And I'm responsible (.) for anything you do on the Estate 'cause I've invited you  
23.   here. 
24. UL:  Right. Right.  
 
Extract 7, Meryl emphasises that the right of entry is premised on the ‘truth’ of my identity – 
that “you’re the PERSON entering the Estate is linked to your driver’s license” (lines 6-7). The 
“regimented” (line 13) nature of The Golf Estate’s security function, constructed here as a 
necessity, references me as the object of surveillance (‘you must have experienced that’ [line 
1]).  Evident in the unfolding exchange, surveillance work extends beyond legal documentation 
(‘a valid drivers license’ [line 1]), continuing under Meryl’s explicit watch: “I’m responsible (.) 
for anything you do on the Estate” (line 22).  Though I have been “invited” (line 22) here, I am 
not the usual visitor.  To this effect, Meryl’s warning to not “misbehave on the Estate” comes 
with a threat of becoming hypervisible (“TRACE … who you are” [line 10]) and being denied 
entry (“BAN you from coming back here” (line 10-11)].   
 
With my identity already verified at the gate, what might ‘misbehaving’ (line 10) mean for 
Meryl? Might this pertain to my researcher status (an outsider seeking insider knowing) 
exploring home and belonging in the context of the gated community, that casts doubt on my 
integrity? Despite Meryl offering herself willingly as a participant in the research, her statement 
is structured as a warning and my response as acquiescence (lines 3, 5, 12, 24). The accounts 
seem s devoid of mutuality and, like the panoptic surveillance at the gate, affords little 
connection or room for movement towards the other. Might Meryl also be issuing caution here 
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on the limits of appropriate questioning? There are numerous lines of interpretation that is 
limited by the presenting data. However, at a subsequent point in the interview with Meryl, I 
attempt to explore a particularity of ‘The Golf Estate’.  I offer the observation that the militarised 
style security seems excessive relative to the explicit function of crime control (Hook & 
Vrdoljak, 2002). Despite a more critical mode of questioning in Extract 8 below, the possibilities 
for articulating alternatives for belonging outside of the ‘insider/outsider’ binary (Probyn, 1996) 
remains stunted. This dynamic of anxiety and desire structures participants’ accounts of 
belonging, but it also parallels my positioning as researcher-participant to these exchanges. 
 
Extract 8: Sit-down interview with Meryl at her home at ‘The Golf Estate’ 
1. UL:  Just the extremeness of the security you know, someone once compared it  
2.   to a prison in some ways, more/uh/even more secure than Leeukop Prison is  
3.   what I've heard .hh Do you feel that the, that/that the extremeness of security  
4.   is almost maybe: exaggerated compared to what's dangerous outside? 
5.   [I regret this as I speak, as if its too confrontational.  And then it feels like somehow  
6.   I’ve betrayed Tim and Sofia’s by drawing on their reference to Leeukop Prison and  
7.   using it to challenge Meryl here] 
8. Meryl:  No.  
9. UL:  Not? 
10. Meryl:  I love it.  
11. UL:  Okay. 
12. Meryl:  I g/I g/I get very (1) CONCERNED when I see, when I see a car coming in and I  
13.   think the security guards haven't done their job properly. I feel concerned. 
14. UL:  Mm. 
15. Meryl:  You see u/NO, I don't, doesn't worry me at all. It makes me feel more secure. 
16. UL:  Mm. 
17. Meryl:  (2.0) You know it's/it's um (.) it makes me f:/it makes me (glad) my money's  
18.   being properly spent, [that  
19. UL:              Mm] 
20. Meryl:  I do spend on security .hh uh because there's a premium that everybody has to  
21.   pay u:m and (1.0) I don't see it as a p/I don't see it as a prison at all. I see it as, a  
22.   more of PARADISE .hh 
 
In the opening of Extract 8, my question (‘just the extremeness of the security’ [line 1]) Meryl 
presents a response that is in direct opposition to the view oo.  On insistence (‘not?’ [line 9]), 
she provides an eclipsing counterpoint (‘I love it’ [line 10]) and a flagrant denial of the 
statement (‘NO, I don’t, doesn’t worry me at all’ [line 15] ‘I don’t see it as a prison at all’ [line 
21]).  Meryl also bolsters support for the necessity for heavy-handed security through 
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justifications of safety (‘it makes me feel more secure’ [line 15]). “Security guards” doing “their 
job properly” (line 13) is offered as a fair exchange for the “PREMIUM” price paid (‘it makes 
me f:/it makes me (glad) my money’s being properly spent’ [line 17-18]).  In response,  my 
earlier acquiescence transitions to an assertive mode of questioning. Wengraf (2004, p. 154) 
likens the assertive-interviewer approach to a ‘court-room’ interrogation style, which is usually 
effected by the researcher who wishes to “control the responses, provoke and illuminate self-
contraction … and self-reflexivity”.  
 
However, there is noticeable anxiety in the way I deliver my question (‘just the 
EXTREMENESS of the security’ [line 1]). Though this counter-construction comes across as 
threatening, my reactions to challenging a guarded worldview are telling. My field notes (lines 
5-7) suggests that my challenge was at the same time silently experienced as fear for having 
criticised Meryl but also as a betrayal of Tim and Sofia (lines 5-7).  What is it about this 
exchange that I fear has transformed a seemingly curious mode of questioning to overturning 
an established order here?  Could my “too confrontational” (line 5) questioning also suggest 
aggressivity at play, similar to M’s mocking laughter at ‘The Golf Estate’ security guards who 
challenge his belonging status? (see Extract 6). Lacan (1948, as cited in Wyatt, 2004) points 
to aggressivity as a component of envy, resting on “fundamental interchangeability of self and 
other” (Wyatt, p. 8). In envy, like idealisation and interpellation is “the desire to be the other” 
or in Freudian (as cited in Wyatt, 2004, p. 13) terms, “one wishes to equal, to replace”. The 
lived reality, however, is that my belonging status, relative to participants from a highly 
privileged community, can only be occupied as a ‘visitor’. Thus, might our ‘aggressive’ 
gestures suggest something of an unrequited longing (Middleton, 2013), as expressed in 
mockery in M’s case and confrontation in mine? 
 
5.6. Co-opted into Fantasy 
At this juncture, it is useful to return to my reflections in Extract 4. I note that I am struck with 
“cowering respect”, co-mingled with “admiration” (lines 14-17) in response to Meryl and the 
panoptic presence of ‘The Golf Estate’ security office.  These momentary connections that I 
share with Meryl are at the same time mingled with admiring fear. Similar to Meryl, Sofia, Tim 
(and perhaps M’s) employment of desire and fear, a parallel process seems to be in operation 
here.  I find myself mirroring the very sentiments that have propelled my participants to choose 
the lifestyle of gated community living.  Extract 9 is an exchange with Sofia on our go-along. 
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Extract 9:  Go-along with Sofia on the grounds of ‘The Golf Estate’ 
[We are walking along a scenic route with trees lining the pathway where a line of houses face the 
golf course]  
1. UL:  I'm thinking back on Tim’s comment about (.) um (1.0) oh, he said something  
2.   about bringing normality to something that's ABNORMAL. 
3. Sofia:  Yes. 
4. UL:  So that/that kind of THING that WE TAKE FOR GRANTED  
5. Sofia:   Yes. 
6. UL:   of having (1.0) fun with families, right, 
7. Sofia:   Yah, yah. 
8. UL:   coming together as families um in a COMMUNAL space. 
9. Sofia:  Yes (1.0) yah (1) yah: it's just (3) very nice staying here. I don't know what  
10.   else §I must SAY about it§ hh 
11. UL:  Mm. 
12. Sofia:   Yah.  
13. UL:  (3.0) Yah, I get the sense of (.)  
14. Sofia:   You know, it's [y a h,  i t ' s  l o v e l y 
15. UL:     very, it's very peaceful] and calm. 
16. Sofia:   Yah, you'd be able to SIT here and look out your window [and  
17. UL:               Mm] 
18. Sofia:   have all THIS.  
19. UL:    Well thank you for (.) taking me on this tour. 
20. Sofia:   NO, it's a pleasure. 
21. UL:   Yes, just to experience and see what it's like. 
22. Sofia:   Yes. 
23. UL:   It's very useful. 
24. Sofia:   And especially now that you got kid/having KIDS. 
25. UL:   Yes. 
26. Sofia:   To be able to love/live in an estate's quite nice 'cause you can [walk around 
27. UL:             R  i : : g h t ]  
28.   yes 
29. Sofia:   um (2)  
30. UL:   and not really  
31. Sofia:   and not worry about 
32. UL:   Yah. 
33. Sofia:  what time it is or 
34. UL:  Right. 
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In an earlier exchange with Sofia (Extract 3), I highlighted my supportive role in colluding with 
her, supporting her views in our talk about crime.  In Extract 9, it is I who is doing most of the 
talking. Tim’s earlier statement about gated community living as affording “normality to 
something that’s ABNORMAL” (line 2) has impressed upon me quite profoundly. Apart from 
reflecting his statement to him in that same exchange (Extract 5a, lines 20-1), I repeat it here 
to Sofia.  The normality of what is abnormal ‘outside’ (of crime and violence that threatens the 
intimacies of ordinary, everyday life) can be escaped from in a much more attractive offer 
provided by ‘The Golf Estate’, that of bringing “a sense of normality to (1.0) to an ABNORMAL 
situation” (Extract 5a, lines 4-5).  This self-revelation, unfolding throughout the go-along, is 
articulated as “that kind of THING that WE TAKE FOR GRANTED” (line 4).  Perhaps the allure 
is all the more potent for me as a new mother, a fact that I had shared with Sofia, to which she 
draws on as a further factor of appeal (‘and especially now that you have got kids/having KIDS’ 
[line 24]).   
 
Yet, this appeal factor has been in operation all along throughout my go-along with Sofia where 
reference to ‘kid(s)’ is made 31 times in various ways (‘the kids come here A LOT’, ‘VERY 
KID-FRIENDLY’, ‘so it’s nice for the k/kids’, ‘this is where the kids come out’, ‘and it’s also for 
the KIDS’, ‘the BIRDS, the/the/the/the FREEDOM for the kids’, ‘kids just playing OUTSIDE’).  
What is more enticing is Sofia’s invitation I could belong here; that I am deemed acceptable 
and legitimate to a world she puts on offer: “Yah, you’d be able to SIT here and look out your 
window and have all THIS [line 16-17).” Beckoned to “the place of the other” (Kristeva, 1982, 
p. 37), I am drawn into the fantasy of imagining future possibilities “of having (1.0) fun with 
families … coming together as families … in a COMMUNAL space” (lines 6-8) that is “very 
peaceful and calm” (line 15).   However, here, Sofia no longer needs to do the talking (‘I don’t 
know what else §I must SAY about it§ hh’ [lines 9-10]).  It is almost as if in this very moment, 
I as ‘individual’, have become successfully interpellated as ‘subject’ into an ideology (Žižek, 
2006).  
 
Important to highlight is that my interpretation of Extract 9 (as with the extracts in which I am 
implicated directly) is a distanciated one and critically removed from the experience of the 
encounter.  Perhaps the tension between the two stances highlights the uneasiness of my 
place in this research, of being drawn to a world of privilege while recognising the obligations 
(or ethical stance) that comes with doing research centred on issues of social inequality and 
injustice.  Perhaps this uneasy resolve relates to my ‘guilt of privilege’ – being complicit in a 
world and perspective that betrays the ideals of research on home and the asymmetries of 
belonging.  
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At the same time, the interpellation is an imaginary identification with the other, that structures 
everyday feelings of idealisation and envy. Wyatt (2004, p. 2-3) suggests that envy operates 
as “desire to be an other who appears to possess a fullness of being and heightened vitality 
that the subject lacks”. The fullness and vitality of being, symbolised in the exclusive gated 
community, is allowed to me momentarily and fleetingly as the visiting ‘outsider’. There is 
something of my “outside belonging” as Probyn (1996, p. 9) that resonates in these 
exchanges. As Probyn (1996, p. 8) puts it, the desire to belong is both “tenacious and fragile”, 
resting with “the knowledge of the impossibility of ever really and truly belonging”.  My attempt 
to resolve or absolve these difficulties (at least temporally) is to theorise these experiences 
and encounters with my participants in a distant manner in the hopes that it lessens the grip 
of a potential ideology at play (Glynos, 2001). I want to argue here that although Meryl, Sofia, 
Tim and M. are actively making home, spatially and linguistically, they are also lured by the 
ideological imaginary (Althusser, Corpet & Matheron, 1993). 
 
5.7. Conclusion 
In this analytic chapter, I mapped out the narrative imaginary of crime talk to show how this 
structured participants’ accounts through interpretive repertoires of ‘terror’ and ‘fear’. In doing 
so, it offered a way of symbolically re-ordering a chaotic world. repertoires of ‘terror’ and ‘fear’. 
Gated community residents justified their lifestyle through opposing constructions of safety-
danger, peace-violence, order-chaos and paradise-prison. These discursive constructions 
were also spatialised in rituals of boundary-making. These distinctions between ‘inside’ and 
‘outside’, ‘normal’ and ‘abnormal’, ‘safety’ and ‘danger’ were evidenced as quilting points in 
the text (Parker, 2005). In turn, I explored how these played out in the regimes of visibility 
regulated through surveillance strategies of the security function and how this informs 
belonging as a mode of looking. These discursive, spatial and visual coordinates seem to 
constitute belonging as a meaningful, interactive process performed intersubjectively. A 
discursive analysis of the texts illuminated questions about how the phenomenon of gated 
community living is spoken about, how subjects position themselves, and what resources are 
used to justify, resolve or substantiate their particular perspectives. 
 
From a Lacanian perspective, these forms of ‘discursive closure’ (Daly, 1999, p. 220) offer an 
imaginary construction that is taken to be fact (Rogers, 2007). While they provide a meaning-
making frame, they do not account for why we are gripped towards particular modes of 
belonging that legitimate specific ideological projects of home. We are not merely disciplined 
or subjected, in a Foucauldian, sense into belonging by a powerful panoptic gaze (Krips, 
2010). As desiring agents, we mutually participate and, with active intent and pleasure, we 
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seek to capture the gaze to submit to it (Cheng, 2000 as cited in Wyatt, 2004). In the next 
chapter, I develop some of these affective resonances highlighted in this chapter, namely 
anxiety and desire as a form of ideological practice. I continue with a discursive analysis of 
but also open up the analysis further towards a symptomatic reading of ideology (Parker, 
2014) using a Žižekian-Lacanian (Lacan, 1977; 1995; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1993; 1994; 
1996; 1989; 2005; 2006; 2008) psychoanalytic frame. Here, I propose a different set of 
questions. How are texts held together as forms of knowledge? How do these forms of 
knowledge conceal desire as the structuring basis of ideological fantasy? How is this desire 
performed as a negotiated fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b) and how does this work to 
‘grip’ us into modes of belonging? 
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Chapter Six: Findings  
The Promise of Being ‘At Home in the World’ 
 
“We see ourselves through the way in which we fantasize that an Other is seeing us. When 
one speaks one imagines that one is being listened to by some Other”  
(Dashtipour, 2009, p. 4). 
 
6.1. The Promise of ‘Being at Home in the World’ 
In the previous chapter, I explored how crime talk functioned to legitimate the material and 
symbolic existence of the exclusive gated community as a paradisiacal construction. These 
performativities of belonging articulated in talk and materialised in boundary-making practices 
functioned to order a chaotic world of crime, violence and disorder. I showed how crime talk 
oriented speakers to make sense of their world. This guiding fiction engendered fear; at the 
same time, provided an alternative aspiring and inspiring vision that functioned powerfully 
evoke desire and the promise of ‘being at home in the world’. These patterns of speech were 
evidenced in interpretive repertoires, the “threads of sense-making”, identifiable in familiar 
tropes, metaphors, and recurrent patterns (Wetherell & Potter, 1988 as cited in Wetherell, 
2012, p. 12). These meaning frames provided the ‘common sense’ or explanatory resource of 
a community and at the same time, organises its accountability (Edley, 2001; Wetherell, 1998).  
 
These forms of “discursive closure”, while providing an intelligible structure to sense-making 
(Daly, 1999, p. 220), however, does not fully explain why (and how) we are gripped towards 
particular modes of belonging that legitimate specific ideological projects of home. In this 
chapter, I illuminate the quilting points (Parker, 2005) in the data, exploring the language of 
desire as central to the workings of ideological fantasy. Drawing from a Žižekian-Lacanian 
frame, I argue that the constructions of gated community living buttressed by crime talk 
operate as ideological forms.  They function, therefore “not to provide a point of escape from 
our reality, but rather to offer the very social reality as an escape from some real, traumatic 
kernel” (Žižek, 1992, p. 76).  Thus, rather than offering a retreat from the ‘real’ world, the allure 
of gated community living in its fictional fantasy coexists with it.  
 
However, the workings of ideology are not merely rational, manifest and transparent in words 
and speech (Vighi & Feldner, 2007).  In this chapter, I explore, from a Lacanian (1977; 2002; 
2014) lens, how desire structures the texts in spoken and unspoken ways. In tracing the 
“language of the unsayable” (Rogers, 2007, p. 113), I show how our desire is always entangled 
with “desire of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 171). In the act of speaking, we seek to recognition 
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from the Other, who offers us co-ordinates of how to belong, and the promise that we can be 
subjects worthy of love, admiration and approval. I highlight the subject’s (unconscious) 
address to the Other as a fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b) to show how desire is bound 
up in power to create social relations that sustain the ‘power grip’ of ideology (Glynos, 2001; 
Hoedemakers, 2010).  
 
I structure this chapter into three parts to explore the constructed nature of desire and its 
implications for belonging: the visual co-ordinates of desire, desire as a fantasmatic 
transaction, and traumatic longings.  I argue that belonging is never really attained even at the 
point of ‘arriving home’ (in material, emotional, or relational sense). Rather, like the moving 
signifier of home (Brah, 1996), it is a constantly shifting process. We momentarily grasp it 
before it slips from our grip. These moments of attunement and mutual recognition slips into 
anxiety/angst. We seek restoration as anxiety shifts into desire (Lacan, 2014), reinstating a 
renewed quest towards the promise of ‘being at home’. I attempt to show these processes of 
‘be – longing’ as affective, embodied and discursive. These shifting processes accord with our 
relations to others (and ourselves) (Probyn, 1996), structured by the socio-symbolic co-
ordinates of desire (Žižek, 2008, p. 7). 
 
6.2. Mapping the Visual Co-ordinates of Desire  
As highlighted in the previous chapter, crime talk (the narrative imaginary) corresponds with 
its materiality in home as a privileged space. In this chapter, I explore how the discursive and 
material converge to enter what Žižek (as cited in Garcia & Aguilar-Sánchez, 2008) refers to 
as the last moment of ideology. In this final moment, social domination is not only naturalised 
and invisibilised but is made alluring. In Extract 5a (Chapter 5), the Golf Estate exudes a 
transcendental quality, having the power to hold you in its grips. As Tim notes, “you know what 
this place does, you’ll see when you drive around” (line 1). Both Sofia and Meryl also comment 
respectively, “when we drive in, you actually almost feel a sense of RELIEF” and “I think people 
are craving um (3.0) uh/ju/just a sense of CALMNESS” (not reproduced in extracts).  What 
seems to make these statements so powerful is that they link narrative with affect, and 
meaning with enjoyment, in a manner that provides a guiding fiction that orders a complex 
world (Gunder, 2014).  The effect is not simply a hallucinatory fantasy that organises desire in 
its material operations. Rather “fantasy constitutes our desire”. Through fantasy, we are 
provided with the co-ordinates to which objects, in reality, perform the role of being objects of 
desire. In a literal sense, these objects “teach us how to desire” (Žižek, 2008, p. 7). 
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However, ideology functions to provide us with “an idealised vision of a ‘society” that cannot 
really exist” (Žižek, as cited in Garcia & Aguilar-Sánchez, 2008, para. 16). For Malik, the 
exclusive lifestyle estate as an embodiment of this fantasised ideal.  In contrast to Sofia, Meryl, 
and M., Malik does not draw on a crime discourse to justify gated living (‘a lot of people make 
a HUGE deal about security, but maybe I just take it for granted because I’ve never HAD that 
as an issue’ [go-along interview; not reproduced in extracts]).  Rather, high-technological 
security features are part of a privileged lifestyle, “as something that you EXPECT … in these 
types of residential (.) SPACES [go-along interview; not reproduced in extracts]”. Malik 
unabashedly holds the privileged lifestyle as an aspiring ideal.  Making repeatedly known that 
he is from the townships, Malik lives in a cluster home located in a security complex just 
minutes from a stand he has purchased in the exclusive lifestyle estate (‘The Ravine’). 
 
6.2.1. Desire as lack 
In Extract 10 below, we are in viewing distance from the entrance to ‘The Golf Estate’, the 
“MAIN ESTATE”, the forerunner of exclusive lifestyle communities in the area. This is a lengthy 
extract which I preserve in its detail to outline the workings of interpellation through desire. 
 
Extract 10: Go-along with Malik (male, executive, lives in ‘East Cluster’) 
1. MALIK: THAT’S THE FIRST PLACE THAT I SAW=In fact this other one [pointing  
2.   towards ‘The Ravine’] that we’re buying in now didn’t exist when I first saw  
3.   this one. Um so 
4. UL:   So when you saw this, you saw it from the outside? 
5. MALIK: NO, NO. There was a friend of mine, it was in two thousand and (.) two 
6. UL:  Mm. 
7. MALIK: I think it was. In fact, not just a friend, a BOSS (.) um a manager that I worked  
8.   with who (.) had a house there um::: and I thought WOW what a nic::e 
9.   neighbourhood, you know, 
10. UL:   [Mm. 
11. MALIK: area]. The houses are hu::ge and fantastic and (.) you know um:: I must (2.0) it/it  
12.   was a su/sort of SUBCONSCIOUS INTENTION 
13. UL:   Yah. 
14. MALIK: um/and almost more like a DREAM or a wish and I think that’s probably funny  
15.   how life works out that way. You see something for the first time. It makes such a  
16.   HUGE impact and you say)) ((clicking fingers)) ‘someday I wanna live here or I  
17.   wanna (1.0) you know  
18. UL:   Yah. 
19. MALIK: have a place like this an::d the way that it happened= 
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20. UL:   Right, and/and SO: I wonder what that uh wh/what you called it um that  
21.   dream or that wish or that inspiration  
22. MALIK: [Y e a h . 
23. UL:   I wonder] what (.) that was about, that/that kind of SPARKED that for you. 
24. MALIK: Um (.) look I think (1.0) for:: A LOT OF people (1.0) there’s always  
25.   something that you:: desire 
26. UL:   Mm hm. 
27. MALIK: WISH for or WANT 
28. UL:   Mm. 
29. MALIK: and/and/and dream about.  
30. UL:   Mm hm.  
31. MALIK: U:m (2.0) an::d I think (2.0) for me um (.) the house that we’re building   
32.   and the kind of HO::ME in this neighbourhood and area and lifestyle in (.)  
33.   w/one way of looking at it is that (1.0) for me this is what (1.0) represents  
34.   success on the one hand  
35. UL:   Mm hm. 
36. MALIK: but also represents fulFILLMENT (.) you know u::m (2.0) [I  t h i n k 
37. UL:               fulfilment] 
38. MALIK: Fulfil/FULFILLMENT 
39. UL:  Mm. 
40. MALIK: in terms of like I said, you know wh (2) WHO (.) YOU ARE because I  
41.   think your HOME (1.0) is a represenTATION of WHO YOU ARE and an  
42.   aspirational home is a representation of who you aspire to be (.) you  
43.   know. Um if you didn’t (2.0), well I was going to say if you didn’t know me  
44.   but until T(hh)WO WE(hh)EKS A(hh)GO §you didn’t really know me§ 
45. UL:  §No§  
46. MALIK: but ((vehicle driving past)) if you DIDN'T KNOW ME and I invited you to  
47.   my HOME uh and my NEIGHBOURHOOD 
48. UL:  Mm hm ((vehicle driving past)) 
49. MALIK: I would want you to feel like, ‘wow this is (.) nice, this is amazing, this is  
50.   (1.0) you know  
51. UL:  Mm. 
52. MALIK: CLASSY, um ((smacking lips)) upmarket you know, ‘CAUSE that’s WHO  
53.   I AM you know, and in a way that’s who WE ARE uh:  
54.   together with/with/with my wife and I.  
 
In this explanatory account, Malik’s opening line in Extract 10, “THAT’S THE FIRST PLACE 
THAT I SAW” (line 1) is spoken emphatically, revealing his excitement as he points out ‘The 
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Golf Estate’. In a Lacanian sense, the act of seeing consolidates the image/visual as the 
‘’initial’ coordinates of his “desire” (line 25). In a Žižekian sense, the privileged home functions 
as the coordinates for this material accomplishment and striving that stitches “desire to the 
fabric of social reality” (Kirshner, 2005, p. 87).  To illustrate, the visual image of exclusive 
home, “as something that you:: desire” (line 25) seems to be for Malik the imaginary object 
that will bring ultimate fulfilment. I explore how these operations come into play, using Wyatt’s 
(2004) reference to Lacan’s three relations of the visual field (the mirror, the screen and the 
gaze).  Through the visual lure, the connection between desire and interpellation becomes 
manifest (Wyatt, 2004).  Althusser’s (as cited in Wyatt, 2004) notion of interpellation provokes 
a forceful pull into being “hailed” into a subject position.  However, for Wyatt (2004, p. 120)  
this presupposes a somewhat passive subject who is compelled into a circumscribed role, but 
overlooks that “the subject, too, is intent on trying to ensnare the gaze.”  To quote Cheng (as 
cited in Wyatt, 2004, p. 120), the unanswered question in Althusser’s formulation is: “what 
pleasure inheres in the act of submitting to interpellation?”. 
 
6.2.2. The mirror  
‘The Golf Estate’ is Malik’s first encounter with the “neighbourhood” (line 47), which captivates 
him and evokes a “desire for identification” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 120).  Malik constructs this visit to 
the house of his “friend” and “BOSS”/”manager” (line 7) in the “GOLF estate” as an enchanting 
encounter with a “nic::e neighbourhood” (line 8-9). Malik remarks that the “houses are hu::ge 
and fantastic” (line 11), effecting a “HUGE impact” (line 16) and setting the stage for “DREAM 
or a wish” (line 14) that “‘someday I wanna live here” (line 16-17). This imaginary identification 
is the ideal ego (Idealich), whereby the mirror image is assimilated to form the ego and 
becomes the origin of all source of identifications in the visual field (Wyatt, 2004; Miller, as 
cited in Žižek, 1989). 
 
However, Lacan (2014) holds that desire is not a relation to the object (in this case, the 
privileged home) but a relation to lack. Read in terms of the Lacanian Mirror, Malik finds 
mirrored in the visual imaginary of ‘The Golf Estate’ the ideal ego – an “identification with the 
image in which we appear likeable to ourselves, with the image representing ‘what we would 
like to be’” (Žižek, 1989, p. 105). This evident gap between the actual state of affairs and the 
imagined ideal is captured in Malik’s linguistic choices: “Dream or wish” (line 14), “someday I 
wanna live here” (line 17), “aspirational home” (line 42). The gap between hope and fulfilment 
is for Lacan the origin and workings of desire (Kulick, 2003). This lack is not simply a material 
one. As Malik makes clear, it is a question of being and becoming: “your HOME (1.0) is a 
represenTATION of WHO YOU ARE, and an aspirational home is a representation of who you 
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aspire to be” (line 41-2). The desire here resonates as “Be Longing” (Rowe, 2005, p. 15), an 
interpellative beckoning towards the other. This totalising effect highlights interpellation as a 
two-sided process, of being hailed and desiring to submit to the hailing (Wyatt, 2004). To follow 
this Lacanian logic, what of Malik is lacking that causes him to be enraptured by this ‘perfect’ 
semblance of imaginary wholeness (Fink, 1997)? 
 
6.2.3.   The gaze 
The imaginary identification is dependent on symbolic identification.  This identification with 
the ego ideal, what Lacan (as cited in Wyatt, 2004, p. 98) designates as the place of the 
validating/admiring gaze that allows us to “feel himself both satisfactory and loved.”  Here, the 
Lacanian (1977, p. 38) maxim that “man’s desire is the desire of the Other” introduces the crux 
of interpellation in its relation to desire. The desire of the Other relates to those cultural ideals 
and characteristics that emanate from the social order. The individual strives to embody these 
ideals to in order to be desired (i.e., to be recognised by the other), and to desire what the 
other desires (as envy) (Wyatt, 2004; Žižek, 2006).  The emphasis here is that “imaginary 
identification is always identification on behalf of the gaze in the Other” (Žižek, p. 106; 
emphasis in original). The image is related to the gaze through symbolic identification. Žižek 
(1989, p. 105; italics in original)  defines symbolic identification as “identification with the very 
place from where we are being observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we appear 
to ourselves likeable, worthy of love.”   
 
The Lacanian notion of “the address” (Rogers, 2007, p. 112) (alluded to in Chapter 5) 
highlighted desire as an (unconscious) and negotiated fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b). 
Its operation in the text helps us understand the force or grip of fantasy. For Lacan, speech is 
an act that seeks recognition, to evoke desire in the other. Through speech, the subject 
“(unconsciously) addresses the Other (subject) so that the truth about his speech—the 
specificity of his unconscious, repressed desire—may be recognised by the Other” (Chiesa, 
2007, p. 40). Malik engages with me directly in the imaginary ‘you-me’ relationship in the 
interview context (Rogers, 2007). I am positioned directly by him as the subject whose 
approving gaze he seeks: “if you DIDN’T KNOW ME … and I invited you to my HOME uh and 
my NEIGHBOURHOOD, I would want you to feel like, ‘wow this is (.) nice, this is amazing ... 
” (lines 46-49). Might this ‘you’, however, also stand as a signifier of a symbolic gaze? Might 
Malik’s address to me be an unconscious address to the Other (Rogers, 2007) for which I 
stand (in my role of the researcher) as its representative? (Bracher, 1993). At the transferential 
level, Malik seeks to resolve his place in the social order: ‘What do you want?’, ‘What am I to 
you?’, ‘What am I to you?’ (Hook, 2008b, p. 404), orienting to an approving gaze. The 
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approving gaze is embodied in the position of the researcher, “the constructed ‘other’ of a 
‘you-me’ relationship” (Rogers, 2007, p. 112), who wields evaluative power over participants’ 
responses.  
 
As Hook (2008b, p. 285) emphasises, fantasy is the “return-effect” of the subject’s response 
to managing the enigma of the Other’s desire. This anxiety for Malik “shifts over towards the 
question of desire” (Lacan, 2014, p. 214) that is bound up in language. The image one adorns, 
therefore, is more than simply what is perceived as full and perfect, or in Malik’s case, 
“fantastic” (line 11) and “amazing” (line 49), “upmarket” (line 52) and “CLASSY” (line 52). 
Rather, it is appropriated as a status of being “admired by someone who is a representative 
of the big Other, of the symbolic order” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 126). The big Other consists of the 
linguistic structure, verbal interaction and the sociocultural structures that configure relations 
of (racial) privilege and oppression (Wyatt, 2004). Malik’s search for self-validation is oriented 
towards the gaze of the Other, the Symbolic Order, the place from where [he] appears to 
[himself] as likeable, worthy of love” (Žižek, 1989, p. 105).   
 
In the same way that I am subject to the invisible, tyrannical and taunting gaze (see analysis 
of Extract 4), Malik is captivated by the gaze that is at once elusive and ever-present.  Extract 
11, makes this explicit: 
 
Extract 11: Go-along with Malik 
1. MALIK: When you see something that you LIKE that RESONATES with you I/I  
2.   don’t even know how you EXPLAIN where that comes from but it’s just like  
3.   WOW, this is FANTASTIC  
4. UL:  Mm  
5. MALIK: I WANT this for [MYSELF  
6. UL:        M  m : : ] right. 
7. MALIK: you know and then (.) it becomes an ASPIRATION you know and=‘Cause it's  
8.   not/you can’t want something until you’ve seen it ‘cause you don’t even know  
9.   what it is. 
10. UL:  Yes. 
11. MALIK: Unless you’re (.) one of those (.) you know (.) THINKERS or VISIONARIES 
12.    you know like, 'hm I'm Martin Luther King. I can SEE a DREAM’, you know, 
13.   Black people being FREE in America but EVEN SO  
14. UL:  hh 
15. MALIK: it’s because you’ve SEEN other people who live free. 
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Malik attempts to map the visual (‘when you see something’ [line 1], ‘can’t want something 
until you’ve seen it’ [line 8]) as the object cause of his desire. The gaze to whom the subject 
looks towards for approval is invisible and not locatable; in actuality, it exists as a lack in the 
symbolic order (Wyatt, 2004). The gaze is what Lacan refers to objet a (the unattainable object 
of desire), “the symbol of lack”, that offers the “promise of completing presence, but it is 
actually missing” or does not exist (Wyatt, 2004, p. 134).  For Lacan, “the object a in the field 
of the visible is the gaze” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 132; emphasis in original).  As Extract 11 illustrates, 
the gaze occupies the status of “something” that is undefinable (‘cause you don’t even know 
what it is’ [line 8]). It has no identifiable or explicable point of origin. As Malik notes, “I don’t 
even know how you EXPLAIN where that comes from” (line 2).  Despite its unknowable status, 
its presence is inescapable.  For Malik, the privileged home evokes awe (‘WOW, this is 
FANTASTIC’ [line 3]), has an effect of “RESONATE[ing] with you” (line 1), and gives rise 
desire as “ASPIRATION” (line 7).  
 
Attending to the structure of this narrative reveals a curious juxtaposition, suggesting 
something more than what is consciously intended (Chiesa, 2007). Notable is an abrupt break, 
from an account of personal “ASPIRATION” (line 7) to a historical narrative, as recounted 
through the gaze of “THINKERS or VISIONARIES … like …. Martin Luther King (lines 12-13) 
of “Black people being FREE in America” (lines 12-13). This chronological and geographical 
disruption in the narrative orients the listener to a broader scenario in which the truth about 
his speech might be recognised by the Other (Chiesa, 2007).  The symbolic juxtapositions of 
disconnected scenes may offer clues as to what is ‘repressed’ in speech. Attention to these 
would highlight the “symbolic relations outside … the linear narratives of a dominant discourse 
(Lapping, as cited in Hook, 2013b, p. 45). Here, Malik’s (unconscious) address to the Other 
exceeds the ‘you-me’ constructed relationship (Rogers, 2007), seeking recognition at the level 
of symbolic identification (Martin, 2015). Developing this interpretation in light of the (cultural) 
screen of Lacanian theory may shed clues. 
 
6.2.4. The screen 
How does Malik seek approval from the gaze that is elusive? Wyatt (2004) proposes that while 
the gaze in itself is invisible, ‘the symbolic look’ (or the look of the social) is identifiable “in the 
eye of a particular other” (p. 128).  It is those desirable qualities seen in others that they 
become a model for imitation.  In other words, “one imputes a desire for the gaze and then 
tries to fulfil hypothesised desire” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 137).  The “friend, “BOSS” and “manager” 
figure, is seen by Malik to possess those qualities he seeks for himself “that will please the 
gaze, and fulfil the desire of the Other” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 135). 
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Moreover, the gaze does not simply reach the subject without passing through the screen.  
Lacan does not further elaborate on the screen. However, Wyatt (2004), along with others 
(e.g., Silverman, 1992; Žižek, 1989) insist on its ideological status. Its projection constitutes 
the subject via culturally defined visual repertoires and images, delineated along various lines 
of social difference: race, class, gender, nationality, etc. Thus, the ego ideal, “the point in the 
symbolic from which I am looked at” (Wyatt, 2005, p. 127) “reaches the subject after passing 
through the cultural screen”. The visual form of subject is weighed up against a cultural ideal; 
on this basis s/he is either validated or disparaged (Wyatt, 2005). In Lacanian terms, through 
mimicry, Malik “turns [him]self into a picture under the gaze” (Wyatt, 2004, p. 138).  The 
“aspirational home” (Extract 10, line 42), the symbol of “success” (line 34) and 
“FULFILLMENT” (line 36), is a preexisting cultural ideal to which Malik seeks to conform.  In 
other words, the screen offers visual repertoires adapting to and visually defining the ideals of 
what it looks like to be “CLASSY” (line 52) and “upmarket” (line 52), to have “success” (line 
34) and “FULFILLMENT” (line 38).  In this sense, ‘The Golf Estate’ seems to function as the 
symbolic object that offers Malik the visual co-ordinates that in a literal sense “teaches [him] 
how to desire” (Žižek, 2008, p. 7).  If we bring these elements together, it is possible to see 
the workings of interpellation. The symbolic look that is projected onto the screen of culturally 
desirable images calls out to Malik. In turn, he responds to the imagined ideal as the subject 
who desires.  In this respect, Wyatt (2004) refers to the idealisation and interpellation as 
processes through which subjects appropriate the other’s image. 
 
If identification involves imitating a ‘model-image’, “which gaze is considered when the subject 
identifies himself with a certain image?” (Wyatt’s, 2004, p. 130). Žižek (1989, p. 105) argues 
that the trait, the basis upon which we identify with another, is usually hidden and “by no means 
necessarily a glamorous feature”.  This “everyday undergirding” fantasmatic transaction is 
what structures identification in unconscious ways.  Could Malik’s “aspirational home” (line 48) 
represent the specular image of himself who conforms to the aesthetics that are pleasing to 
the ‘white’ world (Wyatt, 2004)?  If so, what is the cost of mimicry? Is Malik’s desire to belong, 
to fit in, with the repertoires of “success” prescribed and demanded by the traditionally ‘white’ 
symbolic order to access this world? To risk such an interpretation here is to go beyond what 
is immediately apparent in the data. 
 
However, what gives us clues that race and class play a part in Malik’s self-constructions? 
How do these play a role in his socially indeterminate belongings? On the one hand, he is a 
resident ‘insider’ to an exclusive neighbourhood. On the other, he is a resident ‘outsider’ 
seeking entry into an exclusive estate in which he owns a stand, yet as not broken ground. 
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Throughout our exchange, Malik makes several references to race, belonging and place.  
Apart from “Black people being FREE in America” (Extract 11, line 13), Malik makes 
continuous reference to this sought-after lifestyle as being “VERY DIFFERENT to (.) township 
UPBRINGING and township lifestyle” (go-along interview).  What is telling is how race and 
class shape his constructions of desire/lack relative to a lifestyle to which he aspires. 
 
Malik’s account takes the form of rationalisation. What is considered desirable seems to be 
quilted by the symbolic threads of ‘white’ wealth. Though not explicitly stated, these symbolic 
threads appear, disappear and re-emerge in Malik’s narrative as subtle traces (Rogers, 2007): 
“upmarket” (Extract 10: 52), “classy” (Extract 10: 52), “lifestyle” (Extract 10:32), “aspire” 
(Extract 10:42), and “FREE” (Extract 11: 13). As noted in the opening of this chapter, desire 
is predicated on lack, loss or absence of the real object that remains forever elusive (see also 
Part II Literature Review) (Kulick, 2003). As such, it is always displaced onto those objects we 
instil with hope to satisfy what we desire/lack. Kulick (2003) summarises Elizabeth Grosz’s 
(1990) point. There are two objects through which desire becomes symbolised. One is spoken 
as the demanded object (for Malik, the “aspirational home”); the other is unspoken (as a 
relationship to the other whose recognition we seek). In the next section, I explore further how 
these ‘unspoken’ elements of desire (silences and disavowals) are mapped in the texts 
(Kulick, 2003). I analyse these ‘unspoken’ elements in conversational interaction reveal how 
desire is achieved, expressed, negotiated, and repressed. Through this examination, I aim to 
show how social relations are created through desire that is always bound up with power 
(Kulick, 2003). 
 
6.3. Desire as a negotiated transaction  
Desire alone is insufficient to mediate the role of fantasy. As highlighted earlier, both discursive 
and spatial constructions of ‘The Golf Estate’ is structured by powerful affects of both desire 
and anxiety, displaced and designated onto an object of fear (Lacan, 2014). Rather than 
undermining the other, these seemingly contradictory states are the norm operations of 
fantasy (Žižek, 2008). The lure of fantasy embodies the promise but, more importantly, it 
diverts us away from “looking too closely at the conditions of our social reality” (Gunder, 2014, 
p. 3).  In Lacanian terms, “fantasy bridges our psychic life (the Imaginary) with socially 
constructed reality (the Symbolic) and prevents us from encountering … the Real” (Gunder, 
2014, p. 4).   
 
Ideology, as a form of “discursive enclosure”, may be conceived as a continual struggle 
between reality (the symbolic-discursive order) and the Real (Daly, 1999, p. 220).  While the 
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ideology offers the “‘promise’ of a fully reconciled social order” and deliverance from the Real, 
the Real is that which threatens to “destroy ‘reality’ as an intelligible structure” (Daly, 1999, p. 
221).  It is ideology that does the work of denying access to the Real (Daly, 1999). The Real 
trauma, therefore, resides not in reality out there (i.e., of crime, chaos, disorder), as explicitly 
spoken in ‘The Gated Community’ accounts, but in the excess of the fantasy.  What Žižek 
considers the “trick of ideology” is in the construction of a phantasmatic space that veils the 
true horror (Garcia & Aguilar Sánchez, 2008).   
 
Moreover, from a Lacanian perspective, the horror is not so much what is ‘contained’ in the 
individual. More horrifying is the subject’s alienation from a master discourse, a social 
mechanism in response to conditions of systematised oppression (van der Walt, Franchi & 
Stevens, 2003).  What is traumatic is the surplus experience; that which cannot be spoken 
that slips beneath the signifier, and is neutralised in words and discourse.  Trauma is manifest 
is through the symptom, the modality of the unconscious (the Real), defined in a Lacanian 
sense as the “unconscious that speaks itself disruptively onto the discursive body of the 
speaking subject” (van der Walt, Franchi & Stevens, 2003, p. 262).  In a social sense, it 
disrupts the symbolic coordinates of the subject’s position in the symbolic economy.  To draw 
from Parker (2015b, p. 250), what is disturbed by the unconscious is very much a question of 
‘place’ (be it of ‘race’, geography, ethnicity, gender, etc.), by what “disturbs our consciousness 
of ourselves in our place.”  
 
For Lacan (2002), our desire is not our own but is always imbricated in the Other. From this 
perspective, the task of analysis is to interpret the symptom. The symptom is present as the 
“coded message which the unconscious conveys to the ‘big Other’ (the symbolic social 
system) a traumatic kernel that is yet to be integrated into the symbolic system” (Reed, 2010, 
p. 128).  This entails exploring the jouissance of the text. Jouissance,  a ‘painful pleasure’ as 
a form of enjoyment of the symptom, may be read as “an address by an other to the Other” 
(Braunstein, 2003, p. 108). The symptom in this respect is “the awareness of lack of an object 
of desire expressed in a displaced manner” (Fry, 2009, para. 28). How might this be discerned 
in the text? Fry (2009) notes that the symptom is not manifest in the metonymic course of 
desire, but the ‘moments of quilting’ (the metaphor). Together, both metaphor and metonymy 
co-operate in the discourse of the unconscious.  In this section, I attend to the “disruptive or 
surprising ‘opening of the unconscious’” (Hook, 2013b, p. 41) where it may be possible to 
discern latent significations. An examination of disavowals, silences and repressions in 
speech offers a way of exploring “how the unsaid or unsayable structures what is said” (Kulick, 
2003, p. 133). 
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6.3.1. Silences 
To appreciate what is concealed in the discourse of the speaking subject, would require 
attention to what is spoken. As Rogers (2007, p. 113) notes, although the unsayable makes 
references beyond speaking, the unsayable is “in speaking”. Below, Sofia offers her views on 
the proliferation of gated communities in Johannesburg:  
 
Extract 12: Go-along with Sofia  
1. Sofia:  I just think it/it's actually, well for/we actually pleased this has happened,  
2.   because you see uh [name of township] is getting bigger and bigger and bigger= 
3.   [I k n o w 
4. UL:  Mm mm] 
5. Sofia:  it's terrible to say that but you don't really want (1) everyone squatting outside  
6.   your (3.0) round your/your/where you LIVE, you know what I mean? 
7. UL:  Mm hm. 
 
The reference here to ‘The Township’, comprises formal and informal settlements and 
backyard structures occupied by the poorer segment of the black population (Himlin, Engel & 
Mathotho, 2005). The reference to the “everyone squatting” (line 5) in this exchange signals 
the site of anxiety. This is evidenced in the falters of speech – a noticeable pause and 
stutters/revisions (line 6) – that separate ‘The Township’ (“everyone squatting outside” [line 
2]) from ‘The Gated Community’ (“where you LIVE” [line 6]). The falter in speech, in a parallel 
sense, corresponds spatially to the “falter in the visual field”. This translates to poor, 
‘temporary’ bodies being where they should not be (Hillin, n.d., para. 1) – that is, in proximity 
to sites of established exclusivity. We might recall from Extract 3 in the previous chapter 
Sofia’s ambivalent explanation for violence/crime, as hinging on both sympathy and blame: 
“so many more people are unemployed, and I think out of desperation there’s more violence” 
(lines 29-30).  In Extract 5b, Tim’s construction of black bodies as being ‘out of place’ recurs 
in several instances: “two guys that climbed over a wall” [Extract 5b: 32]; “try[ing] to get in” 
[Extract 5b: 20]; “a squatter camp across the road” (Extract 5b, line 17). The associative chains 
between desperation, poverty and violence thus work to weave together a portrayal of threat, 
evinced in the figure of ‘the criminal’. So far, nothing has been spoken that directly references’ 
race’. However, this need not be uttered. There is already an implicit understanding, conveyed 
and received in subtle ways, as indicated in my affirmations to Sofia (‘Mm hm’ [line 6]).  
 
From a Lacanian stance, by listening to these associative positionings, we discern the 
‘repressed’ of the text. Moreover, what is repressed is covered over by a coherent narrative 
frame (Rogers, 2007). Clear from these exchanges is that it is not ‘blackness’ that is 
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‘repressed’ since it is already ‘spoken’ quite audibly. To the contrary, what seems hidden from 
the dominant construction so far is ‘whiteness’. Whiteness has remained silent, “unnamed and 
unmarked” (Hagey & MacKay, 2000, p. 49) in the hypervisibility of the constructed other. This 
other is rendered racially identifiable through a chain of metonymic signifiers: “everyone 
squatting” [Extract 12: 5] /“squatter camp” (Extract 5b: 17), “the/in the location” (Extract 5b: 
26), “Zevenfontein” (Extract 5b: 27). Stitched together, they allow the unsayable of the ‘black 
man’ to be spoken. Polizzi (2013, p. 180) argues that the black body is “a social body in dys-
appearance”; it becomes hypervisible, “presences itself” when it is in dysfunction.  In racially 
tinged contexts, the social meanings ascribed to the black body, that is simultaneously absent 
and over-present, are limited and foreclosed.  Polizzi (2013, p. 174) argues that the black body 
is persistently constructed as the site of danger and threat.  The fear that is constituted in its 
visible presence also represents “a type of geographical demarcation or territorialization 
whereby the black body may be ‘legitimately’ presenced as a problematic body.”   
 
However, the black body as a ‘falter in the visual field’ is not merely an ‘eye-sore’ in a 
phenomenological sense that is “getting bigger and bigger and bigger” (Extract 12, line 2]. 
Instead, the body of the black man is made to ‘appear’ as the unspoken figure of criminality, 
as the reasoned explanation for why our world is dangerous (Polizzi, 2013).  Bremner (2004, 
as cited in Boersema, 2011) argues that crime offers a new imaginary to talk in coded ways 
about the uncomfortable processes of social change. These relate to a black majority 
government, decline of social service, failing infrastructure, etc.  Societal tensions are 
circumvented onto the intruder (the figure of the ‘black man’) who is perceived as a threat to 
a particular ‘way of life’ (Bremner, 2004). These are spoken in ways that are naturalised, 
ordinary and commonplace. As a result, they go unchallenged even by me as the researcher 
who becomes complicit in these constructions.   
 
These exchanges work powerfully to speak about blackness in hypervisible yet unspoken 
ways. Following Morrison’s (1993, as cited in Kulick, 2003, p. 133) analysis of ‘Africanism’ in 
American literary texts, I argue that the ‘structuring power’ in the fantasy construction lies in 
how whiteness, as a point of contrast, becomes symbolised – “as desirable”, as stated in 
Malik’s yearning: “I WANT this for MYSELF” (Extract 11:5). ‘Whiteness’ is thus symbolically 
juxtaposed as legitimate, abundant, coherent, against the backdrop of “everyone squatting” 
[Extract 11: 5], “unemployed” (Extract 3: 26], “desperation” [Extract 3: 27] and “violence” 
[Extract 3:32]. In the fantasy construction, the “enclave” (forthcoming in Extract 17: 21) or 
“paradise” (Extract 8: 22) affords a symbolic ‘safety’ that prevails over the chaotic ‘danger’. 
The terror of crime, the violence, the chaos on the roads is assuaged in the performance of 
privileged belonging that offers the “promise of being at home in the world” (Gunder, 2013, p. 
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1). Concomitantly, these work to articulate polarising subject positions, affects and locales 
constituted around desire and fear. We can see that the workings of ideology are structured, 
not by knowledge, but by desire to legitimate relations of power and domination (Žižek, 1989). 
As subjects (participants and researcher alike), we are oriented to the promise of abundance 
(signified by ‘Whiteness’), materialised in exclusive gated sites that provide the social, 
physical, geospatial co-ordinates of desire.  
 
‘Whiteness’ as the signifier of abundance, prosperity and fullness, the symbolic co-ordinates 
of ‘white be – longings’ from which Malik seeks to align, however, needs racial difference to 
constitute and inflate itself (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Paradoxically, ‘Whiteness’ is 
simultaneously threatened by an image of the world that does not mirror its narcissistic image 
(Hook, 2005). How then is this tension, a low-level anxiety, managed?  Importantly, the ‘other’ 
cannot be entirely annihilated as this would lead to profound, unmanageable anxiety. The 
‘other’ therefore, must remain an ever-present threat necessary for ‘Whiteness’ to uphold its 
very social and symbolic existence (Georgis, 2007; Hage, 1996; Middleton, 2013)? As noted, 
Lacan’s (2014, p. 214) proposition here is that through the fantasy construction, anxiety “shifts 
over towards the question of desire”. We can see how this is organised in the text around the 
languages of the unsayable (Rogers, 2007). These hinge on two paradoxically juxtaposing 
scenarios, as highlighted in the previous chapter: the beatific ‘reality’ and the horrific one 
(Žižek, 1997).  In the extracts, these are signified by ‘whiteness’ and ‘blackness’ respectively. 
What role does ‘the unsayable’ feature in this structuring narrative, and what does it need to 
‘repress’ to sustain such a fantasmatic construction? 
 
6.3.2. Desire as loss 
For Lacan (2014, p. 277), “desire is lack”, and is geared towards what is absent or lost. 
Moreover, desire is a lack in being that accords with a constitutive lack in the symbolic order 
(Glynos, 2001). The gap between what the subject is and what the Other expects signals this 
lack in being.  Desire, therefore, is a perpetual “craving for fulfilment in the encounter with the 
lost object” (Braunstein, 2003, p. 106). As highlighted, Malik’s account of desire pivots 
thematically on questions of lack. In Extract 13, Meryl’s account similarly centres on questions 
of desire, reflected as a nostalgic loss. 
 
Extract 13: Interview with Meryl  
1. Meryl:  Maybe you craving it because um w/we sort of (.) trying to have a Western style  
2.   LIFEstyle i/in Africa (1.0). U::m (.) but then it happens in India as well, 
3.   you know where/where/where there's chaos on the roads (.) there are still/there  
4.   gate/the gated communities in India too. 
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5. UL:  Mm. 
6. Meryl:  But also largely occupied by Westerners.  
7. UL:  Yah I mean that/that's fascinating in a sense, trying to find a home in a place that  
8.   feels FOREIGN, is that what it is? 
9. Meryl:  Well you know we/we/the thing is, you know, growing up in apartheid South  
10.   Africa you grew up in/in um (.) very ORDERLY communities, 
11. UL:  Ye:s 
12. Meryl:  u:m (2.0) which/in which I believe we were emulating uh a Eurocentric 
13.   lifestyle 
14. UL:  Mm hm. 
15. Meryl:  It’s the same all over the world. But I think the chaos of cities. RURAL AFRICAN  
16.   communities are not dissimilar to (.) to rural (.) AMERICA or Euro/you know rural  
17.   SOUTH AMERICA. Um (1.0) but (1.0) CITIES (2.0). CHAOTIC, disorganised  
18.   (1.0) third world cities FRIGHTen people who/who come from a uh (.) WESTERN  
19.   or Eurocentric-style background in my opinion. 
20. UL:  <<Mm>> 
21. Meryl:  You know we/we do, we do want (.) a bit of, or you can't, you=The speed limit is  
22.   forty kilometres in ‘The Golf Estate’ surrounds. >You/you can't (inaudible). You  
23.   can't drive on the pavements 'cause then they just won't allow you on the estate< 
24. UL:  <<Yah>> 
 
Meryl’s account reveals a nostalgic longing (“of craving” [line 1]) to an imaginary fullness, a 
return to roots characterised by “very ORDERLY communities” (line 10) reminiscent “of 
growing up in apartheid” (lines 9-10).  The account, though ambiguous, functions as a form of 
injunction and justification for gated communities, delineating clear boundary lines between 
who is (not) “allow[ed] on the estate” (line 28).   The issue of ‘race’ emerges as salient in some 
instances, disappears and then re-appears in muted tones, leaving subtle ‘traces’. I argue that 
the dominant ‘story thread’ creates particular associative positionings that (unconsciously) 
‘represses’ a more horrifying reality (Rogers, 2007; Žižek, 1993). Here, Meryl expresses as a 
yearning for familiarity: the semblance of order/sameness (line 10) characteristic of “a 
Eurocentric lifestyle’ (line 12), and reminiscent of “apartheid South Africa” (line 9). This 
orderliness is juxtaposed against the fear of disorder of the ‘third world’ (‘CHAOTIC, 
disorganised (1.0) third world cities FRIGHTen people who/who come from a uh (.) WESTERN 
or Eurocentric-style’) (line 18-19). Though ‘race’ seems explicitly spoken, it is also 
simultaneously concealed and naturalised in geospatial patterns of settlement constructed as 
endemic to communities “all over the world” (line 15). Despite, this seeming neutrality, ‘race’ 
re-emerges through metonymic chains: “chaos of cities” (line 15, 17), “RURAL AFRICAN 
communities” [line 15], “drive on the pavements” (line 22-3).  These constructions allow for 
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particular relational configurations of race, space and geography, where the ‘chaotic’ third 
world is depicted as threatening to conservative, ‘civilised’ social order. 
 
The text simultaneously evokes desire (‘craving’ [line 1], counterposed against fear (‘FRIGHT’ 
[line 18]). Moreover, Meryl’s injunction: “You can’t drive on the pavements ’cause then they 
just won’t allow you on the estate” (line 23), draws me in as the agreeing listener (‘Yah’).   
Noticeably, my affirmation (and complicity) is a hushed one (<<..>>) (line 24). In a strategically 
directed manner, the ‘you’ who “drive[s] on pavements” (line 22-3) metonymically refers to the 
mini-bus tax drivers3. Significant in this exchange is who is explicitly addressed. It might be 
argued the ‘you’ in Meryl’s injunctive command addresses me directly as the ‘visitor’ to the 
Estate, pulling me into a ‘you-me’ relationship (see Chapter 5, Extract 7). More broadly, it can 
also be an address to the constructed ‘other’ of the unruly ‘black man’. I argue, however, that 
her address transcends the immediate and broader social context. It orients both of us towards 
the trans-subjective symbolic order – the desire of the Other – that gives direction to how we 
form our respective identities within a community (Hook, 2008b). 
 
Meryl, as the ‘insider’ resident, holds some power to regulate entry into the Estate based on 
whom she deems a legitimate visitor. As the visiting ‘outsider’, I am subjected to the 
surveillance gaze of the Estate and Meryl. Despite this, I am vested with a kind of evaluative 
power as a researcher. The symbolic ‘Other’ of the unconscious is unrecognised in this piece 
of discursive text. Nevertheless, it provides the socio-historical co-ordinates to help situate 
and find ourselves (Hook, 2008b; Rogers, 2007). Though the Other is an ever-varying set of 
trans-subjective structures that mediates social relations (Dashtipour, 2009), here, it may be 
recognised as ‘Whiteness’ that “subjects us all ‘equally’ to the logic of race” (Seshadri-Crooks, 
2000, p. 25). Thus, nothing more needs to be said here. Meryl’s statement draws me as the 
listener/researcher into a shared symbolic reality, one that hierarchically structures, affirms 
and naturalises a world of asymmetrical social relations. It is this Other, the place with which 
we symbolically identify – the position from which we are seen – that constrains how we 
evaluate social categories and the possibilities for relating (Dashtipour, 2009). While we may 
all identify with the Other’s ideal (for example, of Whiteness), this big Other sets limits on who 
is “seen as lovable in the gaze of the Other” (Dashtipour, 2009, para. 13). 
 
If we are to explore these questions further along the lines of ideological analysis, we need 
attend to these extra-discursive, ‘hidden’ foundations of discourse that conceal “the material 
 
3 Symbolically, the minibus taxi in South Africa represents political and economic repression of 
Blacks during apartheid and post-apartheid “capitalist accumulation and class struggle” (Harvey, 
as cited in Khosa, 1994, p. 58).  
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conditions of enunciation” (Garcia & Aguilar-Sánchez, 2008, para. 5). A discursive analysis 
might ask how a specific construction was accounted for, or what vantage subject position is 
evident in an utterance. Of interest, however, is what abysmal ‘horror’ is being sutured, 
covered over or disavowed by “the fantasmatic cover of representation?” (Vighi & Feldman, 
2007, p. 154). Is there something more that these extracts say of ‘Whiteness’ that is 
‘repressed’ in and through the ‘hypervisible’ (yet unspoken) presence of constructed 
‘blackness’? 
 
Although the text explicitly draws on desire (‘craving’ [line 1]) (as a loss) in a justificatory 
account, it seems to cover over desire (as lack). Wyatt (2004) argues that envy, idealisation 
and interpellation, are based on the (unconscious) desire to be the Other. It rests on a wish 
“to equal, to replace, to be” the other who is perceived to the possess fullness that is lacking 
in the desiring subject (Wyatt, 2004, p. 13).  To live out the fantasy construction that we are 
loved, admired, and that we belong, requires that we simultaneously repudiate those 
unloveable, unworthy aspects of ourselves. In other words, to be worthy of the “place of the 
Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162) from whom we seek recognition, we project our unwanted parts 
of ourselves to create the ‘other’. 
 
Meryl orientates the “craving” towards the ‘European other’ (“Eurocentric lifestyle” [line 12-13]; 
of “village type living [go-along interview; not reproduced in extract]) upon whom the striving 
and wanting is modelled.  Her choice of word, “emulating” (line 12), is repeated several times 
throughout our exchanges (of locals needing to ‘emulate that same experience we had as 
children’, and of foreigners needing to ‘emulate where they come from’ [go-along interview]). 
‘The Golf Estate’ as “emulating” (lines 12-13) suggests mimesis, an emotional identification 
with the other, where the coherence of the self is modelled on or copied from the other. As 
Wyatt (2004, p. 138) offers: “I mimic what I think the gaze desires and so turn myself into the 
picture (supposedly) demanded by the gaze”. We can surmise here a desire to be the image 
(Dashtipour, 2009), as captured in the phrase: ‘I want to be you’ (Wyatt, 2003). The effect of 
mimicry is camouflage as Lacan (1977, p. 99) offers. ‘The Golf Estate’, is thus as a camouflage 
that bears the resemblance of the ideal through “emulation”, but is in itself lacking, failing ever 
to be the recognised ‘original’ object. As Lacan (1977) notes, it does not harmonise with the 
background, but becomes ‘mottled’. Thus, there is a sense of alienation in belonging. Like 
Malik who presents as ‘black outsider’ seeking white be – longings, this account evinces a 
(nostalgic) longing that remains unfulfilled. In this light, might the characterisations of the 
‘denigrated other’ work to buttress against the disavowal of knowing this lack (Straker, 2013)? 
That is, the knowing is effectively covered over, ‘blinded’ by its fictional image of “PARADISE” 
(Extract 8, line 22) that is taken to be reality. In other words, the fullness of being (‘Whiteness’, 
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its signifer) despite its materially ‘accomplished’ in ‘The Golf Estate’ and other exclusive gated 
sites, remains forever elusive, forever straining against but never finding completion. To 
explore this tentative interpretation, I draw on two instances of explicit disavowals of racism 
and what this might say about lack, ‘be – longing’ and alienations in ‘Whiteness’ (Esprey, 2017; 
Straker, 2013). 
 
6.3.3. Denials and disavowals  
From a Lacanian stance, desire may be traced in disavowals and denials in speech. The 
notion of disavowal, as Hook (2005) notes, offers a way to understand the workings of racist 
ideology. As a form of ‘contradiction-management’, disavowal allows the knowing of one thing, 
while believing another. Thus, racial tolerance may be (authentically) stated, and coexist – 
consciously and rationally – alongside behaviour and thought that seems overtly racist. In 
Extracts 14 and 15 below, I highlight the Lacanian notion of the ‘divided subject’, namely 
between a statement (the content of speech) and enunciation (performance of utterance), 
signalling that what is spoken exceeds the intent of speech (Hook, 2013b). Tim and Sofia and 
Meryl quickly dismiss any anticipated judgements ascribed to ‘The Golf Estate’.  In citing these 
extracts, my purpose is not to label a speaker or interaction as ‘racist’. Instead, it is to examine, 
in a sympathetic and critical light, how ideological fantasy shores up lack (Straker, 2013) and, 
at the same time, “disavows alternative ways of seeing the world” (Dashtipour, 2009, para. 
12). 
 
Extract 14: Exchange with Sofia and Tim (residents of ‘The Golf Estate’) 
1. Tim:  So on a Sunday morning, you go up to the clubhouse to have kind of breakfast  
2.   and there's French and there's Spanish and it's uh G/and Germans and  
3.   AMERIC/lots of Americans 
4. UL:  Mm.  
5. TIm:  uh a lot of uh um um ((smacking lips)) who, the Samsung guys, Koreans. 
6. S:  Yes. Lot of Koreans um VERY cosmopolitan. 
7. Tim:  It's quite nice. Quite nice. 
8. UL:  Ye:s, so like='cause you saying it/it's really nice that it's cosmopolitan and there's  
9.   that sense of diversity, 
10. Tim:  Mm. 
11. UL:  I wonder if you feel South African in this [space 
12. Tim:  Yah, you do. 
13. Sofia:          Y e s ] 
14. Tim:  Yah, you do. 
15. Sofia:  No, absolutely. 
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16. Tim:  No, absolutely. Because it's still (.) I would say about seventy percent  
17. Sofia:  [  Oh   no,   it's,   lot   of,   lot  of  South  Africans 
18. Tim:  about seventy five, eighty percent of the people are] are (.) 
19. Sofia:  Yah. 
20. Tim: pretty normal South Africans (.) BLACK and WHITE, uh/mm 
21. Sofia:  All mixed. 
22. Tim:  Yah, it's very mixed. 
23. UL:  Mm. 
24. Tim:  Very mixed. 
25. Sofia:  Yah. 
26. Tim:  But it's quite a nice, it/it's not like it's a, hey, this is a White enclave for you  
27.   know sort of a broederbond type=Not a all like that.  
28. UL:  Right. 
29. Tim:  Not at all. It's very, very mixed. In fact, I think there's em/eh/if you look at it,  
30.   there's a, there's a big black population here, 
31. Sofia:  Mm, there is. 
32. Tim:  so the upmarket Black guys who sort of, you know, MDs of big companies  
33.   and CEOs 
34. UL:  Mm hm. 
35. Tim:  of big companies. Lots of them are here, lots. 
 
Extract 15: Meryl. Go-along at ‘The Ravine’  
1. Meryl: So there a lot of walks and things here but (.) you can't/there isn't (1) an  
2.   actual golf course but this is very, quite affluent. This would be A [inaudible]  
3.   group only here. There's no (2.0) [and there's a lot of  
4. UL:                                                         This seems to be] still in process. [I’m  
5.   commenting on a vacant stand, conspicuously bare against expansive  
6.   properties adjacent to it and I think immediately of Malik]  
7. Meryl:  It's one of the last houses [to be built here 
8. UL:             Mm  hm ] 
9. Meryl:  Been taking forever. Um (3.0) the’re lot of wealthy uh black South Africans  
10.   living in both estates [referring to ‘The Golf Estate’ and ‘The Ravine’] (2.0)  
11.   and (2.0) you see a very MIXED South African=It should be very interesting from  
12.   your point of view, mixed .hh um (2.0) GREAT demographic representation of/of  
13.   all South Africans (2). It's NOT EXCLUSIVE for (1.0) WASPS or §you know§ hh 
14. UL:  hh  
15. Meryl:  §You know§ there's no religious:: [It's  
16. UL:          Uh huh] 
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17. Meryl:  very mixed. It's wonderful. 
 
Meryl states that ‘The Golf Estate’ is a hub for “expats from all over the world” and is “really 
like Europeans live” (go-along interview). The two extracts above offer imaginary images of 
“diversity” (Extract 14: line 9), “cosmopolitan[ism]” (Extract 14: line 8) and racial integration 
(‘very MIXED South African’ [Extract 15: 11]) to depict the Estate as embodying values of 
tolerance, representation (Extract 15: 12), and inclusivity.  
 
Of interest here is: “for whom are these images depicted?” (Dashtipour, 2009, para. 24). Who 
is being addressed here, and how do speakers seek to align with what the Other wants? Meryl 
is quick to observe that the ‘The Golf Estate’ has “GREAT demographic representation of/of 
all South Africans” (Extract 15: line 12). Moreover, she remarks that “this should be very 
interesting from your point of view” (line 11). What does Meryl take to be my’ point of view’ 
here? Could this relate to my role as a researcher interested in disparities of making home? 
Perhaps Meryl assumes that I am seeking particular responses in line with post-apartheid 
democratic ideals. Could these (also) be articulations of ‘social politeness’ as demanded by 
cross-racial nature of our exchange (Tim, Sofia and Meryl being White and myself Asian)? 
There is an outright denial in both extracts that ‘The Golf Estate’ is aligned with stereotypically 
racist or supremacist ideologies.  Tim outwardly declares, for example, “it/it’s not like it’s a, 
hey, this is a White enclave for you know sort of a broederbond type=Not at all like that. Not 
at all” (Extract 14: 26-9). The ‘hey’ seems to serve an interactive function. It addresses me 
directly, yet it also appears to address the Other of a democratic, nonracial social order, which 
I may be seen to represent. Tim is subjected to the evaluative gaze of this Other, but he also 
addresses this Other to ‘set the record straight’. Similarly, Meryl explicitly asserts: “It NOT 
EXCLUSIVE for (1.0) WASPS” (Extract 15: 13). She delivers this in a jeering tone, revealed 
in the laughter and smiling that punctuates her words, “§you know§ hh §You know§ there’s 
no religious::” (Extract 15: 15). The effect is a refutation of preconceptions about white privilege 
and gated living.  In both extracts, there is an explicit nod of approval of the “mixed” racial 
composition (Extract 14: 22, 24; Extract 15: 11) of the Estate (‘it’s quite nice’ [Extract 14: 7], 
‘It’s wonderful’ [Extract 15: 17]). 
 
However, against these broad ideals of tolerance, representation and inclusivity that serve as 
the ‘public narrative’ of ‘The Golf Estate’, there is a ‘hidden’ narrative that is overwhelmingly 
present in the data.  In Extract 14, Tim and Sofia attest to the “VERY cosmopolitan” (line 6) 
feel of ‘The Golf Estate’ in reference to the “French”, “Spanish”, “Germans” (line 2), 
“Americans” (line 3), and “Koreans” (line 6) enjoying breakfast at the clubhouse. In its appeal 
to expats and “pretty normal South Africans” (Extract 14: 20) alike, what other social ideals 
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does ‘The Gated Community’ hold itself up against to be seen as acceptable, likeable and 
worthy? What is it that this Other wants (from us) and how can these ‘certain attributes’ seen 
as valued (Dashtipour, 2009) be gleaned from the texts?  
 
“Black” is referenced several times, particularly in Extract 14 (lines 20, 30, 32) and openly 
asserted in Extract 15 (line 9). This contrasts with earlier extracts, where the black man is 
rendered anonymous or is surreptitiously elided. The explicit message in these exchanges is 
that of non-racialism; that being black is acceptable to ‘The Golf Estate’.  However, there are 
a series of qualifiers that subvert this non-racialist stance, namely “upmarket black guys” 
(Extract 14, 32), “MDs of big companies and CEOs” (line 32) and “wealthy uh black South 
Africans” (Extract 15: 9). In this respect, previously ‘silent’ signifiers of blackness, now appear 
explicitly as a metaphor. Thus, belonging is rendered as conditional, based on markers of 
Whiteness (wealth, class, status).  In other words, access to an exclusive gated community is 
premised on mimicry. The qualities deemed favourable in the eyes of the Other (the ego-ideals 
of White’  European’ symbolic order) are those very qualities that Malik strives to embody and 
around which he moulds his identity (‘CLASSY … upmarket … ’CAUSE that’s WHO I AM’) 
(Extract 10, line 52-54). 
 
There is an ‘unevenness’ in belonging evident in these texts. To meet the standards of 
acceptability, “black” cannot be positively appraised in its own terms, but needs the 
benchmarks of the (‘White’) Other, as the ‘minimal standards’ for belonging (Dashtipour, 
2009). Striking here is that these ‘minimal’ standards – being “MDs of big companies and 
CEOs of big companies” (Extract 14: 33, 35) – are far from ‘average’, of “pretty normal South 
Africans” (Extract 14: line 20). Rather, they are markers of ‘exceptional’ achievement – for 
both “BLACK and WHITE” (line 20) alike. What then might such an elevated ideal of the ‘black 
other’ serve in the fictive, imaginary construction?  
 
These contrasting ideological positions of the community are seemingly coherent in some 
instances, yet jarringly disquieting in others. There is outward support for racial tolerance and 
inclusivity. On another level, racial privilege, power and exclusivity underwrites the texts in 
unspoken ways. Of interest here is not how participants manage these ideological positions, 
but why they are gripped into such positionings. Lacan proposes that in speaking, the subject 
must be divided in order to represent itself. Thus, the romanticised self is fictionalised as an 
imaginary construction (Rogers, 2007). Might this fictionalised ideal – of black exceptionality 
– serve to uphold an image of Whiteness that assures the latter’s own distinctive and 
unattainable status, as Dashtipour (2009, p. 9; emphasis in original) notes, to protect a 
“narcissistic jouissance”? In other words, to preserve its unique, favourable and privileged 
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place in the eyes of the Other requires a mode of distinction: exceptionality and difference. By 
this account, being ‘the same’ as the Other seems threatening to Whiteness. A social order 
modelled on liberal democratic ideals of tolerance, inclusivity and equal representation) thus 
fails to mirror Whiteness as it no longer projects its own narcissistic image (Hook, 2005). The 
“feeling of difference” or specialness, therefore, must be kept alive to provide jouissance. As 
Extract 16 suggests, this ‘secret’ enjoyment (Žižek, 2005) is tied to difference and exercised 
as privilege and power: 
 
"You see there's a park there=Every/most of the villages have got parks like this .hh 
and the nannies will come and sit=It’s so colonial=They all come sit here with the/with 
the (.) children in the afternoons.” (Meryl, go-along). 
 
Seshadri-Crooks (2000) argues that through explicit denials and disavowals, ‘desiring 
Whiteness’ as a system perpetuates itself. ‘Exceptional blackness’ seems to operate as a 
fetish; the ‘object’ used to “disbelieve what they know” (Straker, 2013, p. 101). That is, it serves 
to cover over a loss of access to Whiteness or the impossibility of Whiteness, which is itself 
castrated (Straker, 2004). From a Lacanian perspective, ‘Whiteness’ as an ideology, therefore, 
operates through this fantasmatic cover that “disavows alternative ways of seeing the world” 
(Dashtipour, 2009, para. 12). As a form of disavowal, might it conceal the melancholic loss of 
an ideal?; that is, the status of Whiteness as a signifier of privilege and power, covered over 
as desire and denigration. It may be argued here that the exclusive gated community functions 
as a “commodity fetish”, a conspicuous consumption as a defence that “both affirms and 
negates the knowledge of castrated ‘Whiteness’/powerlessness in the same moment” 
(Straker, 2013, p. 101).  As an ideology, it ‘fixes’ subjects through a particular worldview 
(Dashtipour, 2009), and thus constrains ways of being and relating, of belonging with others 
in the world (Esprey, 2017).  
 
The ideal of ‘black exceptionalism’ therefore ensures a homogenisation that accords with the 
‘Other as Whiteness’. In effect, this works to keep alive the threatened identity. At the same 
time, as a sophisticated form of compromise, it seems to work as a resistance to ego-ideals 
of the ‘Other’ – of a liberal post-apartheid democratic social order – wants me to be 
(Dashtipour, 2009). In this configuration, a certain jouissance is maintained. Thus, the 
antagonism constituted through ‘scapegoating’ (external) simultaneously involves a 
“dimension of interiority” (of intolerable loss). In a Lacanian (1992, as cited in Daly, 1999, p. 
235) sense, our relation to the other is always extimate: “something strange to me, although 
it is at the heart of me”. The antagonism, a negation/denial of the other, is simultaneously a 
relation of enjoyment to that which is denied (Daly, 1999). 
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6.4. Jouissance and Alienation-In-Belonging  
Summed up as the “‘obscene supplement’ of official narration” (Žižek, 1997, p. 54), acts of 
transgression function to ‘complete’ fantasy in ways that elude Symbolic-Imaginary capture, 
and thus sustain its grip (Glynos, 2008). Jouissance covers over the cracks in the national 
body, and the incompleteness of the social order (Glynos, 2001; McMillan, 2017; 
Papasterigiadis, 2005; Stavrakakis & Chrysoloras, 2006). It points towards the everpresent 
“something else speaking in the place of the subject” (Frosh, 2010, p. 8). Drawing on the 
sample extracts, I argue that jouissance, as central to ideology, maintains the community’s 
symbolic existence. It achieves this through the deferral of desire (Hirvonen, 2016) on the one 
hand, and acts of transgression on the other (Žižek, 1997). Malik’s account, as illuminated in 
the following exchange, may be read as a deferral of desire straining towards the goal of 
fulfilment (Kirshner, 2005). 
 
6.4.1. The deferral of desire 
Fantasy works to covers over the “ultimate horror of the real deadlock”, namely the constitutive 
lack of the social order itself, as Glynos (2001, p. 201) offers. Highlighted in the account below, 
the deferral of desire underscores the elusiveness of home. As a symbol of material 
accomplishment or ‘arrival’, it offers the promise that lack can be thwarted. The aspirational 
failure of home allows it to remain the “moving signifier” (Brah, 1996, p. 173 that keeps desire 
alive. 
 
Excerpt 16: Go-along with Malik (male, renting a cluster home in a security complex) 
[We are standing across the road from the entrance to ‘The Ravine, the grandness of its façade 
marked by its sheer size, with entrance and exit gates further divided into clearly marked lanes for 
residents and visitors] 
1. MALIK: This is the entrance to it. 
2. UL:  Mm.  
3. MALIK: ‘The Ravine is:: RIGHT UP THERE, I mean, you know, um in terms of  
4.   estates. It’s, it’s not a golf estate 
5. UL:  <<Okay>> 
6. MALIK: 'cause the GOLF estate is in (1.0) the MAIN [Estate] which is down there. 
7. UL:   Yes. 
8. MALIK: We gonna walk there (.) but not all the way. I just wanted to go past here. SO::: 
9.   you know, this kind of represents our dream::: LIFESTYLE. 
10. UL:   Can I take a picture of it? 
11. MALIK: Sure. 
12. UL:   Yah, well you can carry on talking as we, as I go along. 
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13. MALIK: Um:::  
14. UL:   Your (.) so it’s your DREAM lifestyle? 
15. MALIK: ↑YAH, yah and ↓uh um: 
16. UL:  Say more about that, that sounds 
17. MALIK: Well (1.0) I don’t know, I suppose it’s/it’s/it’s aspirational in a way ((birds  
18.   chirping)), you know, um we wouldn’t have=Yah, no, I just/we’re not gonna go in.  
19. UL:   Okay. [It’s interesting that we are not going in, but just standing outside, not even  
20.   by the perimeter of its gates, but across the road, looking at it from a distance. It’s  
21.   almost like we only have access to the outside yearningly looking in from a  
22.   distance. I wonder if this is how Malik feels about his aspirational home].  
23. MALIK: I just wanted to 
24. UL:   Mm. 
25. MALIK: So, I mean, I don’t know ((golf cart roaming past)) how many houses they are in  
26.   There but um (.) this complex has been around=So that’s where our stand is  
27.   [pointing in the direction of ‘The Ravine]. It's been around [<<for fifteen 
28. UL:                                                        O  k  a  y  : ] 
29. MALIK: years I think>> (1.0) or so 
30. U:   So having a stand for that long um you’d still have to pay for the the 
31. MALIK: YEAH ((golf cart roaming past)) I’m paying for the stand, I’m paying for the  
32.   LEVIES)) 
33. UL:  Wow. 
34. MALIK: and the penalty for building late hh [hh 
35. UL:              hh  
36. MALIK: hh 
37. UL:   So I see that the urgency of wanting to do it 
38. MALIK: Yah, yah. 
 
In Extract 16, Malik and I position ourselves on the outside, across the road from ‘The Ravine’, 
our gaze extends admiringly towards the estate’s entrance.  Golf carts roam past us, filtering 
in as background noise to our conversation (line 25, 31) as we stand on the corner of the 
pavement.  The metaphor of the “dream::: LIFESTYLE” (line 9) Malik refers to is materialised 
in ‘The Ravine’ that is “RIGHT UP THERE … in terms of estates (line 3-4).  As the object of 
desire, ‘The Ravine’ as home remains at the status of “aspiration” (line 17), not yet materialised 
beyond vision.  My request to “take a picture of it?” (line 10) was for practical reasons, of 
having an image to refer to in my field notes and transcription.  In hindsight, the ‘timeliness’ of 
the intruding question contributes to the ethereal quality of ‘The Ravine’ captured in the 
exchange. There is a taunting quality to this text. The capture of it through a “picture” affirms 
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its status at the level of the unattainable. The object of desire can be seen and admired from 
afar but is elusive to touch. 
 
In a spatial sense, we are in visible distance from Malik’s “aspirational home” but not close 
enough to enter it.  The narrative structure is telling. The first part of the text (lines 1-15) builds 
up towards the culmination of the dream image (the imaginary, ideal ‘I’). This optimistic 
account falls apart (lines 16-38), as manifested in drawn-out fillers (‘Um:::’ [line 15]) as my 
question interrupts the reverie: “Your (.) so it’s your DREAM lifestyle?” (line 14). His assertion 
that “we gonna walk there (.) but not all the way” (line 8), repeated in line 18/23 (‘we’re not 
gonna go in … I just wanted to’), seems to mirror, in a material sense, the thwarted state of 
progress towards his sought after “dream::: LIFESTYLE”  (line 14) – having an unfinished 
stand in an estate that has “been around for fifteen years” (line 27, 29).  What might these 
hesitancies say about the ‘symptom’ as intrusions of the unconscious, signifying something 
that threatens to undo the semblance of coherence? (Rogers, 2007)? The aspirational home 
as signifiers of being (‘who you aspire to be’) is spoken assertively in Extract 10 (line 42). In 
Extract 16, Malik’s speech is punctuated with uncertainty. Verbal qualifiers (‘I don’t know’ [line 
17] and ‘I suppose’ [line 17], ‘in a way’ [line 17]), pauses (‘Well (1.0) [line 17]) and stutters 
(‘it’s/it’s/it’s aspirational’ [line 17]) highlight the materiality of this anxiety. 
 
What Malik identifies as the ‘obstacle’ is the “affordability gap” (go along interview, not 
reproduced in extract). In the preceding exchange, it has the effect of interrupting the dream. 
Malik asserts, momentarily awakening to the cost of his aspiration:  “‘I’m paying for the stand, 
I’m paying for the LEVIES and the penalty for building late’” (lines 31-2, 34).  Apart from 
smoothing over this realisation with laugher (line 34, 36), what might these intrusions signal? 
The materialities of speech – the rising/falling intonations (↑YAH, yah and ↓uh um: [line 16], 
the hesitations, stutters (line 18), whispered quality of Malik’s speech (“<<for fifteen years I 
think>>”) (line 30) and laughter (line 35-6) – seems to signal the creation of the repressed 
(Hook, 2013b). Crucially, the unconscious is not ‘deeply’ embedded in the psyche, but comes 
to the fore in the subtleties of speech. As Hook (2013) notes, the play of signifiers, provide the 
basis for suspicion that brings the repressed to light. The form of the text – the interruptions – 
seem to mismatch what is spoken from what meaning is intended. Contrary to Malik’s asserted 
claims to belonging, the breakdown of ‘egoic’ or narrative coherence in the text seems to 
suggest a sense of alienation and unrequited longings. Malik manages his ‘awareness’ of 
alienation through appeals to laughter (line 34, 36). 
 
However, what happens when an imaginary frame is challenged? What comes to light when 
the paradoxes – of normality/abnormality, safety/danger, and freedom/imprisonment – is 
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rendered conspicuous through a critical mode of questioning? What might be at stake if 
contradictions to the conscious narration are brought to light? (Rogers, 2007). For Žižek (2008, 
p. 84), the collapse of the fantasmatic frame would mean that ontological foundation would 
disintegrate, resulting in the perception of reality as “an ‘irreal’ nightmarish universe” (a loss 
of reality).  Therefore, to preserve the experience of the world as meaningful and consistent, 
the antagonism or inconsistency is silenced.  I draw on two extracts to illustrate how speakers 
manage these perceived threats. 
 
6.4.2. Defending of the symptom: Silencing antagonisms  
If reality is experienced through a fantasy frame to ensure safety, order, stability, etc. (Žižek, 
2008), what happens when this fictional reality is intruded on by crime/criminals that are/are 
supposed to be ‘out there’? In Extract 17,  the idyllic construction of the privileged home is 
belied by moments of anxiety that threaten to undercut illusions of coherence, stability and 
order. 
 
Extract 17: Go-along with Sofia  
1. UL:  So w/when you said um it's like living in a prison, wh/how do make,  
2.   how do you §make sense of that?§ 
3. Sofia:  NO/NO/NO, I 
4. Tim:   N     o        ,        t    h    a    t   '   s.      n   o   t ,   [it's not like that 
5. Sofia:  I don't mean that=I don't mean that. I SAID WE [A L M O S T 
6. Tim:   It's not at all like that. 
7. Sofia:  No, it's not like that. 
8. UL:   Okay. 
9. Sofia:  It's, it's quite WEIRD. We live/have AWESOME life here, 
10. UL:  Yes. 
11. Sofia:  but >we the ones in a fence< if you know what I mean 
12. UL:  [R i g h t 
13. Tim:  Y e a h . 
14. Sofia:  and we in it] but no it's FANTASTIC living here. [When you drive 
15. Tim:  No, it's not at all] like that. 
16. Sofia:  NO, no/no/no 
17. Tim:  It's totally free. [T h a t ' s t h e B E A U T Y. 
18. Sofia:    That was WRONG, WRONG] example I have to [ s a y. 
19. UL:                            Right], 
20.    s/so/so it's like uh:h, it's like a, what's the word, not really 
21. Tim:  It's a little ENCLAVE in the middle of this madness. 
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22. UL:  Okay. 
23. Tim:  That's really what it is. 
24. Sofia:  It's true. When we drive in, you actually almost [feel a sense of 
25.   RELIEF. 
25. Tim:  Y o u actually g e t in/] get into this place, and you think (cool), thank  
26.   God [I'm fine 
27. Sofia:  Y a h ] 
28. Tim:  I'm fine. 
 
My opening question to Sofia and Tim, despite my hesitant delivery  (‘so w/when’ [line 1]; 
‘§make sense of that?§’ [line 2]), is met with a defensive rebuttal. The tone and emphasis 
(‘NO/NO/NO, I’ [line 3]) are telling, suggesting something more than is at stake to the 
conscious narration. Both collude to protect their earlier constructions of gated community 
living. These defensive manoeuvres are evidenced as repeated negations (‘no, that’s not, it’s 
not like that’ [line 4]), self-revisions (‘I don’t mean that=I don’t mean that’ [line 5]), and emphatic 
self-qualifying statements (‘I SAID WE ALMOST’ [line 5]). These in turn are followed by 
repeated denials (‘it’s not at all like that’ [line 6]; ‘no, it’s not like that line’ [line 7]; ‘NO, no/no/no” 
[line 16]) and further attempts to repair a ‘damaged’ depiction (‘it’s totally free. That’s the 
BEAUTY’ [line 17]; ‘that was WRONG, WRONG example I have to say’ [line 18]; ‘It’s, it’s quite 
WEIRD. We live/have AWESOME life here [line 9]). These interruptions in speech, evident in 
negations, revisions and smokescreens (diversions to a safer topic) capture the “unsayable” 
for Lacan (1977, cited in Rogers, 2007, p. 113-4): 
 
An enunciation that denounces itself, a statement that renounces itself, an ignorance 
that sweeps itself away, an opportunity that self-destructs – what remains if not the 
trace of what really must be in order to fall away from being? 
 
Through these interruptions and incoherences in the text, the imaginary ‘I’ (ideal self or  
romanticised narrative construction) is broken through by the real ‘i’ signaling unconscious  
signifiers of ‘unknown truths’ (Rogers, 2007). What is it that cannot be known? This cannot  
be read directly from the text, but what stands out in contrast to the ‘loudness’ of the 
surrounding text is Sofia’s noticeably rushed statement (‘>we the ones in a fence<‘ [line 11]).  
Might this subtle ‘trace’ suggest the censored, the horrifying real underlying the dominant 
idyllic narrative, that conveys the impossibility of freedom, beauty and sanity that estate  
living promises but ultimately cannot fulfill (at least not in its own terms and not without 
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relying on a deviant other to complete the narrative imaginary). As Žižek (2006, p. 25) notes, 
sometimes, when we inadvertently disturb the appearance, the thing itself behind appearance 
also falls apart”.  
 
Recognising the threatening nature of my imposed question, I too become complicit in the  
repair work, by searching for a better word to undo the uncalled for ‘intrusion’ and restore the  
imagined ideal (‘s/so/so it’s like uh:h, it’s like a, what’s the word …’ [line 20]). The “ENCLAVE 
in the middle of this madness” (line 21) becomes the restoring narrative to which we all yield. 
It captures the “sense of RELIEF” (line 24-5) offered in gated living, where intercession by 
divine providence (‘thank God I’m fine’ [line 25-6]) affords safety from the ailing world once 
“you actually get in/get into this place” (lines 25-6). This is reinforced by Tim’s reference to “an 
ABNORMAL situation” (Extract 5a: 4) outside of the “enclave” (line 21). “Madness” [line 21] 
and “crazy world” [not in quoted extracts]) characterises the disorder and moral depravity 
‘outside’, which seeks to disrupt law and order ‘inside’ (‘two guys who climbed over the wall’ 
[Extract 5b: 32]). The discourse of normality thus legitimates a material separation of a serene 
‘inside’ firm a disorderly ‘outside’ (‘It’s a little ENCLAVE in the middle of this madness’ [line 
21], ‘It brings a peace of mind and some sort of normality into this crazy world that we live in’ 
[not quoted in extracts]). Despite this boundary work, the anxious quality of the texts betrays 
the illusion of peace and order. My opening question seems to represent a momentary rupture, 
instigating me as an ‘intruder’ to a coherent narrative. This momentary intrusion, however, 
shifts to a moment of re-connection. By submitting to  (and colluding) with Sofia and Tim, I am 
brought back into ‘be – longing’. 
 
6.4.3. Enjoying the symptom 
An ethics of desire for Žižek (as cited in Glynos, 2000) is nevertheless a compromise, a 
defence, or escape against encountering the Real Thing.  In other words, in keeping desire 
alive (through its perpetual deferral), the subject is protected from “going beyond the limit in 
jouissance” and confronting the true horror. However, for Lacan, the speaking subject must 
be divided in order to represent itself. The ‘I’ of the Imaginary maintains the coherence of the 
ideal self, and the ‘i’ of the Real is incoherent, involuntary and surprising. These are the 
unconscious signifiers that falter speech (Rogers, 2007). 
 
In the same way, ideology also needs to contain within its structure its own transgression. 
Contained in its very strictures of ideology is paradoxically the injunction to “Enjoy!”.  Rather 
than an act of subversion against the law, illicit enjoyment argues, sustains it (Žižek, 2008).  
Thus, jouissance is not simply ‘enjoyment’ in its literal translation but carries with it a traumatic 
core – “a violent intrusion that brings more pain than pleasure” (Žižek, 2006, p. 79). 
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The sanitised script of order, serenity and safety, with its attendant spatial practices, contains 
the injunction to obey the “rules and regulations” that make up the civil ordering of society: 
“you can’t drive on the pavements” (Meryl; Extract 13: 22), “you can’t play your music too 
loud”, “we can’t actually walk on the golf course ’cause we will be looking for trouble” (Sofia; 
not reproduced in extracts).  Moreover, the presence of ritualised performances works to 
discipline its subjects through sanitising and purging operations that filter out the abject 
through forms of surveillance, checks, patrols.  On another level, there are the implicit, oft-
times unspoken rules that speak the very opposite, ‘give way to your desires and Enjoy!’ 
(Žižek, 2006).  Read in this manner, co-existing with the explicit rules that hold ‘The Gated 
Community’ together, is the unwritten constitution relating to the excesses of indulgence.  
Rather than undermining or transgressing against these explicit rules, the informal code, to 
the contrary, is an essential counterpart that sustains the law (Žižek, 2006). The injunction of 
law and order is underwritten by the injunction to enjoy, translated as, “they can know it 
perfectly well, but they act as if they did not know” (Garcia & Aguilar-Sánchez, 2008, para. 5).  
In reference to the children living on the estate, Meryl notes: 
 
“because they quite pampered children, not many of them go to school by bicycle, but they 
can go by bicycle 'cause there are=They can go on the routes or they go on their golf carts 
uh hh only suppose/supposed to drive when they sixteen but everyone (.) breaks the law. 
 
Across the majority of accounts, the ‘unruly’ children are the identified ‘culprits’ who transgress 
order within the estate.  From a discursive perspective, recounting such incidents serves to 
minimise the seriousness of these violations. In this manner, the wholesome image of ‘The 
Gated Community’ is preserved: 
 
Extract 18a:  
Meryl:  you know, 'cause these children are INDULGED. They don't need to go and steal  
  things um they do it for the DARE or they'll/they'll go and have a party in an  
  empty house and (.) you know maybe break the window for a/for a JOKE or you know  
or/r it's naughty kids.  
 
Extract 18b: 
M:  uh SOME residents SLEEP with their windows open and, you know, they would have you  
know, laptops or wallets, whatever lying on the table .hh and these kids would, you know, 
reach in or/or/or don't know, whoever to take some stuff, so we had three or four incidences 
like that .hh but OTHER than that, they/they've been nothing major within the Estate. 
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Extract 18c:  
Tim:  If we have a problem here (1.0), I would say the only problem that we have is that  
  we have a lot of rather indulged kids who run around and get a little bit out of  
  control from time to time (Sofia: But all estates have that). 
 
While the theft of personal property on the estate seems to violate the founding rules of gated 
living explicitly, Meryl reframes this as “petty crime um:: but again no life-threatening stuff.”  
Similarly, as Extracts 18 (a-c) highlight, typically ‘serious’ incidents are nonchalantly 
overlooked: “for a joke” (Meryl), “nothing major” (M) and “a little bit out of control” (Tim).  From 
a Lacanian psychoanalytic stance, however, it is the violation of these explicit rules that 
“represents the spirit of the community at its purest, exerting the strongest pressure on the 
individuals to enact group identification” (Žižek, 2006, p. 88).  Contained in its very strictures 
of ideology is paradoxically the injunction to “Enjoy!”. Rather than an act of subversion against 
the law, illicit enjoyment argues, sustains it (Žižek, 2008). In other words, it is in the prohibitions 
that in an obverse manner, allow subjects to enjoy.  Moreover, the functioning of ideology is 
premised on the adherence to this clandestine code.  While prohibitions guarantee a coherent 
social order through its ritualistic practices, ‘yielding’ to jouissance as a transgression of these 
rules, as the extracts suggest, illuminate the repressed ‘Real’ of that constitutes ideological 
practice. 
 
6.4.4. An alienation from ‘secret enjoyment’? 
However, jouissance is far more complex than explicit ‘confessions’ of ‘secret enjoyment’ that 
these preceding extracts seem to suggest. As I will illustrate, M. and Malik’s accounts evince 
an alienation from this ‘secret enjoyment’. This alienation is measured against others who are 
seen to have access to ‘most enjoyment’ or ‘unbridled jouissance’ (Somnay, 2007). In a sense, 
while jouissance as the transgressive underside of ideological fantasy, sustains our “ultimate 
support” for it (Žižek, 1994, p. 32), this by no means guarantees that all subjects have ‘equal 
access’ to this ‘secret enjoyment’. Nor does our transgression of fantasy play out in even ways. 
Before turning to the extracts to illustrate this more fully, a brief departure is necessary to 
understand jouissance in relation to the superego injunction to ‘Enjoy!’. Here Žižek (2002, p. 
9) argues that “enjoyment itself, which we experience as “transgression” is not spontaneous, 
but is something imposed. This “obscene call” is the superego. As Žižek (1994, p. 54) offers, 
the superego is the “nightly law”, the shadow of the public law. It emerges at the point where 
public discourse fails and is “compelled to search for support in an illegal enjoyment”. Thus, 
while Freud’s superego constitutes the ‘moral’ conscience, with its prohibitions of enjoyment, 
Žižek (2008) argues that the reversal of our current society comes with the injunction to 
‘Enjoy!’. For Lacan (as cited in Žižek, 2008), the superego is also equated with jouissance as 
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an ‘obscene’ rather than ethical category, a deadly excess that overrides the economic logic 
of Freud’s pleasure principle to minimise pain and maximise pleasure. Therefore, jouissance 
is not merely ‘enjoyment’ in its literal translation but carries with it a traumatic core – “a violent 
intrusion that brings more pain than pleasure” (Žižek, 2006, p. 79). 
 
Following Žižek (2008), if the injunction in contemporary society is to ‘Enjoy!’, the feeling of 
‘missing out’ on what others have access to seems to be a prevailing sentiment. This 
contradictory state of affairs is captured by McGowan (2012, p. 177; emphasis mine) as “being 
enjoined to enjoy … while feeling its own lack of enjoyment in contrast to the other.” In several 
instances, I referenced envy, following Wyatt’s (2004, p. 1) interpretation of Lacan, as “a 
confusion of self and other, impelled by the (usually) unconscious desire to be the other”.  
Envy, therefore, has a particular relation to jouissance. As spelt out by McGowan (2012, p. 
178): “when I am really enjoying, I do not envy the enjoyment of the other, as the uncivil and 
aggressive subject in the society of enjoyment does”. Thus, incivility and aggression, as 
McGowan (2012, p. 178) notes, are the symptoms of an enjoying society given that its subjects 
are “constitutively unable to enjoy themselves and yet constantly feel as if enjoyment is their 
right”.  
 
A response of ‘true envy’ (Lacan, 1977) is experienced relative to the other, who is seen to 
possesses the objet petit a (“object little-a”), the unattainable object of desire, the ‘secret 
enjoyment’ that is publicly paraded. Such envy, as Lacan (1977, p. 116) notes, “makes the 
subject pale before the image of completeness closed upon itself”. For McGowan (2012, p. 
139), this public display is no more evident than on the roads.  Like the enclave which functions 
as “repositories of private enjoyment”, the car is an extension of privatised pleasures where 
the world’ out there’ exists wholly separate from oneself.  Losing out on the ‘right’ to enjoyment 
is captured in the ‘theft of enjoyment’ (Žižek, 1993). As McGowan (2012) points out, our 
incivility and aggression are symptomatic of being haunted by our own lack of enjoyment. In 
Extract 19, M. overturns the narrative of civility, order and safety, the underpinning rationale 
for a gated lifestyle. The following exchange takes place as we are driving along a road 
adjoining all the estates in the area and comprising a series of shrubbery-adorned traffic 
circles: 
 
Extract 19: Drive-along with M along a road that adjoins all gated estates in the area 
 
1. M:  It's because of that, you know, you (.) you get people driving cars that's worth  
2.   houses up and down this road, but .hh the level of courtesy they have (3.0) it's  
3.   (1.0) really nothing compared to, you know, their/their/their WEALTH ((sniffing)) 
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4. UL:  Mm hm. 
5. M:  /…/ (2.0) Just (.) the usage of the circles, uh/it's a, uh/it's a courtesy that you  
6.   know, you don't go:: and (.) try to (3.0) you know, RIDE OVER SOMEBODY  
7.   (2.0) But uh you see people driving (.) straight down in towards  
8.   ‘THE GOLF ESTATE’ .hh They will not make way for anybody. They will just  
9.   drive (1.0) even though they see you coming, they will go. 
10. UL:  (1.0) Hm:: 
11. M:  Because they feel like, you know/you know, 'I'm going straight [pointing in the  
12.   direction of ‘The Golf Estate’]. Don't try to stop me.' .hh and (1.0) I always try to  
13.   say, 'slow down,' you know, stop. There's a school here, you know. 
14. UL:  Right.  
15. M:  You gonna hit somebody (.) you know people, you know/you know how they (.)  
16.   wave their hands in the air 
 
M’s account speaks to the incivility and aggression performed on the roads adjoining the 
neighbourhood estates: having ‘right of way’ in the “usage of the circles” (line 5), “not mak[ing] 
way for anybody” (line 8), “driv[ing] even though they see you coming” (line 9), failing to “slow 
down” (line 12), and dismissing own wrongdoings (e.g., ‘they wave their hands in the air’ [line 
16]).  This recklessness and flagrant lack of “courtesy” (line 2) – ‘RID[ING] OVER 
SOMEBODY” (line 6) and “hit[ting] somebody” (line 15) – is offset against the innocence of 
children as potential victims (‘there’s a school here, you know’ [line 13]). These entitlements 
are for M. a function of privilege and wealth as “you get people driving cars that’s worth” 
houses” (line 2). M.’s moralising stance is a curious one. In demonstrating an attitude of 
rationality, measured sensibility, and civic respect, he sets himself apart from the excessive 
enjoyments or jouissance associated with wealth and privilege.  
 
However, might this positioning be more than a form of impression-management? Despite his 
resident status in an adjacent “little estate” (Extract 2: 12), his outright criticism of other drivers 
positions him as law-abiding and courteous (‘I always try to say, ‘slow down,’ you know, stop’ 
[line 12]. In this construction, he situates himself on the outside. What is it that makes M. an 
‘outsider’ to this community? Is it his occasional ‘visitor’ status to other more exclusive estates 
in the area that make him “pale before the image of completeness” (Lacan, 1977, p. 116)? We 
are reminded of his earlier account (Extract 6: 2) of the “snotty” [sic] security guards that 
regulate entry/exit to ‘The Golf Estate’ and his self-positioning against this as the 
“WORTHLESS” (Extract 6: 9) visitor. Alternatively, could this relate more broadly to 
admissions that he struggles to “call a place home” (sit-down interview; not reproduced in the 
extracts) initially as an immigrant and now naturalised South African citizen? Or perhaps it is 
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his difficulty straddling racialised boundaries as a citizen who is “NEI:THER black nor white” 
(not reproduced in quoted extract)? These are all open-ended possibilities hinted at across 
the data but cannot fully be explored here given the limitations of selected extracts. 
 
However, what I wish to highlight are the subtleties of affect that differentiate belonging in an 
exclusive neighbourhood marked and governed by the hierarchies of privilege and belonging.  
There is a subtle hint of envy (possibly resentment) of the other that seeps through Extract 19 
in enunciated and performative ways. M’s reference to the courtesy level of “people driving 
cars that’s worth houses” (line 1-2) is in specific reference to the residents of ‘The Golf Estate’. 
Its status in the neighbourhood as the “MAIN ESTATE”, similarly echoed by Malik (Extract 10) 
is strategically positioned at the end of a cul-de-sac that enjoins other smaller estates. In M’s 
comparisons (line 3), he reduces their entitlements of “WEALTH” (line 3), materially 
accomplished as “cars that’s worth houses” (line 1-2) to a status of lack (‘the level of courtesy 
they have … it’s really nothing compared to …. their WEALTH” (lines 2-3). Read in conjunction 
with the quality of its enunciation – the noticeable pauses (line 2, 3), the stammerings 
(‘their/their/their’ [line 3]) and ((sniffing)) (line 3) – reveals the anxiety of the text. Might these 
anxieties signal M’s alienation from a much-aspired status of belonging? 
 
Or perhaps, following McGowan (2012), the public display of others’ enjoyment forces us to 
confront our failures to enjoy; thus, triggering reactions of incivility and aggressiveness. M’s 
‘aggressivity’ suggests alienation from the ‘secret enjoyments’,  evidenced in failing to 
participate in incivility and reckless driving (McGowan, 2012).  His verbal gesticulations 
suggest a ‘spoiling’ or diminishing the enjoyments of others seen to possess access to an 
abundance from which he is deprived. After all, as Vighi, (2010 as cited in Hook, 2017, p. 9) 
notes, “we perceive enjoyment not as lack but as fullness”. 
 
To ‘pin down’ this interpretation, however, risks sliding into a form of reductionism squarely 
focused on M.’s individual psychology, despite efforts to align M’s (lack of) enjoyment relative 
to the ‘other’. Hook (2017, p. 4) argues that jouissance must be understood in relation to an 
“intersubjective economy of libidinal enjoyment”. The implication here is that jouissance is a 
social relationship that predates the ‘other’ on whom jouissance is projected. In other words, 
rather than an individual response, jouissance is ‘not a thing in itself’ but is instead patterned 
in accordance with sociohistorical co-ordinates that structure and give force to fantasy. Hook 
(2017) further suggests that enjoyment perceived as obscene, or outside of the norms of 
‘reasonable’ enjoyment – who can(not) enjoy, how they enjoy, what is enjoyed) – is suggestive 
of social asymmetries. In the previous section (see ‘Desire as a Negotiated Transaction’), on 
a fantasmatic level, the ‘thief’ of this illicit enjoyment is explicitly the ‘criminal’, ‘intruder’, 
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‘squatter’, ‘taxi driver’, etc. and implicitly, the ‘poor black man’.  However, there is a ‘reversal’ 
of the identified ‘culprit’ in the narrative M. offers in Extract 19 – not the ‘usual suspects’ but 
the most affluent residents of a highly privileged neighbourhood in which he resides. 
 
Žižek (2006) argues that it is in jouissance, through the transgression of fantasy, that the spirit 
of community is united in belonging. What is explicit in the text are the asymmetries of 
belonging governed by class. However, M’s ‘alienation-in-belonging’ is perhaps not just in an 
Imaginary and Symbolic sense. In other words, there is more to his alienation than failing to 
measure up to the tangible, material co-ordinates of privileged (possibly ‘white’) belonging 
(i.e., living in a ‘little estate’ or ‘driving cars that’s worth houses’ [line 1-2]). The quality of 
jouissance as a “type of possession” (Hook, 2017, p. 8) is all the more real when the ‘not 
having’ of it or being dispossessed of it is made apparent. In this respect, M’s account speaks 
to being ‘deprived’ of the Real of enjoyment, that underlines his ‘destitution’ in the sense of 
being denied full access to enjoyment. In this light, what may be disavowed is this lack or 
alienation from belonging, that is covered over in his self-positioning as a morally sound, law-
abiding citizen? M.’s ‘refusal’ to partake of the excessive enjoyments of ‘The Gated 
Community’ lifestyle situate him as the ‘outsider’ at least in a discursive sense. In so doing, 
however, he partakes in jouissance in distantiated ways in his stance of aggressivity. Despite 
our efforts to neatly cordon off a neatly circumscribed subjectivity, jouissance is the “surplus 
of marginalisation” (Malone, 2000, p. 83), the unnameable excess of pre-symbolic enjoyment, 
the lost traumatic kernel of our subjectivity that seeks representation (Žižek, 1997). 
 
In reading the extract in terms of the social dimension, belonging is ‘sedimented’ in particular 
transgressive enjoyments that are materialised in social practices that conform to the rules of 
enjoyment (Hook, 2017). Such enjoyments entail not only driving recklessly, disobeying the 
laws of the road, breaking windows (Extract 8a), stealing laptops (Extract 8b), etc. but having 
or possessing the material rights and privileges to engage in these ‘indulgences’ (Extract 8a, 
8b). Manifest in M’s account is the alienation-in-belonging as a result of ‘uneven’ access to 
this coveted jouissance. However, what contributes to this unevenness? Is it merely a matter 
of class? What is not explicit in these accounts is the question of how ‘race’ structures 
jouissance. How is jouissance as a ‘painful pleasure’ articulated in (racialised) belongings? 
Jouissance, as Hook (2017, p. 7) argues, is not simply affect. Rather, it is “a mode of intensity, 
a type of arousal – a thrilling twist – that occurs when affect moves beyond the bounds of what 
is comfortable, reasonable or satisfying”. 
 
In the next section, I explore the final extract of this chapter to explore the paradoxes in 
jouissance in relation to classed and racialised belongings. The account is an illuminating one 
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as it ‘captures’ the arousal of both enjoyment and suffering, excitement and despair, pleasure 
and pain of the racially ‘divided subject’ (within and without). Hook (2017, p. 5) reinforces the 
Lacanian position that the repressed is not affect, but the idea (signifiers) to which it is 
associated. In this respect, what becomes foregrounded is “the contrary directions that 
subjects of ideology find themselves pulled in”, alerting us to the disjuncture between 
outwardly stated values and transgressive enjoyments. Thus, while jouissance is “not itself 
unconscious, the framework that attaches it to meaning is not itself fully conscious” (Hook, 
2017, p. 10).  I highlight this in relation to the moments where fantasy as ‘completion’ begins 
to experienced as partial, fractured, inconsistent, and becomes ‘no longer enjoyable’ (Cohen, 
2001). 
 
6.4.5.   Painful pleasures: ‘Be Longing’ as racially ‘divided subjects’  
 
Extract 19: Go-along with Malik (go-along) 
 
1.   But you know this (.) << is a lot of wealth>> hh hh §this area, lots of business  
2.   people you know um if you, if you just (1.0) take a look around at the kinds of  
3.   cars that dri(h)ve u(h)p a(h)nd do(h)wn he(h)re. Sometimes when I invite other  
4.   friends over or my brother (1.0) like he'll marvel at seeing certain cars and I’ll be  
5.   like, ‘why you getting so excited? This is like an everyday thing:: here’ and he’s  
6.   like, ↑‘DUDE, ↓this is not an EVERYDAY THING: EVERYWHERE’. But because  
7.   (.) I see this all the time, 
8. UL:  Mm. 
9. MALIK: to me it’s normal (1.0) you know um  
10. UL:  You/you immune to it because you’re immersed in it. 
11. MALIK: ↑↑EXACTLY ↓I mean I see the cars and I’m like yeah, that’s a great car, you  
12.   know um (2.0) but it's/it's/it's/it's like NORMAL hh hh b(h)ut, but §to a lot of  
13.   people§ it’s NOT normal you know [um 
14. UL:                  Mm] it’s  
15. MALIK: It's/it's a <<microcosm of>> (.) South Africa wher:::e you’ve got a (.) small  
16.   concentration of people who really (.) are wealthy and have A LOT of  
17. UL:  Right. 
18. MALIK: disposable income um I don’t count myself amongst those people hh hh hh  
19.   BUT what’s it like living here? What it’s like living here is that (1.0) sometimes  
21.   (.) that’s very inspiring like WOW you know, look at THAT GUY, and then there’s  
22.  OTHER TIMES where /.../ it’s like (1.0) it almost feels a bit (.) too MUCH you 
23.  know like (2) you know ((sighing)) (1.0) <<why is>> it that SO:: few 
24.             people have so much yet and yet there’s so many out there who have so 
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25.  little? 
 
In this account, Malik highlights a shift between belongings. His insider status is asserted in 
claims to being “part of this community … where we live” (not reproduced in extract). 
Compared to “people who really are wealthy and have A LOT of disposable income’ (line 16, 
18), his status is indeterminate. He remains awkwardly suspended as the ‘outsider’ in terms 
of wealth status (‘I don’t count myself amongst those people’ [line 19]). There is some 
ambivalence to this ‘insider’ status. Malik’s ideological dilemma, signalled by several linguistic 
markers: the conjunctive ‘but’ (line 1, 12, 20), and the use of qualifiers and limiting conditions 
(‘sometimes that’s very inspiring … and then there’s OTHER TIMES) (line 20, 22).  On the 
one hand, he is beckoned by a world of the highly privileged, comprising “business people” 
(line 1-2) and “HIGHLY salaried executives” (go-along interview; not reproduced in extract). 
Being subsumed in “a lot of wealth” (line 1), as Malik notes, is evidenced by “the kinds of cars 
that dri(h)ve u(h)p a(h)nd do(h)wn he(h)re” (lines 2-3).  The laughter in his utterance (lines 3) 
reveals the thrill of this beckoning, along with its “very inspiring like WOW” (line 21) effect.  On 
the other hand, he is confronted with a different reality, one channelled through the worldview 
of his brother who “marvel[s] at seeing certain cars” (line 4).  More starkly, the “highly 
privileged” lifestyle that Malik is simultaneously “immersed in” (line 10), is a world apart from 
an ailing reality for “so many out there who have so little” (line 24-5).suggests 
 
Malik attempts to normalise the displays of affluence as “normal” (line 9, 12), “an everyday 
thing:: here” (line 6) and as something “I see …all the time” (line 7). Despite this, the falters in 
his speech highlighted the slips from this positioning.  His brother’s infiltrating voice (‘↑‘DUDE, 
↓this is not an EVERYDAY THING: EVERYWHERE’ [line 6] appears as an awakening to the 
abnormality of the situation. As this exchange unfolds, Malik adopts an increasingly 
distantiated view of the gated neighbourhood. In contrast to Tim who views the community as 
comprising “seventy-five, eighty percent of the people [who] are (.) pretty normal South 
Africans” (see Extract 14,  lines 20), Malik offers a stark perspective. Rather than normal, this 
“highly privileged community” (not reproduced in extract) is an anomaly for a majority of people 
(‘for a lot of people it’s NOT normal’) (Extract 19, line 13).  This view also departs from Meryl’s 
portrayal that ‘The Gated Community’ is a “microcosm … of how society should work where 
… where there are THE RULES THAT APPLY apply (.) to the BENEFIT of everybody” (not 
reproduced in extracts). For Malik, the ““<<microcosm of>> (.) of South Africa” (line 15), as 
represented by the ‘The Gated Community’, is one where “a (.) small concentration of people 
who really (.) are wealthy and have A LOT of disposable income” (line 16, 18). 
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What is the intended effect in Malik’s statements here? While it reveals an outward articulation 
of a dilemma, it could variously function as a form of impression management to stave off 
potential judgment about a lifestyle toward which he has chosen to orient himself. 
Alternatively, perhaps it serves as a form of guilt alleviation to manage the conflict, one that 
gives the nod (in the spoken act) to the suffering of “so many out there who have so little” (line 
25). However, to ask why Malik struggles to hold onto a fixed position, rather than how he 
manages to straddle between two contradictory scenarios, requires that we attend to the 
jouissance of the text. In this respect, I draw on Kristeva’s (1982) notion of abject to explore 
these resonances. Kristeva (1982) references the experience of strange familiarity, the 
uncanny, as a perpetual haunting feeling that hovers on the fringes of our neatly, 
circumscribed subjectivity. 
 
The excesses of wealth are articulated as affective discomfort (“it almost feels a bit (.) too 
MUCH” [line 22]) that aligns Malik towards an ideological position, one that is conscientised 
towards the stark inequalities between affluence and dispossession. Such an affective 
positioning illuminates M.’s strivings for wealth and status seems to alienate him from familiar 
“township living”, a world of his “other friends” and “brother” (line 3). In our exchanges, Malik 
repeatedly draws on a discourse of difference to highlight the contrasts between “a very 
different … township upbringing, township lifestyle” and “predominantly White historical:: 
suburbs”: “a different culture of relating to one another”; “different lifestyles”; “different kind of 
feeling of HOME … in terms of how you were taught to behave, the values you were taught to 
(.) ESPOUSE”. There is wistful yearning, a quality of ‘loss’ evident.  His ‘numbing out’ 
(‘immune’ [line 10]) — no longer being able to “marvel” (line) at the abnormality of superfluous 
wealth – suggests a distance from a familiar “upbringing”, and a further alienation from “so 
many out there who have so little” (line 25). 
 
Other instances of emotionality in the text is evidenced in laughter intercepting at various 
junctures – in reference to, “the kinds of cars that dri(h)ve u(h)p a(h)nd do(h)wn he(h)re”, the 
displays of wealth as “NORMAL” (line 12) and following the assertion that “I don’t count myself 
amongst those people” with disposable income (line 19). Moreover, there is a hushed quality 
to the text, where the speech takes on a secretive quality (<< >>). This is marked in depictions 
of the neighbourhood: “this (.) << is a lot of wealth>> (line 1), t’s/it’s a <<microcosm of>> (.) 
South Africa (line 15), and in a final lament [((sighing)) (1.0) <<why is>> (line 23)] over the 
marked inequalities. Moreover, the abrupt changes in tone in two instances (reproduced 
below), that mark moments of exhilaration in Malik’s elevated speech is immediately followed 
by a downward inflexion in speech: 
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↑‘DUDE, ↓this is not an EVERYDAY THING: EVERYWHERE’ (line 6) 
  
↑↑EXACTLY ↓I mean I see the cars and I’m like yeah, that’s a great car, you know um 
(2.0) but …”) (lines 11-12)  
 
The elevated speech seems to mirror the inflated quality of the fantasy frame that makes 
reality bearable; that is, ‘The Gated Community’ as a place of exuberance, wealth, abundance. 
This image is deflated by intrusive moments of ‘irreality’ (a loss of reality). For Malik, this 
“nightmarish universe” (Žižek 2008, p. 84) is one in which “so many out there have so little” 
(line 25). These complex and ambivalent affective resonates are pronounced in the text. They 
range from jovial laughter to sighing (line 23), raised speech and muted tones, pauses and 
stammering (line 12). Thus, the relish of being immersed in wealth as an “EVERYDAY THING: 
EVERYWHERE” (line 6) is at the same time undercut by a shifting awareness that we are 
alienated in our belongings (line 19). 
 
Like M., Malik’s positioning is complexly ambivalent and conflicting. Hook (2017) offers that 
jouissance amplifies a split in the subject:  s/he reviles this enjoyment and in moments, 
surrendered to it. This jouissance quality to the text highlights an enjoyment that carries with 
it a traumatic core – “a violent intrusion that brings more pain than pleasure” (Žižek, 2006, p. 
79). Malik seems suspended between ‘be – longings’ between two worlds, yet in some 
respects alienated from both.  From a Lacanian perspective, jouissance presupposes the 
existence of a ‘big Other’ that binds the community through its Law (Sharpe, 2004 as cited in 
Hook, 2017). Perhaps these moments of being pulled ideologically in opposing directions 
(Hook, 2017) may be read as our (un)conscious address to the Other (Rogers, 2007): ‘What 
does the Other want of me?’ ‘Who must I be?’ remains unresolvable. In these moments, it 
seems as if Malik’s belonging is held in suspension, in ‘exile’, not knowing where his place is 
in the symbolic order. Here, Kristeva (1982, p. 8) offers that “the one by whom the abject exists 
is thus a deject” who “strays instead of getting his bearings, desiring, belonging or refusing”. 
The question becomes not of being (‘Who am I?’) but of place (‘Where am I?’). In dejection, 
laughter places or displaces abjection where we simultaneously include ourselves among the 
outcasted, while “casting within [ourselves] the scalpel that carries out … separations” 
(Kristeva, 1982, p. 8). However,  laughter may serve to displace abjection, as noted earlier, 
but Malik’s laughter also suggests relish or enjoyment (lines12-13). What this pertains to 
cannot be known, but what is hinted here is a ‘jouissance in abjection’ that comes with 
becoming subjects. As Kristeva (1982, p. 9) notes, subjects that are the “victims of the abject 
are its fascinated victims”. 
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Moreover, there is a hint of a ‘double alienation’ (Oliver, 2004) in Malik’s account. On the one 
hand, he is estranged from ‘Whiteness’ (materialised in the privileged home) but also removed 
from the ‘Blackness’ (signified by ‘the townships’) where the excitement of “seeing certain 
cars” (lines 4-5) is “not an EVERYDAY THING” (line 6). Malik’s lament is spoken as an 
(un)conscious address to the Other (Rogers, 2007): “<<why is>> it that SO:: few people have 
so much yet, and yet there’s so many out there who have so little?” (lines 24-5).”  The symptom 
may be seen as a form of jouissance addressed by an other to the Other that, as Braunstein 
(2003, p. 108) observes, appears as confession, guilt, contrition or remorse. Huson (2006, p. 
56) asserts that the symptom, the “unconscious truth”, intrudes into the coherence of everyday 
existence. Appearing as an “inexplicable stain”, it makes social discourse impossible but, at 
the same time, sustains it as fictional truth. The symptom exposes the incompleteness of the 
social order, and where the subject is unable to answer the anxiety-provoking question: ‘what 
does the Other want of me?’ (Bosteels, 2006). Desire (stitching together the anxious points in 
the text) serves to structure ideological fantasy. It ‘neatly’ compartmentalises the social world 
(‘me/not me’, ‘us/them’, ‘black/white’, ‘safe/dangerous’, etc.). However, the ‘residue’, the 
jouissance of our subjectivity, as complex embodied, feeling beings, seeps through these 
distinctions or differences. Thus, the affective conflict does not merely play out at the level of 
the individual’s ‘internal’ struggle. As the data suggests, it permeates the rituals of the civilised 
social body to produce the nation as ‘secret enjoyment’ (Solomon, 2012). As Žižek (1994) 
points out, this spirit of enjoyment in acts of transgression is what binds the community in 
belonging. 
 
Malone (2000) asserts that it is our impossible relationship with the Other through 
which our relations with others are derived as love, hate, envy, and power. Thus, as 
the findings suggest, we defensively use our investments in class, ‘race’, sexual, and 
gender hierarchies to distinguish ourselves as superior to others. This, however, 
perpetuates our suffering and ‘redeems’ us from acknowledging that we are mutually 
implicated in each other’s suffering (Layton, 2008). From a relational psychoanalytic 
stance, Layton (2008, p. 68) argues that what divides the self ultimately divides the 
self against others. 
 
6.5. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I argued that the aspirational quality of home requires that we reformulate the 
concept of belonging. It is not simply an achievement nor a performance of the self (Bell, 
1999), spatially, bodily, linguistic, or otherwise. It is also a complex, ambivalent and affect-
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laden process through which we perpetually desire, strive and long to belong (Rowe, 2005).  
From a Lacanian perspective, I argue that the subject is “not at home in the world as it is” 
(Nichols, 2008, p. 471). Rather, the aspirational home acts as a fantasy frame. It offers us the 
promise of fullness, resolve and relief from the burdens of fear and anxiety of living in a country 
perceived as dangerous. From this perspective, belonging is moulded by the socio-symbolic 
co-ordinates (the Other) that teach us how to desire (Žižek, 2008). Moreover, our ‘be – 
longings’, as a desiring process, is an ongoing, negotiated fantasmatic exchange with the 
Other that we (unconsciously) speak through (small) others in the intersubjective realm. What 
sustains us in our strivings to belong is a complicated ‘painful pleasure’ that interrupts our 
sense of illusory coherence, presenting momentary recognition that we cannot fully belong, 
and yet re-instigates desire in our pleasurable strivings for belonging. 
 
Moreover, belonging always involves a painful loss of being. We manage this ‘horror’ by 
blaming the other for why we can never attain the promised ideal of becoming. I argue that 
desire eclipses affects of anxiety and fear evoked in/by participants and their listeners. Desire 
thus performs an ideological function (Martin, 2015) that structures belonging in ways that 
conform to historically-constituted sociosymbolic co-ordinates of ‘race’.  
 
Home, therefore, as Brah (1996), articulates is an impossible arrival (or return). As a moving 
signifier, it metonymically and metaphorically slips into other signifiers that stand for “IT” 
(place, persons, or ideals) but “is never effectively IT” (Žižek, as cited in Polidori, 2000, p. 2). 
Its elusive quality therefore forever sustains in the category of a “homing desire” (Brah, 1996, 
p. 16), with its meaning dependent on its absence or loss to which it refers (Rus, 2006). 
Ideology, therefore, functions as a paradox (Daly, 1999). The object of fullness (e.g., 
‘Whiteness’ as signified by the privileged home) is at once presented as attainable and elusive, 
“sustaining a critical distance to avoid any direct encounter with it”.  This is achieved through 
external hindrances (access, affordability) or identified “fictional’ embodiments” – the other 
(criminals, squatters, taxi drivers) that prevents access to the ‘promise’ of fullness (Daly, 1999, 
p. 224).  Laclau and Mouffe (1985, as cited in Daly, 1999) assert that it is more than simply 
the presence of the other that thwarts the possibility of realising a fullness of self, identity, 
society, etc. 
 
In Strangers to Ourselves, Kristeva (1991, p. 13) writes: “Living with the other, with the 
foreigner, confronts us with the possibility of not being an other”. What Kristeva points to here 
is the inevitable imbrication of the other within ourselves. While we strive to defend ourselves 
against this through (‘racial’, ethnic and other) antagonisms (see Sec. 3.2), the ‘difference’ 
that we seek to annihilate is our own abjected otherness (Cohen, 2001). In the latter part of 
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this chapter, I have ventured an interpretation along the “line of the Symbolic” (Parker, 2005, 
p. 175) that disrupts the ‘stitches’ that hold together contradictory story threads. Despite efforts 
towards a critical reading of the texts, the meaning frame offered and the analytical resources 
drawn upon to support these meanings nevertheless communicates something about the 
knowledge-producing relationship. In particular, this relates to the researcher’s relationship 
and positioning in the texts (Saville Young, 2014). Saville Young (2014) offers that the use of 
a psychoanalytic frame to make interpretive sense of the texts, inserts the researcher into a 
position of ‘expert’, seductively hailed into a stance of ‘one that knows’.  
 
Psychoanalysis as the Master discourse seems to impose a safe, intellectual distance, not 
only from the participants whom I try to ‘interpret’, but also from the ‘me’ who is closely 
imbricated in the lively, unfolding sense-making exchanges. As highlighted, my various 
positionings in the text as temporary ‘visitor’, ‘outsider’ and researcher, confers differential 
access to power and status.  At various junctures, this contributes to relational oscillations –
engagement, misalignment, attunement and alienation – with the participants. More 
complexly, might this moving ‘in-and-out’ of belongings also be structured by ‘race’ as that 
‘invisible’ signifier of belonging (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000)? In this respect, might there be a 
jouissance associated with my act of interpretation?  Perhaps it is a symbolic ‘violent’ 
enactment of joy-in-suffering, making sense of those painful moments, where both participants 
and myself are forever alienated in our racialised ‘be – longings’. At the same time, as the 
interpreter, I safely escape the pain of alienation and any form of relational identification I may 
hold with my participants. By orienting to “the place of the Other” (Lacan, 1977, p. 162), I 
derive a sense of mastery, expertise and ‘knowing’ as the psychoanalytic researcher. As 
Kristeva (1991, as cited in Cohen, 2001, p. 133) offers, the subject is propelled into “that 
painful realm where ‘being alienated from myself, as painful as that may be, provides me with 
that exquisite distance within which perverse pleasure begins”. In becoming a stranger to 
myself (Kristeva, 1991), what of myself is abjected in order not to become ‘other’?  
 
In the next chapter, I turn to ‘The Township’. I draw on data to bring to life the lived bodily 
experiences of jouissance. These are evidenced in constant slippages between ‘me’ and ‘not-
me’ in participant-researcher interactions as we orientate to the broader community. I highlight 
our dominant constructions of ‘The Township’ and how these are performed as we orientate 
towards the White gaze. This hegemonic gaze renders certain bodies as ‘illegible’ relative to 
their location in the cultural symbolic (Winnubst, 2004). I analyse co-constructed embodied 
exchanges to highlight how, in abjecting our ‘racialised’ identities, we become momentarily 
aligned in White ‘be – longings’. These offer the illusion of safety, direction, approval and 
recognition in our quest to find home. 
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Chapter Seven: Findings  
Not Belonging ‘At Home’:  
Abjection, The Place Where I Am Not’ 
 
“Living with the other, with the foreigner, confronts us with the possibility of not of being an 
other” (Kristeva, 1991, p. 13) 
 
7.1. Introduction 
In Chapter 5, I highlighted how crime talk offered a narrative imaginary” for residents of ‘The 
Gated Community’. This functioned to help residents make sense of their world, as well as 
manage the ‘terror’ of living in Johannesburg, perceived as dangerous and chaotic. I extended 
this narrative frame in Chapter 6, at the same time, focused on exploring how the language of 
desire works to structure ‘be – longing’ as a narrative construction and spatial practice. I 
illustrated how these work in ideological ways to beckon us towards the “place of the Other” 
(Lacan, 1977, p. 162), which we aspire towards belonging. I argued that we are ‘gripped’ into 
these belongings as they offer us a place (of love, admiration and approval) in the social order 
(Bracher, 1993). The chapter further explored the role that ‘race’ plays as an ‘invisible’ signifier 
of belonging, structuring not only the regulated, law-bound practices but also the ‘enjoyment’ 
associated with their transgression.  
In this chapter, I explore a contrasting site to ‘The Gated Community’.  As documented in 
Chapter Four (Methodology), ‘The Township’ is a sociospatial material site that, while 
formalised, nevertheless houses a majority of inhabitants that live in informal settlements. The 
theme of making home in a dangerous place is a continuing thread that links ‘The Gated 
Community’ accounts with ‘The Township’. However, how crime is spoken about across both 
sites is qualitatively different. In the former, the organising structure of crime talk provides the 
narrative co-ordinates to construct an alternative space, ‘The Gated Community’ as an 
‘enclave’, a place that strives for normality amidst the lurking dangers ‘out there’. In contrast, 
‘The Township’ residents construct their neighbourhood as generally ‘unsafe’, but designate 
the place of Ext. One, the social periphery for new arrivals (locals and foreigners alike) as 
most dangerous.  
In the first part of this chapter, I explore how crime talk structures ‘The Township’ imaginary, 
how this discursively positions ‘The Township’ as the ‘representative’ of all townships in the 
South African imaginary. At the same time, I show how ‘The Township’, through metaphorical 
and metonymic chains, is seen as constituting ‘blackness’. As a sociohistorical construction, 
it is structured and oriented by the symbolic co-ordinates of ‘Whiteness’. This is performed in 
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discursive, affective, and in spatially embodied ways as we (the participants and the 
researcher) navigate ‘home spaces’ of the community.   
In the latter part of this chapter, I offer a symptomatic reading (Parker, 2014) of this 
overarching narrative of crime, violence and disorder, to ask why such a representation is 
anchored in the texts. What function might this anxious repetition hold? How does it resonate 
for the participants and the researcher as we lay claims to (not) belonging relative to various 
home spaces in the community?  I draw attention to the anxious qualities in narrative texts, 
namely the repetition of signifiers (quilting points) to query what might be ‘repressed’ in the 
texts as a whole (Parker, 2005). Referencing specific scenarios, I show how desire is bound 
to images and talk (Martin, 2015). I argue that desire is continuous with abjection as a 
discursive function, spatial practice and affective register, that works ideologically to structure 
depictions of township living.  
As the underside of desire, abjection works to evoke disidentification with “the place that I am 
not” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3). Through these operations, there is constant slippage between what 
is ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, what is ‘me’ and ‘not me’, and what is the place where ‘I am’ and ‘am 
not’ (Kristeva, 1982). I propose that these work together to construct a fantasy frame that hails 
subjects into affective investments. These have the effect of ordering spaces, bodies and 
subjectivities to produce hierarchies of belonging in ‘The Township’ – spatially designating 
zones of (non)being (Gordon, 2015) where the ‘foreigner’ functions as the repository for 
abjected Blackness.  In particular, I highlight the role of the body as the site of abjection and 
traumatic bodily enjoyment that is performed and held at a tolerable distance (Martin, 2015). I 
illuminate the jouissance quality of participant-researcher exchanges to show how abjection 
functions as a visceral register to construct “plausible stories” (Martin, 2015, p. 2). In spoken, 
felt and embodied ways, I argue that it lends its power-grip to ideology (Glynos, 2001) to effect 
particular modes of belonging in the making of home. 
7.2. Structuring Narratives: ‘Survival’ and ‘Fear and Horror’  
In ‘The Township’ accounts, participants drew upon interpretive repertoires of survival, 
evidenced in recurring tropes. These metaphorically and visually depicted lack and direness 
of the physical body (e.g., trying to ‘put food on the table’ [Khuras, Mlandy], getting ‘something 
in your stomach’ [Madala], getting ‘hungry’ [Madala, Mmbatho], ‘something to eat’ [Madala, 
Mamakgowa], not enough for ‘food’ [Mmbatho]). Physical survival was predicated on having 
financial resources, as summed up in Madala’s statement: “here by [The Township] as long 
as you’ve got MONEY … you not gonna get hungry.”   The vulnerable body that strains against 
the physical elements also constituted another aspect of surviving in ‘The Township’. Madala’s 
illustrative account references this striving for existence in the context of sheer material lack. 
 146 
Extract 1 (Madala, 45, gardener. Lives in an extension with no electricity) 
1. MADALA:  Ext. ONE is dark city. We don’t have a light there. We don’t have eh  
2.    electricity 
3. UL:   Mm:: 
4. MADALA:  Like ((vehicle hooting)) (1.0) there by where I’m STAYING. I haven’t  
5.    got electricity there’s=I’m/I'm using the/the/the candle.  
6. UL:   Yes. 
7. MADALA: So it’s/s:: a DIFFERENCE. And then it’s a SHACK. It’s not eh, it's not  
8.    a  house (1.0) That is the difference /…/ You know why hh (.) you  
9.    know what is, what is happening? When/when you STAY:: in in the  
10.    shack, especially when (1.0) when it’s raining (1.0) you/you FEEL::  
11.    you  feel SHAME FOR YOURSELF because (1.0) your SIDE is/is::/is  
12.    a/is a STEEL, top is a steel and [then 
13. UL:                    Yah] 
14. MADALA: when the person is (.) is staying in the/in the/in the HOUSE, it’s the  
15.    wall:: that all/all around then here is steel all (.) on the top, and then (.)  
16.    and then the WATER (.) it’s easy to attack you when you stay to [the, 
17. UL:                           Yea] 
18. MADALA:  to the/to the shack, because it’s going underNEATH, top (.)  
19.    yo(hh)u/yo(hh)u/yo(hh)u ar(hh)e o(hh)n ri(hh)sk. 
 
Madala’s designation of Ext. 1 as “dark city” metaphorically connotes undertones of crime, 
fear, abandon and danger which, as I will show, are made most explicit in other accounts of 
this place. Madala lives in Ext. 11, a zone within proximity to Ext. 1. His use of the first person 
‘we’ in the opening lines 1-2 suggests a conjoined identity with the place of Ext. 1 (‘like there 
by where I’m STAYING’ [line 4]). Both Extensions lack a basic living resource (‘we don’t have 
a light there. We don’t have eh electricity’ [line 1-2], ‘I’ m/I’m using the/the/the candle’ [line 5]).  
Despite recounting these shared instances of lack, Madala positions himself as distinct from 
the people of Ext. 1 (‘when you stay there … you are poor’ [not reproduced in Extract 1]). 
Madala’s employment of a discourse of difference (lines 7, 8) highlights the stark material 
contrast between a house and its protective walls (lines 14-15) with the exposedness of shack 
living. The latter indignifies a ‘naked’ existence. The shack cannot be designated as a house 
(‘it’s not a house’ [line 7-8]) as it fails to provide shelter for the body (‘the WATER (.) it’s easy 
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to attack you when you stay to the … shack’ [lines 15-16, 18]. The effect is a physical body 
that is rendered defenselessness as an exposed site of vulnerability (‘because it’s going 
underNEATH, top (.) (yo(hh)u/yo(hh)u/yo(hh)u ar(hh)e o(hh)n ri(hh)sk [line 28-9]). The feeling 
state, articulated by Madala, as one of “feel[ing] “SHAME FOR YOURSELF” (line 11) 
underscores the state of destitution that is, at the same time, ameliorated with laughter (line 
19). What is the function of Madala’s account here relative to me as the listener/researcher?   
I draw on this opening extract as a contextual backdrop to narratives of ‘survival’, which I 
argue, evokes in the listening audience a stance of sympathy. Sympathy, or pity, to draw from 
Lacan’s invocation of the Aristotlean definition, is ‘the trembling for the other’ (Vieira, 2015). 
As a bodily effect, it is affected by a mode of seeing the other that recognises the other’s 
humanity (seeing our ‘sameness’ in the other). In these embodied narratives, the body though 
depicted as vulnerable is nevertheless a ‘surviving body’ that weathers the physical elements 
of weather, hunger and financial strain.  In contrast to these ‘survival narratives’ as I will show, 
narratives of ‘horror and fear’ offer up constructions of the body as punctured, ailing, lifeless 
or dead. I ask, in the analysis that follows, what function might these ‘survivor’ subject 
positionings serve in contrast to depictions of ‘dead’ bodies? What do these simultaneous 
evocations – both having differing bodily effects – say about desire as a fantasmatic 
transaction (Hook, 2008b)?  
As indicated in previous chapters, desire is constituted intersubjectively. We desire what the 
other desires based on what the other is seen to possess or has access to (Davidson, 2012). 
In the transference, we lean onto the other as the holder of power, knowledge and authority 
as one “the subject who is supposed to know” (Lacan, 1998, p. 225). Our (unconscious) 
address to the Other (subject) is activated in performances of speech where we constantly try 
to resolve our place in the symbolic order relative to the desire of the Other. We do this by 
seeking recognition beyond the speaking encounter to a symbolic identification with a broader 
context (Martin, 2015).  
As I will argue, the narratives of ‘survival’, ‘horror and fear’, respectively, offer up ‘plausible 
stories’ (Martin, 2015) of ‘The Township’. Through these constructions, (not) belonging is 
performed relative to the gaze from which the speaking subject seeks recognition. In the 
analysis to follow, I attend to how desire is structured in the text to delineate speaking subjects 
from the abjected ‘other’. As I will show, these are tied to “illusory identifications via images, 
language and traumatic ‘enjoyment’ respectively” (Martin, 2015, p. 9). Based on variable 
constructions of the body, I argue that these narratives, centred on stories of crime and 
violence experienced at a distance, seem to provide a ‘stable’ re-ordering of a world rendered 
meaningless through violence (Caldeira, 2000). However, there is something more to these 
 148 
recountings of crime that elicit horror, particularly in their centring on the diseased, assaulted 
or dead body. These accounts appear to perform the boundary work of designating Ext. 1 as 
the ‘anOther’ place characterised by deviance and criminality. However, they are also a 
fantasmatic construction that provides an everyday ideology that gives meaning to a place 
where meaning is disrupted. Here, Creed’s (1993) articulation of the abject offers a useful 
frame for the accounts of ‘The Township’: 
The place of the abject is ‘the place where meaning collapses’, the place where ‘I am 
not’. The abject threatens life, it must be ‘radically excluded’ from the place of the living 
subject, propelled away from the body and deposited on the other side of an imaginary 
border which separates the self from that which threatens the self (p. 46). 
7.2.1. Dead bodies  
Like the ‘The Gated Community’ residents, none of the residents indicated having experienced 
crimes directly. However, in contrast to ‘The Gated Community’, the ‘The Township’ 
participants constructed violence and crime as an intrusive and pervasive everyday reality, 
designating places of danger within physical reach. Featured prominently alongside survival 
repertories was talk about crime and violence, relayed through tropes of death. These are 
exemplified in the two sample extracts below: 
Extract 2: Mlandy, NGO librarian. Rents a ‘zozo’ located in the backyard of an RDP home 
1. Mlandy:  EVERYday lot of people die here [UL: Okay=] people they kill each o::ther::  
2.    you know. Even last we/week, yah last week there is a woman=They were  
3.    ((smacking lips)) they/they just gaining a woman's house=Is a zozo4 [UL:  
4.    Mm. Then] I don't know, they were looking for a MONEY or  
5.    something=Then they shoot that ((smacking lips)) uh woman and then he  
6.    die immediately=Then they, he or ~h~e~, I mean she was sleeping with  
7.    her gi/her, her daughter but the daughter h/she's in hos/she's in hospital.  
8.    That's why now they are, they are striking like. E::VERYday=[Everyday  
9.    p    e   o    p   l   e ] are dying. 
10.  UL:       [O h  m y  g o s h ] 
 
 
 
4 In township talk, ‘zozo’ refers to tin shack’  
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Extract 3: Mamakgowa, unemployed;  collects recyclable plastics to make a living. Lives in 
Ext. 1 
1. Mamakgowa:  And that side, you KNO:::W, maybe you know last, last s:: time, neh? [UL:  
2.    mm] the child they/are k/they/the/the/the people they kill the child and then 
3. UL:   Here? 
4. Mamakgowa:  See the dustbin here? 
5. UL:   Yes. 
6. Mamakgowa:  For five years they (.) <<they:: 
7. UL:   They put the dustbin, [put the baby in the dustbin. 
8. Mamakgowa:              Yes , they  put  the  baby ] in dustbin. 
9. UL:   Oh (.) gosh>>  
10. Mamakgowa:   Five years and then:: two to three years again the [UL: Mm] (.) child. They  
11.    raped=After that, they KILL the child that side, you [see. 
12. UL:                                So] what’s ↑it, ↓what’s  
13.    it like for YOU to:: HEAR the stories and you when/when for you, you hear   
14.    that story, and you and you SEE (.) WHERE it took place, how do you feel  
15.    about that? 
16. Mamakgowa:  I’m not feeling all right, because I have no nothing that side, no I saying, I  
17.    tell you I, I've no CHOIC::E ‘cause I’ve got no nothing ((vehicle passing)).  
18.    I’m not feeling all right ((vehicle passing muffles speech)), ye::s because e  
19.    (.) this place is not all right. 
 
Both extracts are depictions of untimely deaths in the community. In Extract 2, word repetitions 
variously enunciated (“EVERYday [1:1]; E::VERYday [1:8]; Everday [1:8]) captures death (‘kill 
each o::ther::’; ‘died immediately’; ‘people are dying’) and violence (‘they shoot’) as a recurring, 
ordinary and almost banal feature of daily living in ‘The Township’. The regularity of these 
happenings in the community lends a quality of certainty. This is juxtaposed against the 
senselessness of these regular killings, as echoed in Mlandy’s statement: ‘I don’t know’. 
In Mamakgowa’s account (Extract 3), the “dustbin” (line 4, 7) is the scene of a crime. 
Contained “in the dustbin” (line 7-8) is a body of a raped and murdered baby (lines 2, 11), 
such a state of affairs, producing a profound disturbance to the ordinary rituals of everyday 
practice (i.e., of dirt belonging “inside the dustbin” (Mmbatho). What is disturbing here is the 
uncomfortable ambivalence marked by crossing over of boundaries of life and death under 
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circumstances that defy normality. Here, the infant body, typically symbolised as life, is 
reduced to a corpse in a dustbin. More horrifying about Mamakgowa’s account is not simply 
the ‘out-of-placeness’ of a(n infant) body in the dustbin, but also the very regularity of such an 
occurrence “five years [ago] and then:: two to three years again” (line 11). It has a reeling 
effect on me as the researcher: “Oh (.) gosh>>” (line 9). This anxious quality of the text is 
noticeable further in questions to Mamakgowa – marked in tonal fluctuations (line 13), 
stuttering (‘when/when’ [line 13]) and repetitions (‘and you and you’ [line 14]) to derive ‘sense’ 
to these happenings. I will subsequently return to Mamakgowa’s response, but for now, I draw 
attention to the repertoires and tropes that structure these narratives characteristic of ‘The 
Township’. 
These accounts, replete with images of injury, violence and death are told time and again. 
Visual repertoires, imaged as disturbing crime scenes, are centred mainly on the body: “you 
can see someone dead on the streets”, “people have INJURED, have been ROBBED, have 
been STABBED, have been (.) KILLED” (Khuras), “That/that lady get SHO::T (.) with two bullet 
and DEAD” (Mmbatho), “someone is STABBING …somebody’s ROBBED” (Madala). The 
purpose here is not to question the integrity of these accounts, nor to ascertain the true status 
of recounted events. Of interest is how language, images and affective resonances cohere to 
generate ‘plausible stories’ to offer a version of reality as an insistence of “the way things are” 
(Martin, 2015; Parker, 2005, p. 7). Here, these symbolic and imaginary descriptors reproduce 
stereotypical constructions of township life as (post)apartheid-derived spaces. 
These accounts of bodily injury in wide circulation in ‘The Township’ as “BAD NEWS” (Madala) 
or “stories around this place” (Khuras) contribute to an affective climate of fear and horror 
produced by discourses of crime and violence. These affective intensities conveyed in these 
extracts may be discerned in the formal qualities of this text – stuttering (‘we/week’, ‘they/they’, 
‘h/she’s in hos/she’s in hospital’ [Extract 2]; they/are k/they/the/the/the [Extract 3]), drawn-out 
words, quivers in voice (he or ~h~e~) (Extract 2). Combined with my shocked response (‘Oh 
my gosh’) [Extracts 2, 3], they contribute to the anxious quality in the texts. In these and other 
instances, as the interviewer, I am effectively co-opted into the imaginary frame constructed 
by the participants, evoking reactions of reeling horror, anxiety and fear.  
The effectiveness of these accounts – aside from the palpable feelings of fear, horror and 
disgust they evoke – is their capacity to permit the listener/interviewer (but also participants 
as recipients of such stories in wide circulation) to “grasp a situation and place themselves in 
it” (Martin, 2015, p. 16). I want to highlight this performative act as more than just an assertion 
of self-differentiation. Rather, between the participants and researcher, these exchanges point 
to desire as a negotiated fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2008b).  The key affective strategy 
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here is that it provokes symbolic identification with a broader scenario that transcends the 
relational exchange between speakers. In other words, as individuals, we affectively orient 
ourselves to stories told to us, by (dis)identifying with reasonings, characters, and expressed 
feelings. In so doing, we attune ourselves to the broader symbolic order whose approving 
gaze we seek to capture (Martin, 2015).   
Here, Žižek (1989, p. 105) offers that symbolic identification is the “identification with the very 
place from where we are being observed, from where we look at ourselves so that we appear 
to ourselves likeable, worthy of love”. This vantage point is the ego-ideal—a virtual, 
‘impossible gaze’. Martin (2011, p. 14) offers that the gaze serves as the ‘quilting point’ that 
“stitches together the discourse into fantasy”. In other words, through signifying operations 
and semiotic material (images, sounds, gestures) depicting darkness, decay, deprivation, 
disorder, dirt, dying and dead bodies, etc.) and evocations of horror, ‘The Township’ is 
metonymically linked to the (black) townships as ‘places of danger’, historically constituted in 
the South African ‘cultural architecture’ (Parker, 2010). Hook (2013, p. 259), for example, 
offers that such images of (black) bodies-in-pieces offer a soothing function by locating 
anxieties “in a site of pronounced dis-identification” reaffirmed in their repetitions. 
Here, in unspoken terms, might these narratives offer a suturing of a historically defined 
discourse of crime and violence in the townships to the (white) fantasy of (black) abjection? 
That is, of black bodies-in-pieces (Hook, 2013a), a fantasy in which both speaker and 
listener/interviewer are conjoined and become complicit. Fantasy is understood in a Lacanian 
sense not as an escape from reality, but rather as a structure to render reality more intelligible. 
In other words, to restore meaning where meaning has collapsed (Kristeva, 1982). The images 
of bodies-in-pieces offer up sites for disidentification, as a place that is ‘not me’. Why might 
this be necessary? The narratives of horror and fear seem to function as a fantasy frame to 
offer a distinct mode of dis-identification from an abject place that is ‘not me’ (Kristeva, 1982). 
Striking in these moments is that, despite our differences (participant/researcher, ‘race’, class, 
etc.), we are aligned momentarily towards a ‘common’ historically constituted discourse about 
violence and township spaces held by the White gaze. In our concerted efforts to belong ‘in 
difference’, we seem to draw on the gaze of ‘Whiteness’ as the one “who is supposed to know” 
(Lacan, 1998, p. 225).  
The hegemonic discourse it offers, as the ‘common’ explanatory resource, knits us into 
belonging. Both participants and the researcher in these mutual connections, become 
(unconsciously) aligned in the abjection work that is akin to a ‘black-on-black’ symbolic 
violence (Langa & Kiguwa, 2016). From a Lacanian perspective, evocations of fear and their 
reeling horror produce bodily effects – ‘a trembling for oneself’, to invoke  Aristotelian definition 
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– affected by what is ‘not like us’. Rather than inviting sympathy, it evokes a mode of seeing 
that situates emotions in relation to the specular (the imaginary realm). To this effect, it 
instigates a conjoined separateness (the participants and myself as the researcher) from the 
wounded, punctured, decaying and dead bodies. These images of ‘The Township’ life have 
the effect of dissolving resemblance such that the ’other’ is not ‘our kind’ (Vieira, 2015).   
In this respect, we make ‘sense’ of this horrifying reality – its randomness, chaos, absurdity – 
by conscripting it into meaning (Vieira, 2015), albeit a dominant meaning frame defined by 
Whiteness. I argue that these elicitations of horror and fear effect distancing that elicit affective 
enjoyment structured by the (White) fantasy of (black) abjection. There is a complex ‘painful 
pleasure’ at work here that is captured in jouissance. For Lacan, jouissance is the other pole 
of human desire, which entails a desire for recognition or what the other enjoys (Chiesa, 2006). 
As Braunstein (2003) points out, jouissance always involves a relation to the Other. Why might 
an affective investment that effects the apartness of bodies via specular dis-identification be 
necessary for the participants (Ahmed, 2003)? How is such a mode of belonging performed? 
What is the cost of seeking recognition from the other, be it the researcher in the 
intersubjective relation, or the structuring (White) Other of the sociosymbolic order? I argue 
that the ideological fantasy needs to offer specific sites of delineation. Seeking recognition 
from the (White) Other is dependent on repudiating a ‘blackness’ that is ‘not-me’. Once again, 
the body (metaphorically, the house) is the site of this struggle. 
7.2.2. Surviving bodies 
A key feature of these accounts is their centring on stories of crime and violence, experienced 
from a distance. Second, while the township was depicted as generally crime-ridden, much of 
the horror was attributed to a marginalised zone of Ext. 1. Designated as the “dark city” 
(Madala), a place of “no electricity” (Madala, Mlandy, Khuras, Mmbatho),  Ext. 1 occupies a 
‘sub-subaltern’ status in the ‘The Township’ imaginary. It is characterised as “overcrowded” 
(Khuras, Mlandy, Mmbatho), dirty and disorderly (“LOT OF RUNNING, dirty running water on 
the streets” [N]” and populated by “DANGEROUS criminals” (N).  Termed the Reception Area 
(Harber, 2011), Ext. 1 in the minds of ‘The Township’ residents, is an informal and temporary 
settlement (“PURE SQUATTER CAMP” [N]; ‘a shacks place’ [Mmbatho]) where newcomers 
(locals and foreigners alike) carve a makeshift existence upon entry into the township.  
What is noticeable in the narratives is constant slippage between simultaneous identification 
and disavowal. Participants draw on survival repertoires repeatedly to distinguish themselves 
(physically and psychically) from the ‘other’ of Ext. 1. In the extract below, Khuras draws on 
the metaphor of darkness to depict ‘The Township’, and in a collaborative exchange between 
interviewer and participant, we construct this zone as a place of danger: 
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Extract 4: Khuras, works as a videographer in ‘The Township’ selling newsworthy footage to 
media agencies  
1. Khuras:  It’s too dark this place. There’s NO LIGHT. There is no electricity. There’s  
2.    nothing. They/they USE paraffin and candle [UL: Yes] So=I WAS STAYING  
3.    HERE long time and then it was hh=LIKE it was so bad because sometimes  
4.    can’t do nothing during the night. You just [UL: Mm :::] six o’clock you have  
5.    to be at the house. 
6. UL:    ((smacking lips)) Ri::ght and/and um ((smacking lips)) because there's, it’s  
7.    Just SAFER the house? 
8. Khuras:  YAH EVEN in the house you safe [but not safe. 
9. UL:               M m : : : : ] 
10. Khuras:  So because sometimes they can even:: get into your house because it’s  
11.    the shacks [UL: Mm::]They can even BREAK the, the/the/the, the ZINC and  
12.    get in.  
13. UL:   And um for you::: (.) when you (.) when you return to THIS place WHERE  
14.    YOU USED TO LIVE [Khuras: Yeh] does it (.) does it make you FEEL  
15.    anything (.) uh::= 
16. Khuras:   Yuh they changes i(hh)s yo(hh)u kn(hh)ow) hh u:::m=SINCE I LEFT HERE  
17.    There were lots of stories around this place [UL: Yah] and then I realise  
18.    that oh my gosh, what if I was still staying the:::re? [UL: Yah::] 
19.  Khuras:  Maybe [I/I'll 
20. UL:               Right] 
21. Khuras:  be one of the VICTIM or whatever. 
Having “NO LIGHT” (line 1), in Khuras’ depiction in Extract 4, is synonymous with a meagre 
existence. This is captured in statements such as: “there’s nothing’ (line 1) and “I can’t do 
nothing during the night” (line 3). My response to Khuras (‘it’s just SAFER the house?’ [lines 
8-9]), however, develops a construction of ‘The Township’ (but of Ext. 1 in particular) as a 
place of danger, rather than possible boredom resulting from having “no electricity” (line 1). 
The flimsiness of the shack with its “ZINC” (line 13) exterior, therefore, fails to belong to the 
linguistic category of “house” (line 9).  
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In a material sense, moreover, the shack offers minimal insulation from the persistence of 
criminal elements outside (‘they can even:: get into your house because it’s the shacks’ [line 
12-13], ‘they can even BREAK the, the/the/the, the ZINC and get in’ [line 13]). Symbolically, 
the shack, lacking the protective walls of a house, stands as a permeable boundary structure 
that fails to offer a clean-cut separation from the threatening ‘outside’ of Ext. 1, rendering it 
both “safe but not safe” (line 10). Drawing on a survival repertoire, Khuras effectively distances 
himself from the category of “VICTIM” (line 21), owing to this escape to having moved from 
“this place” (line 1, 17) where he once “WAS STAYING” (line 2). Furthermore, the “lots of 
stories around this place” (line 17), presumably of victims of crime, simultaneously bolsters 
justification for Khuras’ move away from Ext. 1 and offers relief from escaping a possible attack 
(‘oh my gosh, what if I was still staying the:::re?’ (lines 17-18). The disavowal of place/identity 
is performed by constructing a body, that is a surviving body rather than an injured or dead 
body. In contrast to narratives of horror, survival narratives such as these, evoke sympathy 
and identification (as opposed to fear and horror), as noted in my neutral responses to Khuras 
(lines 9, 20). 
 
7.3. Designating ‘Zones of (Non) Being’ 
What sense can we make of these accounts that portray a violent everyday reality eliciting 
sympathy in some instances and fear and horror in others? What ‘sense-making’ do 
participants (and the researcher alike) make of these tangible happenings in ‘The Township’. 
Such happenings appear to accord with the material reality, as opposed to merely discursive 
constructions. The survival repertoire depicts the physical body as a marker of deprivation, 
dispossession and decay. The scarcities of food, light, space and shelter exaggerate the 
body’s ‘naked’ vulnerability – its heightened risk for “attack” by natural elements of the weather 
(Extract 1, line 16), its perpetual state of hunger, and its near exposure to violence and death. 
All of these make for conditions uninhabitable for living. These characterisations point to the 
relevance of a postcolonial reading of the extracts. The transience of existence is resonant of 
the “native quarters” arising from a Manichean order in Frantz Fanon’s (1963, p., 4) The 
Wretched of the Earth. In contrast to the superfluous colonial city that is “built to last … stone 
and steel”, with “lights and paved roads”, “streets … clean and smooth” and a “belly … 
permanently full of good things”, the ‘native’ sector, by contrast, is: 
the shanty town, the Medina, the reservation … a disreputable place inhabited by 
disreputable people. You die anywhere, from anything. It’s a world with no space, 
people are piled one on top of the other, the shacks squeezed tightly together. The 
colonized’s sector is a famished sector, hungry for bread, meat, shoes, coal, and light. 
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The colonized’s sector is a sector that crouches and cowers, a sector on its knees, a 
sector that is prostrate. It’s a sector of niggers, a sector of towelheads (p. 4-5).  
The “wretched” speaks to the material and existential beingness of those who are “damned, 
outside, and silenced” (Gibson, 2009, p. 2). This Manichean division of consciousness, for 
Fanon (1967) splits society into ‘zones’ of being and non-being. In a material sense, the sheer 
“nothing[ness]” (Extract 4, line 1) (of space, light, food), impermanence and instability of 
township living resonates with a Fanonian existential account of subjection. Such beings are 
dispossessed and “disinherited [from] the possibility of being human” (Bataille, as cited in 
Tyler, 2013).  
Fanon’s (1963) account highlights the dialectical relationship between coloniser and 
colonised. In this relationship, hegemonic domination is exercised through power that is not 
only physical and spatial but psychological and ideological. Here, the material conditions and 
relationships structured hierarchically as domination and oppression. However, the political 
and economic relationship between the Empire and the colonised nation does not cease with 
territorial handovers. Rather, coloniality continues to exert its power, and its effects are carried 
through long after the end of colonial administration (see Maldonado-Torres, 2007). Here, The 
Township’ accounts collectively portray a daily existence teetering on the limits of survival. 
The tropes of survival – hungry bodies, decaying bodies, bodies assaulted, dead bodies – 
accords with a survivalist mode of existence characteristic of contemporary post-colonial/post-
apartheid society.  
These images of horror, not unique to this site, support stereotypes of township life in South 
Africa as dangerous and abject spaces (Bremner, 2004; Buur, 2009). Here, as Sithole (2016) 
observes, subjection as a haunting spectre of the Blackness, while explicitly operationalised 
in practices of colonialism, slavery and apartheid, is rendered ‘hidden’ in the day-to-day 
banalities of life in post-apartheid and post-colonial contexts. Subjection entails an arbitrary 
existence of life or death, where the will to survive predominates over the will to live. Here, 
Sithole (2016) observes that the existential predicament of Blackness even in the post-colonial 
and post-apartheid context is that it is perpetually bound to a survivalist mode of existence. 
To merely survive throws into question the very humanity of the Black subject. Here, at the 
lived experience of the body, lies the vulgarised Black subject whose “existential condition [is 
that] of crisis” (p. 37). 
Narratives of survival appear to be structured along these lines. The speaker positions 
him/herself from a place of lack and the listener is pulled in as the rescuer. This hierarchical 
relation offers little room for shared identifications.   Due to disparate social positionings, they 
reinscribe a hierarchical pattern of relating, premised on a dichotomy of dominance and 
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submission, where any sense of mutual reciprocity is denied. In several encounters with 
several participants (Khuras, Mamakgowa, Madala), I am positioned as the ‘White’ other who 
brings change to the community. The sample extract below is a go-along with Madala as we 
walk along Ext. 6: 
Extract 5: Go-along with Madala  
1. MADALA:  They:: they are/the're/the're/they are eh:: interesting. They not eh taking  
2.    you like, WHY, WHY IS, WHY THAT LADY IS, IS WALKING HERE, is  
3.    walking here and then is WHITE and then (.) you walk with the/the/the/the  
4.    BLACK PERSON and and then (.) stop you, 'HI, WHY? WHY ARE YOU  
5.    WA/WALKING HERE, WHAT ARE YOU DOING? So, they KNOW::  
6.    maybe you come and HELP THEM maybe I/I, you, you HERE to/to/to  
7.    HELP THEM. They don’t know= 
8. UL:   You mean WHO? [I ’ m  
9. MADALA:                               They/they/they] the peoples of the COMMUNITY. 
10. UL:   Okay. YES 
11. MADALA:  Maybe they, they said, 'okay (.) that’s why eh she walk HERE. Maybe  
12.   she, she, she doing the research and (.) maybe we gonna get eh/eh/eh 
13.    IMPROVEMENT of the/[of the/of the 
14. UL:                               Okay, okay] 
15. MADALA:  of the place (.) maybe of the poverty. 
 
My presence here in ‘The Township’ is not met with overt interrogation. However, as Madala 
observes, there is something unusual about our encounter. Constructing my presence in 
racialised terms, he points out the anomaly of the situation: “THAT LADY IS, IS WALKING 
HERE ... and then is WHITE and then (.) you walk with the/the/the/the BLACK PERSON’) 
(lines 2-3). Perhaps it is the very ‘strangeness’ of this situation that evokes an uncanny 
association, one that is familiar yet strange at the same time, namely, that when “the WHITE 
person … walk[s] here by ‘The Township’” there is a likelihood that “maybe we gonna get 
eh/eh/eh IMPROVEMENT …” (lines 12-13).  
Freud (1919, p. 237) points towards the uncanny as an “involuntary repetition” that is aroused 
in response to impressions, situations, events, or things or persons. It captures a perception 
that is homely (heimlich) “which develops in the direction of ambivalence until it finally 
coincides with its opposite,  unheimlich [unhomely]”. Thus, what is unheimlich is what was 
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once homely or familiar, but has become repressed. Anxiety as a repressed form shows up 
as a recurring affect in response to “frightening things” (p. 241); the height of such dread 
experienced in relation to death, dead bodies and the return of the dead as ghosts. This 
phantasy of terror, argues Freud (1919, p.244, is a transformation of the original phantasy 
that, rather than resting on fear, is “qualified by a certain lascivious – the phantasy of intra-
uterine existence”.  The uncanny is, therefore, a “home-sickness”. It articulates a longing for 
the familiar, “heim [home] of all human beings, to the place where each one of us lived once 
upon a time and in the beginning” (p. 245).  
There is certainly a haunting element that appears in my walk with Madala. As recounted in 
the above extract, there is something that resonates as both threatening (‘WHY, WHY IS …’ 
[line 2]) and comforting (they KNOW:: maybe you come and HELP THEM’ [lines 5-6]), as well 
as familiar and strange. These affective nuances allude to Freud’s (1919) notion of uncanny. 
As an ambivalence that is at once ‘homely’ and ‘unhomely’, Freud’s (1919) uncanny is traced 
to neurotic guilt and castration anxiety. The research, however, departs from this view. What 
is ‘homely’ and ‘unhomely’, as it relates to the findings, is more closely associated with 
postcolonial dispossession; that is, of people living in unhomely spaces dispossessed of their 
original home (Nayar, 2010).  The shift from a psychosexual emphasis to a postcolonial one 
foregrounds themes of repetition relating to experiences of subjugation, loss and violence. As 
Nayar (2010) notes, perceptions of place or event evoke the uncanny as a space of uncertainty 
and hesitance where the poor are “reduced to apparitions that point to an unjust past and 
present” (Nayar, 2010, p. 116). This “return of the oppressed” (Bhabba, 1983, p. 25) marks 
the space as uncanny; as “strange rendered vaguely familiar” (Nayar, 2010, p. 100). As I show 
subsequently,  this strange familiarity is experienced as a perpetual haunting feeling that 
hovers on the fringes of our neatly, circumscribed subjectivity, what Kristeva (1982) refers to 
as the abject, 
 
The colonial imaginary, uncomfortably resonant in this exchange, inscribes an asymmetrical 
mode of relating. Madala, at the end of our walk, suggests that “sometimes God, he send you 
the right person in the right time … to do the research here by ‘The Township’” (not in quoted 
extracts). Here, I become interpellated into a subject position of a “White person” (line 25) who 
will “help” (lines 8, 42) the community via “IMPROVEMENT of the … place (.) maybe of … 
poverty” (lines 13, 15).  
In effect, my subjectivity is inscribed with a duty and responsibility. This moral inscription to 
provide to an impoverished community evokes a defensive response, perhaps of (White) guilt 
attached to privilege: “you mean WHO? I’m=“ [line 9]). At the same time, it has the powerful 
effect of reinstating the inexorable hierarchical order between privileged and marginalised and 
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that I, not even in my racialised positioning as an Asian woman, can safely elude. Although 
my ‘racial’ status is a historically marginal, I find myself straddling racialised subjectivities. 
On the one hand, I occupy the (historical) status of  ‘non-white’. At the same time, I have 
access to ‘Whiteness’ through the portals of class status, education, and language.  Moreover, 
my researcher status confers many privileges and power relative to an impoverished township 
community.  
Making sense of these oscillations in hindsight brings forth some questions: which Other do I 
wish to address? To which Other do I have allegiance? In response to Madala, perhaps my 
resistance is against the inscription into the role of ‘White’ other is to escape accountability 
towards a needy commmunity looking towards me as a ‘rescuer’. At the same time, his 
beckoning throws me into disarray (line 8). Inadvertently, I am confronted with my visitor status 
as a researcher to an impoverished community dilutes any claims I might have to marginality 
or oppression. In this respect, Blackness or Whiteness has no essential quality; it is relative, 
situational and dependent on the gaze from which we see or are being seen by another 
(Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Thus, evoking sympathy (or pity) is a transference relation that vests 
inexorable power into the “other who is supposed to know” (Lacan, 1998, p. 225). The 
researcher is interpellated here as “other” who is supposed to resolve the questions of (lack) 
in the contexts of material deprivation. At this transindividual level, participants turn to the big 
Other to structure meaning out of chaos. In settings such as ‘The Township’, the scarcity of 
discursive resources to make new meanings reinscribes the tired (post)colonial narrative of 
poverty, need and survival.  
In this section, I have attempted to show how narratives of ‘survival’ and ‘horror and fear’ 
produce differing bodily effects that affect distinctions between what is ‘me’ and ‘not-me’ 
respectively. These affective evocations, through fear and sympathy, provide the vehicle 
through which participants and researcher are transferred to the “place of the Other” (Lacan, 
1977, p. 162) as desiring subjects. In the accounts of gated community residents, the tropes 
of terror were repeated through fantasy, shifting anxiety “over to the question of desire” (Lacan, 
2014, p. 214). Here, in the context of ‘The Township’, anxiety seems to be viscerally 
pronounced through the register of abjection as a discursive function and spatial practice. In 
the next section, I explore abjection as a visceral register to explore its function and place in 
the fantasmatic construction. Using a Lacanian analysis, I show that affective resonances of 
fear, loathing and disgust – the anchoring points of abjection – point towards desire in the 
texts that create the ‘foreigner’ as an object of fear (Ahmed, 2003). 
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7.4. Abjection: The Place Where ‘I am not’  
‘Difference’ as a recurring motif supported the survival narrative that dominantly structured 
residents’ accounts. The ‘difference’ repertoire was salient in participants’ marking Ext. 1 as 
distinct from the rest of ‘The Township’. It may be recalled from Extract 1, that Ext. 1 is the 
“dark city” (without lights), and in Extracts 2 and 3, as the locale where the scenes of horror 
and crime play out. Khuras introduces Ext. 1 : “They call it RECEPTION AREA where::: when 
people come from outside”. The ‘outsider’, as most accounts affirm is subsumed in the figure 
of the lawless foreigner. The foreigner, typically “from Africa” (Khuras), is without papers or 
traceable identity (Mlandy, Khuras). In this microcosm, new hierarchies of belonging are 
effected. Ext. 1, the spatial designation of ‘the foreigner’, seems to function as a repository for 
the abjected ‘Blackness’. Constructions of space limitations (Mmbatho, Khuras), dirt and 
disease (Mmbatho) and danger served to delineate the ‘pure squatter camp’. The account 
below shows how anxiety is ‘symptomatic’ of desire (Parker, 2005), alluding to something 
lacking in the subject (Hook, 2008b). 
Extract 6 (Mlandy’s neighbour, N. Lives in Extension Six) [We are sitting in Mlandy’s ‘zozo’ 
when a neighbour stops by. After conversing with Mlandy for a brief time, who appeared to 
cue him about my presence, the following exchange takes place between N. and me] 
1. N:  'Cause you see there's a difference between squatter camp an::d  
2.   Ext. 6 'cause at Extension One, it's (.) PURE SQUATTER CAMP. 
3. UL:   Yah. 
4. N:  Yah, it's a squatter camp. 
5. UL:  Yah. NO electricity, [ n o  w a t e r 
6. N:            No electricity] LOT OF RUNNING, dirty running water on  
7.   the streets. Yah, LOT OF CRIME. 
8. UL:  [ Y e s. 
9. N:  HIGH] RATE OF CRIME in the Extension One, but here in Extension  
10.   Six, at least it's (.) better. The rate of crime here is not so high BUT AT  
11.   EXTENSION ONE, you can't walk around/at around nine, ten, during midnight  
12.   [  no, no 
13. UL:  It/it's, it's] very unsafe. 
14. N:  Yah, it's unsafe. LOT OF foreigners there. Zimbabwe, Mozambique. 
15.   DANGEROUS criminals. 
16. UL:  Okay, so yah:: it's, there's a uh different, different area just feels, this  
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17.   part feels a lot safer. 
18. N:  At least. At least. Extension Six, Five, Four, Eight and Extension Nine  
19.   and Ten, but Extension ONE and TWO, even Extension Thirteen, Fourteen, 
20.   squatter camp. 
21. UL:   Mm. 
22. N:   Yah, HIGH rate of crime. DANGEROUS CRIMINALS from (.) Zimbabwe,  
23.   Mozambique. 
24. UL:   Okay::: 
25. N:  EVEN South Africans. 
 
N’s account offers the ‘anchoring points’ that affixes a characterisation of Ext. 1 as a site of 
criminality (‘LOT OF CRIME’ [line 8], ‘DANGEROUS criminals’ [line 16, 23] and disease (‘dirty 
running water on the streets’ [line 6-7]). The effects of danger are emphasised; imposing limits 
on freedoms (you can’t walk around/at around” [line 12]). The account achieves its 
effectiveness as a co-constructed exchange. My affirmations (lines 3, 9), for example, mirror 
N’s statements (‘NO electricity, no water’ [15]); ‘it’s very unsafe’ [line 14]), work to depict Ext. 
1 as a place of danger and sheer material lack. Moreover, the account works through 
metonymic chain to link ‘unsafe’ (line 14, 15) and ‘danger’ (lines 15, 23) to ‘foreigners’ (line 
15) and ‘DANGEROUS criminals’ (line 16, 23) and ‘Zimbabwe’ and ‘Mozambique’ (lines 15, 
23, 24). As an attributional account, these rogue elements are causally implicated in the 
making of Ext. 1 into a “PURE SQUATTER CAMP” (line 2), an “unsafe” (line 15) place. N. 
attests to the “HIGH RATE OF CRIME” (line 10). Through his insisting manner, constructions 
of Ext. 1 lend a visceral ‘realness’ to the place. At the same time, its echoing repetitions – 
“squatter camp” (lines 4, 21), “RUNNING / running” (line 6), “DANGEROUS criminals” (lines 
16, 23), “LOT/HIGH RATE OF CRIME” (lines 8, 10), and “Zimbabwe, Mozambique” (lines 15, 
23-4) – reveal a quality of anxiousness in the text. The language of statistics appeals to 
facticity (line 10), which conceals this anxiety (Martin, 2015). These points of desire in the text, 
appearing as ‘self-evident facts’ provide the basis for ‘plausible stories’ that as Martin (2017, 
p. 5) notes hides people from the truth of their desire”. Thus, through powerful signifying 
chains, ‘truth’ is made to speak through the story (Žižek, as cited in Ali & Whitham, 2018). 
From this Lacanian stance, why might the truth of desire be masked?  
Despite the stark material contrasts, narratives that construct ‘The Township’ and ‘The Gated 
Community’ point towards a fantasmatic construction. These discursive-spatial constructions 
comprise a beatific and traumatic scenario (Žižek, 1997).  As a point of contrast, rather than 
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depicting crime and violence as ‘out there’ having the potential to terrorise one’s place of 
safety, here in ‘The Township’ the danger is depicted as ‘within close reach’. By this account, 
abjection as a discursive, spatial and visceral register, is a defining characteristic of ‘The 
Township’ accounts. What is rendered abject seems to serve an ‘urgent’ purpose – the need 
to jettison the ‘object’ that hovers too close along the fringes of a precarious subjectivity. This 
unstable demarcation of self blurs the boundaries between what ‘is me’ and what is ‘not me’, 
producing a profound agitation. For example, Mamakgowa’s response in Extract 3 (lines 13-
18, reproduced below) to my question depicts the sense of ‘stuckness’ in ‘The Township’, of 
having “no CHOIC::E cause I’ve got no nothing” (lines 16-17).” (line 16). The rendering of lack, 
longing and disidentification evident in the repetitive framing: “I’m not feeling all right …. I’m 
not feeling all right … this place is not all right” (lines 16, 17, 18). Her deictic reference to “that 
side” (line 16) – her home in Ext. 1 – is also the ‘dark’ and ‘dangerous’ repository of the 
abjected foreigner spoken in N’s account (Extract 6). In abjection, the foreigner becomes the 
constructed ‘object of fear’ (Ahmed, 2003).   
How does Mamakgowa manage this ambiguity discursively and spatially to make this tension 
tolerable? In the lengthy extract below, preserved in length to convey the discursive and spatial 
processes of boundary-making, seems to restore a semblance of orderliness and control. 
Mamakgowa’s account is a justificatory one, delivered in a tone that, in contrast to the previous 
extract, renders it decisive and purposeful. 
Extract 7: Go-along with Mamakgowa where we visit her shack in Ext. 1  
1. Mamakgowa:  They put all the fence (2.0) for SAFE my people, or for SAVE MY LIFE  
2.    and the people [and the child 
3. UL:        hh] You/you, I, would be interested to see um (.) you  
4.    mean, you gonna show me the fence?  
5. Mamakgowa:  Yah, come I [show you. 
6. UL:              O k a y] /…/ ((Keys rattling as Mamakgowa locks the  
7.    door)). You see the fence again? This side, you can come here in the  
8.    daytime. [pointing the shared entrance between her and her  
9.    neighbours] 
10. UL:   Oh::: [t h a t s h e c a n  
11. Mamakgowa:  There's the fence that side] [The neighbour's shouting dulls out our  
12.    conversation] connect  
13. Mamakgowa:  And that side. 
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14. UL:   Who put that up there? 
15. Mamakgowa:  Is my hu, husband for protect 
16. UL:   Okay (6.0). [We are walking along the outside of M's shack and crossing  
17.    over to her neighbour's front door as we move towards the exit].  
18. Mamakgowa:  The fence. [Mamakgowa is pointing to the metal-wired fence enclosing  
19.    several shacks. It is taut in some places and in others hanging loosely as  
20.    widely opened horizontal strips, tenuously held together with branches  
21.    acting as makeshift poles. The flimsiness of the fence almost seems to  
22.    negate its presence]. 
23. UL:   And what is the (.) w/uh, the reason why you put this:: up here? 
24. Mamakgowa:  Because they give=We know is not safe. 
25. UL:   Okay. 
26. Mamakgowa:  Yuh. They put the fence. They put the fence, because Number One is  
27.    not that safe, and then afterwards, LATER arou::::n:::d SEVEN, they  
28.    close the gate, ['cause the 
29. UL:   [Okay] 
30. Mamakgowa:  gate, they close then they key [Mamakgowa pointing to the gate that  
31.    stands ajar but nevertheless is fitted with a padlock] 
32. UL:   Does it HELP to put the fence up? 
33. Mamakgowa:  NO ONE for help them.  
34. UL:   They don’t climb the fence?  
35. Mamakgowa:  No. 
36. UL:   Okay, um (2.0) SO (.) so you’re saying in this little community,  
37.    It feels safe because you], you cut (.) [o f f t h e s p a c e. 
38. Mamakgowa:  Yuh, you cut a fence] 
39. UL:   But/but OUT the:::re 
40. Mamakgowa:  Mm NO ONE come inside here. 
 
Mamakgowa’s account resonates anxiety and fear. Safety (line 1) is linguistically performed 
in various ways (e.g., ‘save’ [line 1], ‘protect’ [line 15]) throughout the exchange. Moreover, 
this discursive performance is also spatial and material (lines 7, 17, 29) to Mamakgowa 
“show[ing]” me (line 5) the actual “fence” and “the gate”. The explicit correspondence between 
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the linguistic and the concrete markers lends veracity to Mamakgowa’s reasoning but also 
makes realistic the anxieties that have motivated the structures in the first place. Again, this 
is not to undermine the perceptions/experiences of crime and the anxieties they elicit. Rather, 
it is to show how Mamakgowa’s ‘lived reality’. Ext. 1 is constructed through language and 
grounded as a tangible practice (Durrheim & Dixon, 2005). Through linguistic-spatial practices, 
she demarcates a home space within a neighbourhood perceived as unhomely and 
uninhabitable. The cordoned-off area circumscribes the neighbourly values of mutual care and 
respect for “people” and “the child” (line 2). Mamakgowa not only expresses dis-identification 
with Ext. 1 (‘this place is not all right’; Extract 7) but with the ‘The Township’ in its entirety (‘I’m 
tired of this place’; not quoted in extracts). Despite this, her material lack keeps her confined. 
She remains a fixture to ‘The Township’, having “NO CHOIC::E ‘cause I’ve got no nothing’ 
(see Extract 7). 
This extract offers an illustration of the spatializing effects of abjection. As a border anxiety, 
abjection secures a dividing line between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’ that is at once permeable and 
unstable (Mansfield, 2000). Fear and anxiety structure the accounts in different ways. 
Mamakgowa inscribes her subjectivity in spatial ways via the boundary fence she erects with 
her husband (line 15). Despite its rudimentary quality, this material structure seems to offer a 
sense of security (‘NO ONE come inside here’ [line 39]). The ‘NO ONE’ is the ‘stranger’ 
perpetually threatening to intrude. As Kristeva notes, this threat is pronounced  “where one is 
other to oneself, and in the recognition of the other as like” (Kinnvall, 2004, p. 753). 
7.5. Haunting Abjection 
For Kristeva (1982), the abject perpetually hovers on the fringes of subjectivity, despite the 
boundaries we set up to expel these unwanted aspects. This unfolding drama of subjectivity 
is perpetually in process. This defensive position is taken up to preserve the integrity of the 
self. However, the boundaries of a “clean and proper body” (p. 8) are perpetually threatened 
and defiled by that which threatens to flow across it: urine, blood, sweat, excrement, etc. How 
does abjection function in the text? How does it work to disrupt the imaginary fiction, eagerly 
held onto by the participants and myself as a sense-making narrative? How does it intrude – 
in a bodily sense – to unsettle us in ways that provoke anxiety, or evoke terror and fear? In 
the next section, I explore interruptions in the text. I highlight the ‘divided I’ (Rogers, 2007) 
where intrusions disturb to the ideal, coherent textual ‘sense’ of the narrative. In the following 
section, I explore these threats to subjectivity as bodily disturbances and discursive ruptures 
in the text. 
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7.5.1. Bodily disturbances  
Mmbatho is a resident of Tanganani. Relative to other extensions of ‘The Township’, 
Tanganani is an ‘upmarket’ housing section with full access to municipal services (Cross, 
2014). As a formalised residential zone, the homes here can qualify for bank finance. Mmbatho 
positions Tanganani as “a suburb, because HERE in Tanganani we paying water, we p/paying 
the electricity”. In Extract 8 below, she recounts a visit to a friend who resides in Ext. 1. 
Extract 8: Sit-down interview with Mmbatho at her parents’ home in Tanganani 
1. Mmbatho:  Mm lot of people, they used to (.) look at me. 'This lady, where she's  
2.    coming from?', they ask my friend. 'No, she's coming from Tanganani.'  
3.    'WHAT she want here?'. 'No, she VISIT.' 'Oh (1.0) thank you.' /…/ Mm  
4.    ((smacking lips)). If you can go there, they see the DIFFERENT. They  
5.    DIFFERENT mm. They will COME and as::k, 'what (.) what's your  
6.    name? Where you come from?' But there's, they will you, 'oh, we can  
7.    SEE.’ Like I was visit that lady, my friend last week=Check the  
8.    mosquitoes [pointing to her arm], BECAUSE OF THE WATER ON THE  
9.    STREET. 
10.  UL:   Mm. 
11. Mmbatho:  Because we was sitting outside mm talk (1.0). When I wake up in the  
12.    morning, I  said, 'WHAT IS THIS?'. I said, 'oh, is the mosquitoes  
13.    because of:: (.) the water. 
14. UL:    So you mean even GOING THERE, you feel your body reacts (.) in a  
15.    different way. 
16. Mmbatho:   NO, the time I/I/I left here go there, 
17. UL:   Mm. 
18. Mmbatho:   I was OKAY, but the time we s::itting here that day I WAS, you see  
19.    ((rubbing arm)). But I DON'T notice. I think maybe ((rubbing arm)) those  
20.    mosquitoes they bite me. 
21. UL:   Mm. 
22. Mmbatho:  hh hh You see hh hh. Yeh hh hh hh 
In the extract, Mmbatho positions herself a lady from Tanganani (line 2). The visual register is 
deployed effectively to reinforce difference that discerned through a mode looking. For 
example, this is introduced in line 1 when Mmbatho remarks: “Mm lot of people; they used to 
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(.) look at me”. Mmbatho echoes a series of statements that reinforce visuality as a marker of 
difference: “They said, “they see the DIFFERENT” (line 4), ‘“‘oh, we can SEE” (line 6).  
Thus, Mmbatho circumscribes her subjectivity in the simultaneous repudiation of what she 
constitutes outside of herself; that is, her avowed identification as a lady of Tanganani (lines 
2-4).  The abject is the “unlivable” zone that constitutes the boundary wall of the subject. As 
Butler (1993, p. 3) notes, it is the “site of dreaded identification against which – and by virtue 
of which – the domain of the subject will circumscribe its own claim to autonomy and to life”. 
The abjected exterior, therefore, is the subject’s own “founding repudiation”. However, as 
Kristeva (1987) repeatedly affirms, subjectivity is never stabilised but is in perpetual process. 
That which is unconscious is never completely repressed but hovers at the margins of self-
definition. Here, as Mansfield (2000) suggests, “the subject is merely the hypothetical inside 
of an imagined container whose walls are permeable” (p. 81). The anxiety of the text, evident 
in the intrusions, is also registered in a gestural and bodily sense (lines 7-8, 17-18). The effect 
is a disruption of the specular mode of seeing-and-being seen that Mmbatho tries to hold onto 
as an imaginary frame for her lived experience. 
The visual register employed in talk offers the outlines of a carefully articulated subjectivity. 
Despite this, the ‘boundary walls’ are rendered permeable. Mmbatho’s visceral account 
reveals the contaminating effects of Ext. 1 on the body. The latter part of the extract (lines 7-
21) highlights the pollutants of Ext. 1 (‘THE WATER ON THE STREET’ [line 8-9]) onto her 
“clean and proper body” (Kristeva, 1982, p. viii). Here, Mmbatho recounting of her visit to “my 
friend last week” (line 6-7) is abruptly halted and intruded on a change of topic that draws 
attention to mosquito bites on her body (‘=Check the mosquitoes’ [lines 7-8]). Causally 
attributing this to “THE WATER ON THE STREET” (lines 7-8, 11-12), denoted a characteristic 
feature of Ext. 1 (see also Extract 6), Mmbatho recalls the moment of realisation upon 
awakening the following morning: “I said, ‘‘WHAT IS THIS?’’. I said, ‘‘oh, is the mosquitoes 
because of:: (.) the water” (lines 11-12). By Mmbatho’s account, the body that is seen as 
different (lines 1-6, 13-14) is the same body that becomes despoiled, pockmarked by “those 
mosquitoes [that] bite me” (line 19).  
Despite attempts to repel what is threatening, at least discursively, the dividing line between 
self and the ‘loathsome other’ is transgressed in bodily ways. This boundary-crossing is not 
immediately apparent. As Mmbatho notes: “But I ’DON’T notice” (lines 18). The after-effects 
of this ‘contamination’, however, are viscerally discerned on the level of the body (lines 11), 
as Mmbatho rubs her arms (lines 18, 19). These visible ‘symptoms’ highlight this border 
anxiety, and is alleviated by Mmbatho’s laughter (line 21). The body, showing evidence of 
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contamination (line 18-19) becomes interpellated through discourse, and thereby affirms the 
anxieties of ‘dirt and disease’ of Ext. 1 as a place stereotype. 
7.5.2. The return of the ‘oppressed’ 
However, might the above interpretation I offer evince an imaginary construction (Parker, 
2005) of being lured into the same narrative imaginary jointly constructed with the 
participants? Below, I highlight the surprise openings of the unconscious that intrude this 
narrative order and disturb the ‘sanitised’ script that we co-construct and hold onto to make 
sense of the happenings in ‘The Township’. I draw on two extracts to explicate these intrusions 
in a bodily and discursive sense. The first takes place with Khuras on our entry into Ext. 1 on 
a Sunday morning. On this go-along, I accompany Khuras along a busy street where his 
former shack is positioned along the narrow alley opposite a tavern where music is blaring.  
Extract 9: Go-along with Khuras to Ext. 1 
1. Khuras:  Yah it seems like I’m DIFFERENT, you know, I’m different with these  
2.    people. LIKE because now I'M SOMEBODY ELSE. I’m no longer the  
3.    person that they know for befor:::e (.) you see. 
4. UL:   Yes. 
5. Khuras:  Yah AND MYSELF, I'll/I take/I tell myself I’m DIFFERENT to them, you  
6.    know. [We are now further down the alley. We walk carefully to avoid  
7.    the stream of water that marks our path, which from the emanating  
8.    stench, reveals it to sewerage run off. The alley is becoming narrower  
9.    and as we are walking through, it is getting noticeably busier].  
10. Khuras:  Yuh different=[A male passerby approaches and interrupts us] 
11. Man 1:   Hu::ll::o:: 
12. UL:   How are you? Yes [I return the greeting but I'm turn my attention to  
13.    Khuras immediately as I'm not feeling comfortable engaging. We are  
14.    approaching what seems like a tavern] 
15. Khuras:  Yuh. 
16. Man 2:   HEY MORNING. 
17. Khuras:  So= 
18. Man 2:   MORNING. 
19. Khuras:  So:: but yah ((man hollering in the distance)) ah we are busy man  
20.    [speaking to the man who is approaching us quickly. The man  
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21.    acknowledges and steps back] 
22. Man 3:   I am bu:::sy no:::w (mimicking Khuras in a sing-song jeering manner).  
23.    [Clearly we are being taunted. I'm feeling uncomfortable. I'm also  
24.    sensing Khuras' discomfort and we both focus on our own agenda and  
25.    ignore the taunts]. 
26. Khuras:  All right. So um= Because (.) you know] when I was staying HERE (.)  
27.    THINGS were not easy for me, and then now, THE LIFE THAT I'M  
28.    LIVING NOW, 
29. UL:   Yes. 
30. Khuras:  is mu::ch (.) DIFFERENT with them, because (.) I can do::  
31.    EVERYTHING. I can get access to internet. I can::: DO WHATEVER  
32.    anything that can::=I can/I can re/LIKE, to reach MY GOALS, TO LIVE  
33.    THE LIFE THAT that I was looking for for a long time. But (.) WHEN I  
34.    COME THIS SIDE, 
35. UL:   Yah. ((music blaring loudly from the tavern)) 
36. Khuras:  seems like (.) I’m going to a place where I was FEELING uncomfortable,  
37.    when were like (.) sitting here with what we have been sitting,  
38.    something that, NOW I'M GOING BACK to that LIFE, and this means I  
39.    was, I was desperate. 
 
As in previous extracts, “difference” (repeatedly affirmed in lines 1, 5, 30) as an interpretive 
repertoire pervades this account to structure the fantasmatic construction. Khuras insists on 
his difference from “these people” (line 1-2), in effect articulating the boundaries of his 
subjectivity as “SOMEBODY ELSE” (line 2). The temporal dimension is apparent in Khuras’ 
becoming, suggestive of who he is “now” (line 2) as markedly removed from the “person that 
they know for befor:::e” (line 3). Ext. 1, for Khuras, functions as “that site of dreaded 
identification” against which he circumscribes his “own claim to autonomy and to life” (Butler, 
1993, p. 3). Through temporal (‘now’ [line 2, 27, 37], ‘befor:::e [line 3]) and spatial (‘HERE’ 
[line 26], ‘THIS SIDE’ [line 33], ‘here’ [line 36]) deictic references, Khuras highlights the points 
of contrast. The past is associated with survival (‘this means I was, I was desperate’ [line 37-
8]). By contrast, the present (‘THE LIFE THAT I’M LIVING NOW’ [lines 27-28]) is defined by 
freedom and self-determination (‘I can do:: EVERYTHING’ [line 30], ‘I can do WHATEVER 
anything’ [line 31]). The present-centred freedoms instigate a forward-looking orientation to 
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life that transcends a survivalist mode of existence. As Khuras remarks, “I can/I can re/LIKE, 
to reach my GOALS, TO LIVE THE LIFE THAT that I was looking for for a long time’ (line 32-
3). However, the past perpetually haunts the present. Khuras’ return to Ext. 1 (‘but WHEN I 
COME THIS SIDE’ [line 33)] evokes the anxiety of having to relive the life he wanted to leave 
behind (‘NOW I’M GOING BACK to that LIFE’ [line 37]). This reliving, spatially and affectively, 
reminds him of “GOING BACK” (line 37) to “a place where I was FEELING uncomfortable” 
(line 35). This discomfort is palpable. The young men sitting on makeshift chairs made of beer 
crates in front of the tavern serves as a visual reminder of the placidity of “sitting here” (line 
36). This sense of being objectified and lifeless contrasts with the autonomy and freedoms 
attached to living in Ext. 6.  
However “FEELING uncomfortable” (line 35) is not confined to memory. Might this feeling 
state also resonate with the unfolding present, relate to Khuras’ (as well as my own) increasing 
discomfort being in Ext. 1? By my account, something is disquieting about this zone of ‘The 
Township’ in particular. My field notes make salient the material aspects of Ext. 1 – the “the 
stream of water” (line 7), “the emanating stench (line 7) and the narrowing alley (line 8). “Fluid 
and unkempt” (McClintock, 2013, p. 71) might aptly describe these visceral experiences that 
evoke bodily discomfort. However, these visible markers are not unique to Ext. 1. They are 
encountered frequently on my go-alongs with participants outside of this zone.  
Might the discomfort, as viscerally experienced and bodily sensed, set the scene for 
anticipating further interactions with the place and people along similar lines (line 16)? Or, 
might this anxiety stem from the participants’ forewarnings of Ext. 1? Could these discomforts 
relate to stereotypes we hold about townships in general, depicted in dreaded connotations of 
criminality, stench, and disease (Sapire, 1991, as cited in Saff, 2001)? Alternatively, might 
these discomforts be typical of any encounter that pushes us beyond the limits of familiarity? 
Perhaps, the co-constructed encounters between Khuras and myself are mere regurgitations 
of widely circulated meanings about ‘The Township’. Irrespective of their origins, what seems 
to be functioning powerfully here is abjection as an ideological operation (Hook, 2005), in 
which both Khuras and I draw on to support the fantasmatic frame. The discomfort is conveyed 
through speech (‘I’m not feeling comfortable’ [line 13], ‘I was FEELING uncomfortable [line 
35]), but also affectively sensed (‘I’m also sensing Khuras’ discomfort’ [line 23-4] and viscerally 
registered on the body (‘emanating stench’ [line 7]). Conjointly, they evoke disgust, fear and 
horror. As illustrated in the extract, they serve to justify separation, distinction and exclusion 
of certain bodies. 
As evidenced in the extract, we anxiously hold onto this narrative imaginary of township living. 
We repeatedly draw on interpretive repertoires of ‘difference’ to anchor this narrative. Despite 
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this, it becomes ruptured, and in effect, it displaces us. Throughout Extract 9, our attempts to 
engage in a fruitful discussion about the place of Ext. 1 is intrusively disrupted at various 
intervals by patrons of the tavern who vie for our attention (see lines 16, 18, 23). While my 
response is one of half-hearted greeting (‘how are you’ [line 12]) at one point, and dismissal 
at other instances (line 24-5), Khuras’ efforts to limit further engagement are deliberate (‘ah 
we are busy man’ [line 18]). The appeal to busyness pushes our “agenda” (line 27) to the 
forefront. It separates our ‘serious business’ from the disrupting entertainments of tavern life. 
The jarring of bodies, spaces, and interactions, therefore constantly designate what is ‘out of 
place’. The taunts in our direction (lines 23-5) may be read as irruptions to the narrative and 
spatial imaginary in which Khuras and I are anxiously engaged. 
7.5.3. Ruptures ‘to understanding’: falling apart at the seams 
From a Lacanian stance, these irruptions into the text suggest that there is something left 
outside of symbolic survival. These eruptions of the Real threaten to interrupt our 
understanding or sense-making (Hoedemakers, 2010). As Extract 10 highlights, the narrative 
frame of ‘The Township’ is interrogated to the point of disruption, exposing a “tremulous 
subjectivity” (Hook, 2005, p.28). Despite efforts to secure a distinct, bounded self in these 
accounts, there is the perpetual threat of the ‘return of the repressed’. In ‘The Township’ 
accounts, anxiety looms as the “return of the oppressed” (Bhabba, 1983, p. 25) that threatens 
to destabilise the borders of subjectivity. In Extract 5, I highlighted how colonial/apartheid 
inscriptions inform hierarchical relations between Madala and myself. The encounter below 
suggests a reversal of this encounter. In its awkwardness, it marks an interesting overturn of 
the hierarchical order of relations of power. 
Extract 10: Continuing go-along with Khuras as we venture further into the heart of Ext. 1 
1. [We have paused in our tracks with the tavern standing several metres from us, as if  
2. walking further into the narrow alley seems inappropriate. We are standing in full view  
3. of the men sitting on beer crates, eyes glazed over. Music is blaring. I’m feeling very  
4. uncomfortable. I feel their stares on us. I’m feeling especially conspicuous and  
5. vulnerable as a heavily pregnant woman standing outside the tavern. I am completely  
6. out of place here] 
7. UL:    Okay ((smacking lips)). So is there anything else you want to show me::  
8.     around here uh I suppose?  
9. Khuras:  Like what because= 
10. UL:    Okay that’s the end::? [pointing towards what seems like the end of the alley] 
11. Khuras:  Yuh bec/no it's still=The shacks is still go u::p 
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12. UL:    Okay. 
13. Khuras:  but there is/it’s a little bit SMA::LL:: river, 
14. UL:    Oh:::: 
15. Khuras:  and when it’s raining:: people just ??? 
16. UL:    Right right um ((smacking lips)) okay so maybe we can::: go back. 
17. [Khuras answers an incoming call, while an unkempt elderly man who is clearly  
18. inebriated staggers toward me, my heart pounding as he approaches. The smell  
19. of alcohol reeks on his breath as he speaks.  
20. Elderly man:  ((slurring speech)) But ho:::w:: much it should ??? Can I ask you  
21.    something? ((Khuras shouting into his phone)) What are you  
22.    responsible for this section? 
23. UL:   I’m not responsible at all=i/eh/I’m a STUDENT. 
24. Elderly man:  You’re a student? 
25. UL:   Yah. I’m just LEARNING. 
26. Elderly man:  Learning about the area? 
27. UL:   About the community ??? ((Khuras' shouting masks speech)) 
28. Elderly man:  Why/why, why can’t you GREET the people? [Suddenly, I'm feeling  
29.    accosted as the unwelcome stranger; feeling misread, vulnerable].  
30. UL:   We were greeting. 
31. Elderly man:  Are you sure? 
32. Khuras:  HEY MADALA, what do you want? [Khuras now off his phone and finally 
33.    intervening] 
34. Elderly man:  Uh I was actually (.) eh/u/u/un ??? today. Can I uh:: <<ask you  
35.    something?>> ((slurring speech) [still demanding answers at me]. 
36. UL:   Sure ((coins flipping on a nearby table where young men are ‘playing  
37.    dice’)) 
38. Elderly man:  Should I ask you something? What CHANGE are you expecting to::  
39.    CHANGE in ‘The Township’ eh maybe a better pla:::ce as a better  
40.    community? 
41. UL:   Well, I’m a student so we’re trying to UNDERSTAN::D the community  
42.    ((coins flipping)), do you understand? To understand (.)how people  
43.    live. [We are clearly intruding here, though I too am feeling harassed,  
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44.    intruded upon. This alley has become too narrow.I'm motioning to  
45.    Khuras that we leave]. 
46. Elderly man:  ((dice thrown on table)) Ah:: good and then YAH 
47. Khuras:  Okay, sharp, sharp ??? Go. 
 
Anxiety is pervasive in Extract 10, framed by my subtle suggestion to Khuras that we have 
exhausted our go-along into Ext. 1 (‘so is there anything else you want to show me:: around 
here uh I suppose? [lines 7-8], and my beckoning him towards an exit (‘okay so maybe we 
can::: go back’ [line 16]). Our departure, however, is intercepted by two simultaneous 
interruptions – Khuras’ incoming call (line 17) and the simultaneous appearance of the elderly 
man whom I identify as “clearly inebriated” (lines 17-18). My initial response to this unkempt 
figure registered viscerally as fear (‘my heart pounding’ [line 18] and disgust (‘the smell of 
alcohol reeks on his breath’ [line 18-19]). What is so disturbing about this man that elicits such 
a response in me? Could this be a build-up of discomforts alluded to in the preceding 
exchanges? Could the scenes of “men sitting on beer crates, eyes glazed over” (line 3), the 
blaring music from the tavern (line 3) and the young men gambling (line 37, 42, 46) contribute 
to the affective tone of the place? 
Perhaps the elderly man presents as a disturbing figure by virtue of his “unkempt” appearance 
(line 17), his body reeking of alcohol (line 19), his slurred speech (lines 20, 36), his staggering 
gait (line 18) and nonsensical line of questioning (‘But ho:::w:: much it should ???’ [line 20]). 
All of these work convincingly to render my account of him as a ‘drunkard’. Proverbially he 
‘comes apart at the seams’. His limited control over his comportment, his manner of speech, 
and inability to contain the smells from his breath – presented in my field notes (lines 17-19) 
– are aspects that violate the rules of propriety that govern a “clean and proper body” (Kristeva, 
1982, p. 71). Here, Kristeva (1987, p. 3) reminds that “the abject is always associated with 
some kind of death, inasmuch as it always evokes the primal fear of the ultimate dissolution 
of the ego, of that place ‘where I am not’”. From this perspective, perhaps it is the confrontation 
with such a horror that propels me to conclude that “I am completely out of place here” (line 
6). Moreover, there seems to be a shared sentiment between myself and Khuras in response 
to this threatening figure, evoking a confrontation (‘HEY MADALA, what do you want?’ [line 
33] and blatant dismissal: “go” [line 47]).  The irony of this injunction lies in our status as visitors 
to Ext. 1. Hook (2005, p. 685) suggests that abjection as ‘border anxiety’, is an “urgent 
response” that arises in efforts to secure oneself as separate from a “potentially overwhelming 
or contaminating external quality or entity”. 
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However, it is also our conjoined and confusing presence in this space that flouts the system 
of order, the ‘rules’ and ‘codes of behaviour’ that govern interaction here. I/We are positioned, 
but we also position ourselves as removed and unengaged (Extract 9, lines 23-5). Instead of 
interacting with the tavern patrons, we attend to the more ‘important’ matters that keep us 
wrapped up in our busyness (‘ah we are busy man’ [Extract 9, line 19]). Khuras and I conjointly 
construct a narrative of Ext. 1 as disorderly and disquieting. Ironically, our joint presence, as 
a “heavily pregnant” [line 5] Asian woman accompanied by an English-speaking  Black man, 
is troubling5. Our engagements in ‘serious busyness’ disrupts the spontaneity of the tavern 
scene of Ext. 1, where “blaring music”, gambling and intoxication are the order of the day. In 
this respect, it is we who present as the anomaly. Moreover, we are called out by the elderly 
man as dismissive observers who show little effort in engaging with the locals (‘Why/why, why 
can’t you GREET the people?’ [Extract 10, line 29]).  
However, even this distantiated sense-making – namely the lens of abjection as an informative 
resource – in itself situates the researcher outside the frame. What remains unexplained is 
the residue of awkward affect, revealing something of ambivalence related to ‘privileged guilt’ 
possibly? Perhaps in resorting to a ‘student’ façade, I escape the accountability that comes 
with performing “WHITE[ness] (see Extract 5) in a socially and materially impoverished 
community. My defensive response is telling (‘I’m not responsible at all’ [line 24]). In my urgent 
scrambling for a positioning (‘i/eh/I’m a student’ [line 24], ‘I’m just LEARNING’ [line 26]), I 
attempt to escape the burden of responsibility that comes with walking as an ‘outsider’ in the 
township. Although my retort eventually appeases the elderly man (‘ah:: good and then YAH 
[line 46]), I nevertheless fail to escape accountability. The exchange conveys the clear 
message: the visitor to an impoverished community cannot merely stand by as the passive 
observer. As the holder of privilege and power, s/he must be responsible for “CHANGE” (line 
39). This overturn is an effective one. My attempts to recover, to find a sure footing from the 
“place of the abject” towards a “place where ‘I am’” is rendered futile (Creed, 1993, p. 46). By 
implication, as the researcher, I am rendered abject by the ‘drunkard man’. 
How might we ‘make sense’ of these disruptions, as possibly surprise openings of the 
unconscious “which disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place” (Parker, 2015b, p.  
250)? Here, the motives of the researcher seemingly “trying to understand” (Extract 10: 41) is 
exposed as exploitative – not unlike the colonial ‘White’ other whose seeming benevolence 
masks a much more insidious intent. In this respect, the older man’s intrusions (in a bodily 
and discursive sense) subverts this hierarchical ordering of human relations. It undercuts the 
 
5 In an earlier exchange (not reproduced here), Khuras is taunted by the locals who he had known 
previously for conversing with them in English as opposed to the local vernacular. 
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narrative frame we uphold of ‘The Township’ and Ext. 1. At the same time, it also challenges 
my framing (‘to understand’) of this encounter (repeated in lines 41, 42).  Retrospectively 
‘making sense’ and ‘disrupting sense’ of these texts can further function as statements of 
confession, justification or defence. On my part, I am left to ponder the implications for ‘be – 
longing’ and researching belonging.  
The fantasy of ‘fear and horror’ that we so frantically hold onto (as participants and researcher) 
seems to restore cohesion or meaning to a place where meaning has collapsed (Kristeva, 
1982). However, as a narrative shield, it stands in the way of ‘be – longing’ or allowing the 
‘other’ a place in belonging. However, to hold only to this interpretation risks overlooking the 
role that jouissance (pleasure-pain) plays out in research interactions. As the researcher, I 
adorn a façade that disguises my struggles to belong, all the more prominent with the 
participants whose social positioning is so removed from my own. As we straddle anxiously 
between belongings, we find ‘mutuality’ through the ‘White’ gaze, which offers a familiar way 
of relating and seeing others. In effect, we jointly rehash a familiar narrative of township life 
premised on criminality, stench and disease. Although we are conjoined in belonging;  at the 
same time, we hierarchically and ‘racially’ locked into repeating asymmetrical relations.  
Abjection here seems to resonate not only as a psychical or bodily response but co-extends 
with the socio-symbolic order. Here, McClintock (2013, p. 72) observes that abjection is a 
liminal state that “hovers on the threshold of the body and body politic”. Moreover, what abject, 
therefore, takes on different shape and form as determined by the rules, strictures, 
prohibitions, values and ideals of a given society (Kristeva, 1982). In this respect, Hook (2005) 
emphasises the expulsive act of abjection as an ideological operation that is not only 
affectively registered as disgust, horror or fear but is evinced in actions that expel, separate, 
or exclude oneself from the other. Inscriptions of dirt, disease and disorder may be 
conveniently employed to foster exclusion and hatred in the service of ideology (Hook, 2004). 
The preceding extracts reveal this boundary work in discursive acts and bodily gestures that 
Khuras and I perform that signal dismissal: ‘Go’ (Extract 10: 47) and separation (Extract 9: 24-
5]). Each of these expulsive acts, as Hook (2005) observes, is an attempt to restore, 
ambitiously so, the perceived threats to wholeness. As, as McClintock (2013, p. 72) points 
out, while “the abject is everything that the subject seeks to expunge in order to become social; 
it is also a symptom of the failure of this ambition”. It is the disturbance of a system of law, 
order, truth and meaning that fails to respect “borders, positions, rules” that Kristeva (1987, p. 
85) speaks of abjection, the very ambivalence that brings confusion, anxiety and distress. 
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7.6. Desiring a Unified Body 
Abjection as an ideological operation seems to function as the constitutive underside of desire. 
Rather than separate processes, they jointly constitute the performances of belonging. Thus, 
in desiring, longing, loathing, and repudiating the ‘other’, we define the boundaries of our 
subjectivity. Consequently, the hierarchical relation is produced premised on the 
sociosymbolic co-ordinates that insofar as they teach us how to desire (Žižek, 2008) also 
teach us how to loathe. If ‘surviving bodies’ are demonstrably more whole than dead, 
decaying, wounded bodies or bodies falling apart, then what is desired is a whole body. As 
the analysis has shown, blackness is repudiated as ‘bodies-in-pieces’ (Hook, 2013) or bodies 
without identity (having ‘no fingerprints’, ‘no identity document’ [Mlandy, Khuras], as 
constructions of the ‘criminal foreigner’. So far, ‘Whiteness’ is shown to possess a ‘rescuing’ 
power central to narratives of ‘poverty and need’ (see Extracts 5 & 10). However, its structuring 
power is ‘felt’, embodied and spoken in silent ways. 
Extract 11: Sit-down interview with Khuras at a nearby KFC located outside ‘The Township’ 
1. Here in ‘The Township’ I’m not like feeling:: like I can stay there for the rest of my  
2. LIFE. I need changes also from there (.) so that I can stay maybe stay around  
3. Fourways or Lonehills WHERE NOW I CAN say that THIS IS MY HOUSE  
4. and then I’m going to live here for (.) the rest of my life with my family. 
Khuras here points to the predominantly White suburbs of “Fourways or Lonehills [sic]” as the 
rewarding culmination of a life lived (‘to live here for (.) the rest of my life with my life with my 
family’) (line 4). Home, specifically in the northern suburbs, functions symbolically in this 
respect as a marker of identity that designates his arrival (‘WHERE NOW I CAN say that THIS 
IS MY HOUSE’ [line 3]. To “live” (line 4) and to have “life” (line 4) is associated with “Fourways 
or Lonehills”. By contrast, ‘The Township’, lacks life or the feeling of life (‘I’m not feeling:: like 
I can stay there for the rest of my LIFE’ [lines 1-2]). In a metaphorical sense, home seems to 
stand in for a fantasy of Whiteness, despite it masquerading as the signifier of being. 
Mamakgowa, who lives in Ext 1, repeatedly affirms her struggles (‘I’m suffering’ [not in quoted 
extracts]) and holds out for her RDP home, which she claims is currently being built in the 
Fourways area (‘they building the house there that side’ [not in quoted extracts]). Mamakgowa 
holds up Fourways as the promise of the ‘good life’ to redeem her from the drudgery of ‘The 
Township’: “I’m tired of this place. I’m tired”. 
Extract 12: Sit-down interview with Mamakgowa on bench located on the premises of a 
community NPO 
1. Yah I like Four, FourWAYS because I (.) the townhouse neh (2.0) no/no/no/no shelters,  
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2. neh? Nothing shelters, tin house, and then:: the security is/is guarding there and  
3. everything, you see /…/ There, happy, and there fresh air everything, you see. No noise.  
4. If noise, maybe from people who go to the bar ((clicking fingers)). They are dancing. It's  
5. too much happy, at least. Not here. If they happy, everybody say, 'no, wait, wait.' They  
6. fight. Ah, no man. It's not happy 'cause there's too much=‘Oh, this one they killed  
7. somebody,’ you see. Maybe otherwise, if you stay here, you see, people they stay here  
8. is dying, you see. No, is not alright. 
 
As the imagined emblem of wholeness, ‘The Township’ fails to provide a solid grounding for 
home (‘tin house’ [line 2]), and safety that a “townhouse” (line 1) in “FourWAYS” (line 1) offers 
(‘the security is/is guarding there’ [lines 2-3]). Moreover, what Fourways promises, by 
Mamakgowa’s account, is abundant happiness (‘happy’ [line 3], ‘it’s too much happy’ [5]) as 
an authentic and unadulterated state of being, such which [The Township’] denies. What is 
momentarily enjoyed as happiness in ‘The Township’ turns over into conflict (‘not here. If they 
happy, everybody say, ‘no, wait, wait.’ They fight [line 6]), and ultimately death (‘they killed 
somebody’ [lines 6-7]). For Mamakgowa, “dying” (line 8) eclipses happiness as the condition 
for the “people [that] … stay here” (line 7). This account resonates with a Fanonian account 
of the black subject whose existential predicament as one survival, and of lacking “the will to 
live” (Sithole, 2016, p. 25). Symbolically, Mamakgowa’s need to break away from ‘The 
Township’ seems to be simultaneously a search “to break away from survival and to move 
toward the existential condition of having the will to live” (Sithole, 2016, p. 25). 
 
7.6.1. Desire and abjection in jouissance  
The ‘good life’ is not simply the material construction of home in the suburbs as a point of 
contrast against what is lacking in ‘The Township’. Like Mamakgowa’s account, Madala offers 
a juxtaposition of Black and White worlds as lived through Madala as a Black raced subject. 
 
Extract 13: Sit-down interview with Madala on bench at a community centre 
1. Madala:  I was enjoy to::: to Randpark Ridge, when I was staying in Randpark  
2.    Ridge I was doing a painting, and then (2.0) my jobs it was always there  
3.    by Randpark Ridge for five years. 
4. UL:   Mm. 
5. Madala:  So:: I was walking ALL AROUND the/the/the AREA, not going out by  
6.    the/wi/with the taxi travelling and .hh maybe GETTING eh problems like  
7.    eh::: you hear a BAD NEWS, ‘eh  (.) some eh w/we saw someone is  
8.    STABBING eh/eh/eh there by the street somebod/some/somebody's  
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9.    ROBBED, somebody’s car is GONE’ (.) like there/there/there is no::  
10.    that/that/that things there by:: ((smacking lips)) by the suburbs=You/you  
11.    just=The problem is (1.0) you just see §the White people here§, is, you  
12.    don’t see most of the:: most of eh/eh Black peoples (1.0). So:: (2.0) you::  
13.    (.) you LEARN A LOT. 
14. UL:   Mm. 
15. Madala:  When you stay with the/with the/with the eh White peoples, in one place  
16.    (.) long time (.) you LEARN MANY THINGS. You LEARN HOW TO, to  
17.    treat peoples, you LEARN HOW TO talk to peoples, you LEARN how to  
18.    (.) TRAVEL, you l/learn, you LEARN HOW TO, to do THINGS, h/how to  
19.    WORK, HOW TO=EVERYTHING you LEARN. Even (.) they/they/they  
20.    teach you eh MANY THINGS /…/ I was not knowing how to use the  
21.    computer, but there by Randpark Ridge, they teach me how to, how to  
22.    use the computer. I said ‘ah, I’m enjoying now.’ 
 
Where the Black world is eclipsed by “BAD NEWS” (line 7) about “someone STABBING … 
there by the street” (lines 7-8), “somebod/some/somebody’s [being] ROBBED” (line 8-9) and 
“somebody’s car [that] is GONE” (line 9), the White “suburbs” (line 10) secures a peaceful 
existence where “there/there/there is no:: that/that/that things there” (lines 9-10). What might 
such a construction of a superior white world serve for Madala (as well as the other ‘Township’ 
participants)?  
 
Seshadri-Crooks (2000) argues that our investment in racial identity is secured through race 
as a “regime of visibility” (p. 21). Moreover, this investment is made because ‘Whiteness’, the 
unconscious signifier of being that inscribes the logic of racial difference, offers the promise 
of wholeness. In other words, it promises “access to being itself … the prestige of being better 
and superior … the promise of being more human, more full, less lacking” (Seshadri-Crooks, 
2000, p. 7). More precisely, it is at the heart of ‘race’ that this possibility for enjoyment lies. 
Employing this line of thinking to the extract draws attention to the modes of enjoyment (‘I was 
to enjoy’ [line 1]; ‘I’m enjoying now’ [line 22) which frames Madala’s account. Madala here is 
raced in his subjection to the signifier of Whiteness (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Enjoyment here 
is tied up in the fantasy of wholeness that he ascribes to the “suburbs” (line 10), here Randpark 
Ridge, where “you just see §the White peoples here§” (line 11). The pleasure ascribed to 
“stay[ing] with the/with the/with the eh White peoples” (line 15) is highlighted by Madala in 
“LEARN[ING] MANY THINGS” (line 16), including “how to treat peoples” (line 16-17), “HOW 
TO talk to peoples” (line 17), “how to (.) TRAVEL” (line 18), “HOW TO, to do THINGS” (line 
18), “h/how to WORK” (line 18-19), “how to use the computer” (line 21-22) and “HOW 
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TO=EVERYTHING” (line 23). More critically, through the regimes of learning (lines 13, 16, 17, 
18, 19) or of being taught (line 21), Madala becomes the disciplined, knowable subject (line 
20-22). The beatific scene of fantasy here seems to fill the lack, offering a meaningful reality 
outside of the horror of arbitrary “STABBING[S]” (line 8) and robberies (line 9) in ‘The 
Township’.  
 
However, the possibility of enjoyment or jouissance also yields to unpleasure, “the opposite 
pole of desire” (Braunstein, 2003, p. 102). Here Seshadri-Crooks (2000) argues that while 
Whiteness offers the possibility of enjoyment, it also entails the “annihilation of difference” (p. 
7). Whiteness, as the “fraudulent signifier” of illusory wholeness, while promises 
“EVERYTHING” (line 19), also “disavows its symbolic origins” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 21). 
Whiteness, to preserve its enigmatic status and function is predicated on the eradication of 
difference. In other words, it must exclude the other so that the fantasy of enjoyment is 
maintained. Thus, despite Madala’s “enjoying” (lines 1, 22), “the problem” (line 11) in living in 
the suburbs “is [that] you just see §the White peoples here§, is, you don’t see most of the:: 
most of eh/eh Black peoples” (lines 11-12). Here, Madala as the raced subject is 
simultaneously subsumed, eclipsed in the enjoyments of Whiteness and yet in so doing, risks 
alienation from Blackness that is excluded.  
 
However, such enjoyments are not particular to this account but seem to structure our co-
constructed meanings and performativities of belonging in ‘The Township’. As highlighted in 
the texts, our place in the cultural symbolic is informed an optic of belonging; how we appear 
to others and how others look to us. In effect, it designates “some bodies as more powerful, 
more valuable and more meaningful than others” (Winnubst, 2004, p. 26). However, these 
enactments are not limited to meaning-making. The disjuncture between white and black 
worlds is a collective enactment informed and enacted through the dynamics of the Lacanian 
mirror, which is essentially a ‘white mirror’ (Oliver, 2014; Winnubst, 2004). While the white 
man beholds his image as unified, for the black man, what is reflected back is a reversal of 
this image – not a whole body, but a “body … given back to me, sprawled out. Distorted, 
recolored, clad in mourning …” (Fanon, 1986, p. 114). 
 
These extracts may be read with the Fanonian question in mind: ‘What is it that the Black man 
wants?’ Fanon’s (1967) response is that “the black man wants to be white” (p. 3). As Hook 
(2012) observes, it is to aspire to a level of humanity that is signified by whiteness. For each 
of the participants, situated differentially in various spaces of ‘The Township’, a house in the 
suburbs symbolises the dream, wish or ideal of whiteness the master signifier of full 
humanness or “access to being itself” (Seshadri-Cooks, 2000, p. 7). The desire for whiteness 
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is not consciously considered but rather exists as an unconscious wish, a “fantasmatic urge” 
that underpins the strivings of the colonised to mimic what is white (p. 134). Colonial relations 
instigated the Black man as the ‘real Other’ of the white man. In the post-apartheid/post-
colonial context, a new hierarchy of belonging is instigated (Back et al., 2012). Blackness is 
the Other of the Black man whose ideal of whiteness is internally inscribed (Fanon,1967). 
Blackness, in some respects, seems to be repudiated and symbolically reconfigured in the 
figure of the African foreigner. However, as Seshadri-Cooks (2000) proposes, Whiteness is 
itself fraudulent. It positions itself as a signifier of humanness that cannot be signified. The 
Lacanian point here is that the sociosymbolic order on which Whiteness premised is itself 
lacking and fragmented.  
 
For Fanon, the black man does not only arrive in a pre-existing world of meaning. His struggle 
is that of “arriving too late into a white world” (Oliver, 2014, p. 16). The meaning that predates 
his arrival leans on a white man’s construction of what it means to be ‘fully human’. Given this 
predefined world of meaning, the black man cannot create the white man as his Other to 
constitute his positive identity. Rather, what becomes Other for the black man is Blackness. 
Fanon (1967) emphasises here that the black man is doubly alienated – fundamentally 
alienated as a subject but further alienated from productions of his own meaning (Oliver, 
2014). The effect of this ‘double lack’ is a displacement (temporally, spatially, socially, 
psychology) by an ontology of a white social order: 
‘You come too late, much too late. There will always be a world – a white world –
between you and us … 
 
7.7. Conclusion: Arriving Too Late  
In this chapter, I explored the everyday doings of making home for ‘The Township’ participants, 
which were structured simultaneously in narratives of ‘survival’ and ‘fear and horror’. I argued 
that these co-constructed embodied narratives perform a function of circumscribing a 
subjectivity that accords with desired belongings. In the narratives, these were evidenced in 
distinctions between ‘surviving bodies’ and ‘dead’ or ‘decaying’ bodies, and further distinctions 
from the ‘foreigner’ figure who is seen to enact violence on bodies. These co-constructed and 
embodied narratives seem to be evince a struggle to belong in a space created and sustained 
by historical structural violence that constrains the possibility of ever belonging in a post-
apartheid and post-colonial world (Rowe, 2005). Brah (1996) aptly refers to home as a ‘moving 
signifier’. It signals the yearning for home; at the same time, an impossible arrival. In the data, 
the body not ‘at home’ in ‘The Township’ was depicted as the ‘surviving body’ straining against 
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the elements of crime, lack and deprivation. In so doing, it escapes the category of the ‘dead 
body’ that belongs to the abject place of Ext. 1.  
If horror is the dominant fantasmatic frame through which we libidinally invest (through disgust 
and fear), what could be the more horrifying reality it covers over? In this way, both desire and 
abjection are constitutive processes that supplement our investments to the symbolic order. 
They are the “transgressive underside that evokes our secret enjoyment” (Martin, 2015, p. 
15).  Our ideological attachments cover over the lack in the social order and subjectivity itself 
(Glynos, 2001). In line with this reasoning, for historically abjected black body in these 
accounts, might it conceal a ‘double lack’? Through a Fanonian lens, the othered subject is 
not only confronted with a fundamental lack that is at the heart of human subjectivity, but also 
a debilitating alienation of racial oppression. The latter relates to an alienation full humanness 
signified, albeit fraudulently, by whiteness (Oliver, 2004; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). The findings 
point to the impossibility of home not merely as a material construction, but its symbolic 
representation (Rus, 2006). The desire for home rests on an “uneven becoming” (Rowe, 2005) 
due to the social asymmetries that structure projects of belonging. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
“We need a constructive imagination to help us create the fictive world of our dreams, of 
dreams worth struggling for” (Friedmann, 2002, as cited in Gunder, 2005, p. 174). 
 
8.1. Purpose and Findings 
In this research, I explored the question of home in post-apartheid Johannesburg. Of interest 
was how and why asymmetries of belonging are persistently reproduced and materialised in 
spaces of affluence and poverty. I focussed on the relationship between affect and narrative, 
the co-ordinates of desire, and their role in structuring our belongings. I argued that these 
performances of belonging are simultaneously relational, processual, embodied, discursive, 
material and spatial. From a ‘sense-making’ stance (Saville Young & Berry, 2016), the 
research aimed to understand the coherent story that informs practices of homemaking. An 
analysis of conversational exchanges between the participants and myself as the researcher 
highlighted ways in which we create, perform and navigate our social reality. From a stance 
of ‘disrupting sense’ (Saville Young & Berry, 2016), the research explored ruptures – both to 
the narrative imaginary and our lived bodily coherence – by attending to how our 
commonsense understandings and ways of being in our world are structured as ideological 
fantasy (Žižek, 2008). I argue that in our performativities of be – longing, we mask our very 
own alienation that is covered over with illusory wholeness in the precarious fantasy of home.  
 
The findings of the research highlight belonging as a continuous process that never reaches 
completion. Our seeming ‘arrival’ – where we conjoined to others in belonging, in a relational, 
social, affective or material sense is but momentary. Moreover, our belongings correspond to 
the shifting sets of social relations performed relative to others (Probyn, 1996) and patterned 
by our collective histories (Georgis, 2007). These moments of attunement and rupture are 
structured by affects of desire, anxiety, fear and abjection that keep us locked into the ‘power-
grip’ of ideology (Glynos, 2001). We not only participate in these everyday lived practices 
willingly. We also traumatically enjoy them (Žižek, 2006). Below, I elucidate these findings in 
response to the questions that guided the research: 
 
1. How do residents living in spaces of affluence and poverty respectively make meaning 
of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in an affective, discursive and bodily sense? 
 
The research focused on two data collection sites, the ‘Gated Community’ and the ‘Township’. 
The former comprised ‘The Golf Estate’, The Ravine’ and other smaller estates in the 
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neighbourhood. The latter consisted of mixed housing types, including shacks, RDP homes, 
and bonded homes. The idea of making home in a dangerous place is a common thread that 
runs across the ‘go-alongs’ and story interviews. The central organising principle is crime talk, 
a dominant narrative that offered residents ways of making material and discursive sense of 
their dangerous worlds. Participants across both sites did not experience crime directly. The 
‘Gated Community’ residents constructed crime as something ‘out there’; nevertheless, it 
exerted its reverberating effects.  In contrast, residents of the ‘Township’ site constructed 
violence and crime as an intrusive and pervasive everyday lived reality, physically designating 
places of danger (particularly Ext. One) within their ‘physical reach’.  
 
In terms of the former, ‘interpretive repertoires of ‘terror’, ‘safety’ and ‘freedom’ offered the 
threads of sense-making (Wetherell & Potter, 1988 as cited in Wetherell, 2012) and 
justification for exclusive gated living. Such tropes simultaneously positioned speakers as 
‘potential victims’ of crime, and ‘active citizens’ able to recreate home as a ‘paradisiacal 
enclave’ cordoned off from the ‘madness’ of violence, chaos and disorder.  Discourses of 
normality structured these accounts to differentiate privileged spaces from abject spaces of 
the ‘The Township’. ‘The Township’ residents offered embodied narratives, articulating 
variable constructions of the body.  The ‘survival’ repertoire was the organising narrative 
across residents’ accounts and served to articulate a subject positioning (‘surviving bodies’) 
distinct from bodies that are wounded, punctured, decaying or dead. Drawing on ‘crime talk’ 
as a discursive resource, ‘The Township’ residents presented themselves as near-victims of 
violence and crime, but also as bodies surviving material lack. 
 
2. What are the ‘affective co-ordinates’ of this narrative imaginary that structure it as 
ideological fantasy?  
 
Across both sites, narratives were structured as ideological fantasy. This hinged on two 
simultaneous plots: the beatific scenario (the ideal state of affairs, the promise of completion) 
and the horror (trauma) scenario (the obstacle to the fulfilment) (Žižek, 1997). Anxiety shifting 
into desire, as something constructed, resonated in participant accounts.  Rather than 
separate affects, both are constitutive of the other, in accord with Lacan’s (2014) view that 
anxiety is symptomatic of desire. However, there were clear contrasts in how desire was 
articulated and negotiated in the accounts. For ‘The Gated Community’ residents, anxiety was 
displaced to create the ‘object of fear’ (Ahmed, 2003), to derive the figure of ‘the criminal’ or 
the ‘squatter’. Similarly, for ‘The Township’, narratives of fear and horror coalesced to effect 
the place of abjection (Ext. 1), the ‘Reception Area’ for ‘outsiders’. While desire as lack and 
nostalgia resonated in narratives of gated residents, abjection as a discursive, bodily and 
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affective register predominated ‘The Township’ accounts. To affirm Žižek’s (1992, p. 76) point, 
the constructed fantasy (of paradise or abjection) functioned not to provide a point of escape 
from reality, but to offer the very social reality that makes it bearable. 
 
3. How do the affective co-ordinates of fantasy ‘grip’ us into ‘be – longing’ that (re)produce 
asymmetries relationally, socially, spatially and materially in ways we make home?  
 
The research highlighted belonging as constituted in both desire and fear as structuring affects 
negotiated through a fantasmatic transaction (Hook, 2000a; 2000c). The fantasmatic 
transaction is an address to the sociosymbolic Other, who we look to for direction, purpose, 
recognition and approval.  Through this vehicle of ‘transference communication’, we 
perpetually seek recognition from the Other – to desire what the Other desires, but also to turn 
ourselves into the object of desire (Bracher, 1993). The research illustrated that the 
fantasmatic transaction activated is not only in performances of speech but also through 
affects and bodily (dis)comforts. As speaking and listening subjects, we attend to 
communicated speech, discerning whether we identify or disidentify with the named 
characters in speech and the relations between them (Martin, 2015). In so doing, we transcend 
this intersubjective dimension, and (unconsciously) orientate ourselves to the gaze of the 
Other perpetually seeking to resolve our place in the socio-symbolic order (Hook, 2000a). 
 
The findings of the research highlighted how this transference communication at this 
transindividual level (Hook, 2008a; Martin, 2015; Žižek, 1994) helps us return chaos to 
meaning, disorder to order and abnormality to normality. However, our desire to be transferred 
to “the place of the Other” (Kristeva, 1982, p.37) is at the same time dependent on our 
repudiation of the abject – “the place that I am not” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 3).  As highlighted in 
the data, the call to ‘be – longing’ and our performances in response to this beckoning, 
conformed to a hierarchical pattern of collective relations. These were set against historically 
structured relations of racial oppression that inevitably produces unevenness in our strivings 
to belong. The privileged home (variously expressed by participants as the exclusive lifestyle 
estate, or the home in the suburbs) was constructed as the material accomplishment, a point 
of ‘arrival’ – epitomising freedom, safety, achievement. 
 
In contrast, homes in abject places were symbolised as dispossession, death and decay. The 
(unconscious) threads interweaving these metaphorical depictions pointed towards 
‘Whiteness’ as the invisible, fraudulent, and empty signifier of being (fullness, plenitude, 
completion), constituted and inflated by ‘blackness’ (lack, emptiness) as its founding 
repudiation (Butler, 1993; Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). Thus, we are gripped into ideological 
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projects of belonging (and not belonging) through affective strategies (desire, fear, disgust, 
etc.) evoked in speech that guides us as empty, desiring subjects seeking completion or 
fullness of being.  
 
As I highlighted in the analysis, our belongings are never stable and perpetually receding. This 
perpetual flux within the transferential dynamic was evident across exchanges with (even the 
same) participants, where we slip in-and-out of belongings with one another. These 
corresponded to moments alignment with wider ideological interpellations of the ‘big Other’, 
and moments of misalignment – for example, through confronting or being confronted by the 
‘small other’. ‘Whiteness’, a “fraudulent signifier” (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000, p. 21) of belonging, 
is beguiling not only to those who are ‘racially’, sociospatially, materially, and economically 
oppressed, but also to the ‘white’ participants in the research who occupy the ranks of material, 
social, and economic privilege.  The findings highlight this relational dimension of belonging 
that is at once inspiring and anxiety-provoking – being offered the promise of ‘be – longing’ 
but never its fulfilment. Thus, home as a project of belonging inasmuch, it invites moments of 
mutual recognition also provokes a profound sense of alienation. 
 
4. How do unexpected encounters (‘surprises’) in relational encounters with and between 
participants, the researcher and the community produce the ‘repressed’ in texts? How 
do these (unconscious) ‘ruptures’ disturb the narrative frame in ideological fantasy?  
 
The research highlighted several exchanges with participants where the coherence offered by 
the co-constructed narrative imaginary of crime talk was ‘intruded’. A Lacanian psychoanalytic 
reading of the texts attended to breakdowns in narrative form. These affective and ‘immediate’ 
ruptures were evident as ‘interruptions’ discernible in speech (noticeable pauses, laughter, 
increased volume, whispers, tremors, etc.). These seemed to signal something more beyond 
the spoken that “resists being known within, between and around subjects” (Saville Young & 
Frosh, 2018, p. 203).  From a Lacanian perspective, these interruptions signalled opposing 
voices of the divided subject. On one level, the ‘I’ seeks imaginary coherence, but this ideal 
narrative is undermined by the faltering ‘i’ (the real). These ruptures emerge as interruptions 
to coherent speech (Rogers, 2007). From a Kristevan (1987, p. viii) stance, these interruptions 
signal instances of a troubled subjectivity, where the abject hovers on the margins of the “clean 
and proper body” perpetually threatening to destabilise identity, order and borders. Instances 
of rupture in the data signalled ideological ‘fault lines’. Here, reasonings, explanations and 
justifications in crime talk no longer buttressed a view of paradise (serenity, order, safety, 
beauty). The coherent narrative was surreptitiously and (unconsciously) undermined by 
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ruptures in the text. These were evidenced as revisions, negations, and diversions (Rogers, 
2007), which served to silence antagonisms or inconsistencies (Daly, 1999).  
 
At a distantiated level of analysis, the research also highlighted the ‘repressed’ in the texts 
(Hook, 2013b), or to follow from Bhabba (1993, p. 25), the “return of the oppressed”. Here, 
analysis attended to the ‘languages of the unsayable’ (Rogers, 2007). Silence played up 
variably across situational contexts. Among ‘The Gated Community’ residents, Blackness was 
rendered silent, yet visibilised in metonymic terms (e.g., squatters, taxi drivers, and criminals). 
In other instances, Blackness was spoken explicitly and associated with qualities of 
exceptionalism (wealth, affluence and achievement). This had the effect of rendering ‘silent’ 
the role of ‘Whiteness’ – behind the scenes – in constituting and structuring the acceptable 
standards for privileged and exclusive belonging. The research highlighted how Whiteness’ 
functions a signifier of ‘arrival’ and belonging in its promise of plentitude, wholeness and being 
while disavowing its lack. At a further critical level, the research further highlighted the 
‘surprises’ in the text that unravelled the researcher’s own ‘neatly circumscribed’ subjectivity. 
This became evident in exchanges with participants where, as the researcher, I became co-
opted into the fantasy frame. For example, in subtle concurrences with residents’ views and 
engagement in ‘crime talk’, we jointly circumscribe a world of privileged gated living, premised 
on safety, familial sense, beauty, and serenity.  
 
Aspirational belonging was associated with sites of privilege. By contrast, anxiety and fear 
worked to create abjected zones. In these renderings of abjection, by the participants and 
myself, we delineate the space of Ext. 1 in ‘The Township’ as disorderly, dangerous, and 
horrifying. The findings, however, pointed towards a reversal of this narrative imaginary.  As 
the researcher, I am rendered abject in failing to uphold a coherent narrative of my own that 
accounts for my (ethical) place (and role as a researcher) in a township zone teetering on 
survival. From a stance of concentric reflexivity (Frosh & Saville Young, 2010), it might be 
useful to interrogate the use of Kristeva’s (1987) abjection as an analytical resource.  Despite 
offering a useful lens ‘to understand’ unhomely places, it potentially works to disavow our own 
lack (of belonging). By propping up a fictional sense of ourselves as whole, we see ourselves 
worthy of desire. More critically, from a stance now quite distantiated from the lively unfolding 
of interactions, this abject lens inadvertently functions as a form of colonising power that 
(re)produces the very hierarchies of belonging that the research set out to disrupt. Perhaps 
by embodying the colonising gaze, the analytical lens employed enacts a jouissance, an 
enjoyment from a distance that places the researcher outside of the frame of analysis.  
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I argue that our yearnings to belong and find home rest on the co-ordinates of 
colonialism/apartheid that have taught us how to abject and desire (Žižek, 2008). In affective 
terms, this resonates as a collective channelling of desire and anxiety that flows through the 
social body (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b). In our search for belonging, we become misguided as 
we draw on the symbolic co-ordinates that correspond to hailed (or rather seduced) into white 
hegemonic belonging. In desiring whiteness, we give up ourselves. The pleasures that we 
derive in ‘finding’ illusory wholeness gives way to the pain/tragedy of loss. Although we are 
united in our search for home, our differential positionings as ‘raced’ subjects translate to 
uneven performances of belonging. 
  
8.2.  Contribution to Current Literature 
The current research adds to the corpus of scholarship that seeks to elucidate belonging as a 
performative dimension. Some of this previous work limited the focus to discrete domains of 
experience, for example, ‘feeling’ at home as an ‘inner-directed’ experience (humanistic 
geography), or staking claims to belonging in talk (discursive psychology). Critically-oriented 
research has subsequently attempted to blend the discursive with the material dimensions to 
explore place-belonging as performances rooted in ideology (e.g., Di Masso et al., 2014; 
Durrheim et al., 2013). Similarly, Foucauldian-inspired critical geographers have attempted to 
show everyday material sites, such as gated communities, shopping malls, security parks etc. 
as sociospatial practices for belonging (e.g., Ballard, 2005; Gold & Revill, 2014). In a nutshell, 
the findings of the present research confirm that belonging is an ‘achievement’, not an 
ontological given (Bell, 1999). This performative dimension of belonging is elucidated in talk, 
affect and bodily sense that works to effect distinctions between self and other in a discursive, 
material and spatial sense.  
 
However, the current research offers a further explanatory and critical dimension that presents 
a more complex, layered, ambivalent account of home as a psychosocial project of belonging. 
It invites a perspective of home as an ideological project of belonging that derives its ‘power-
grip’ from the logic of fantasy (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). Specifically, it presents an 
analysis of the workings of ideology not only at the outwardly manifest, rational dimension of 
speech; it also reveals its ‘non-visible’, unspoken and unrepresentable dimension. This secret 
enjoyment (jouissance) is what sustains the operation of ideology (Vighi & Feldner, 2007).  
The unique contribution of the research lies in understanding ‘be – longing’ as an interpellative 
command that conjoins us with others not only as disciplined subjects but as desiring agents. 
These interpellations are not merely discursive and embodied, as discursive psychology 
(Wetherell, 2013), and cultural theory (Ahmed, 2004a; 2004b) offers. More powerfully, they 
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operate as desire engendered in and through ideology fantasy (Žižek, 1989). By attending to 
the affective topographies of belonging, the research extends recent research developments 
in the ‘turn to affect’ (Massoumi, as cited in Wetherell, 2012; Thrift, 2000). Much of this 
research, however, has tended to focus on affect as sensuous, ‘raw’ and unmediated by 
language (e.g., Darling, 2010; Lorimer, 2005). Moreover, this body of scholarship focuses on 
the situated affect as an ‘unfolding here-and-now’ process (May & Thrift, 2001; O’Neill & 
Hubbard, 2010), thus divorcing affect from its historical genesis. Despite overlooking this, it 
nevertheless continues to structure belonging as a momentary unfolding and as an affective 
becoming (Jones, 2011; Tolia-Kelly, 2006; Zembylas, 2016).  
 
There are evident conceptual difficulties in the ‘turn to affect’ scholarship, which places 
limitations to how we can understand questions of home and belonging. In this respect, the 
value of the current research lies in its explicitly affective and psychosocial focus. Moreover, 
it conceives of bodily, discursive and affective as integrated domains of lived experience 
(Wetherell, 2013). In other words, affect is not simply ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ of bodies (Ahmed, 
2004a; 2004b) but constructed, relational and performative in ways that repeat past 
associations and performances. At the same time, they disguise the “histories of production” 
that constitutes objects, subjects and the material world (Ahmed, 2004b, p. 36). However, at 
the ‘unconscious’ level, the research shows our ‘be – longings’ as not our own but structured 
by the Other’s desire. Extending on this relational and performative dimension, the research 
drew on a Žižekian-Lacanian (Lacan, 1977; 1998; 2002; 2014; Žižek, 1993, 1994, 1996, 1989, 
2006, 2008) frame, to offer a view of belonging as a negotiated transaction between ourselves 
(the ‘small other’) and the sociosymbolic order (the ‘big Other’). What is desired and loathed 
(abjected) is relative to the sociocultural framing that offers the unique co-ordinates for what 
is deemed worthy of love, approval and admiration. This transindividual dimension – our 
symbolic identification with the world of meaning (Hook, 2008a; 200c) that structures fantasy 
– is overlooked in research. I argue that it is key to understanding where we choose to place 
our bodies (Rowe, 2005), and why we remain enraptured by ideological modes of belonging 
that are counterintuitive to the ideals of social transformation (Glynos, 2003; McMillan, 2017). 
 
8.3.  Limitations 
The research drew from the two constructing socio-spatial and material sites, each 
corresponding to spaces of affluence and poverty. The intention was to explore at depth the 
phenomenon of making home in post-apartheid South Africa, and how these doings could 
inform an understanding of belonging. The findings offer a portrait of how these belongings 
are negotiated between a small sample of participants and the researcher as unfolding 
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interactions in community home spaces. The choice of data collection method, comprising go-
alongs and sit-down interviews, was focused on gaining rich, nuanced, detailed, contextual 
data on ‘lived experience’ from a variety of lenses: walking, talking, seeing, feeling and 
embodying space (Baxter & Jack, 2008). This depth, rather than breadth focus is akin to an 
ethnographic case study utilised in psychodynamically-inflected research (Frosh, 2003; 
Hollway & Jefferson, 2005). 
 
There are limitations to this approach which departs from a traditional ethnography. The latter 
is rooted in the anthropological observation of a culture for an extended period (Silverman, & 
Marvasti, 2008). Such an immersive undertaking would have deepened observer-participant 
engagements with residents at the respective sites. A more nuanced understanding of identity 
dynamics, in particular how ‘race’ and/or ethnicity is experienced, perceived and played out 
between the researcher and participants, might have yielded richer insights beyond initial 
encounters and modes of engagement. As the findings revealed, the researcher-participant 
encounters, at times, mirrored historically inscribed hegemonic scripts that reduced relations 
to a polarised self-other/‘black-white’ binary. Sustained researcher-participant relationships, 
yielded by a full ethnography, might have opened up productive possibilities to navigate this 
tension between ‘opposites’. Beyond surface encounters, fluid ways of relating to others could 
potentially emerge. These relational ways of knowing, through sustained engagement, would 
open up new modes of seeing the world and the data beyond a Lacanian lens. For now, 
however, the partiality of knowledge produced by a nonanthropological ethnography 
(Silverman & Marvasti, 2008) still has productive value. Without resorting to a categorical logic 
of identity politics to improve this state of affairs, it allows us to hold this tension, momentarily, 
so we can appreciate the nuances of ‘be – longing’ in our collective relations with others.  
The findings of this research moreover are not, at least from a traditional quantitative research 
perspective, intended to represent other similar locales or the broader landscape of South 
Africa. However, in line with a contemporary view, Donmeyer (2000) advances that 
generalisability can be understood in terms of experiential knowledge (in part discerned 
through the lens of the researcher’s vicarious and direct experience), as opposed to statistical 
probability. The findings highlighted how desire, fear, and abjection were performed in 
interactions that produced indeterminate and shifting belongings. It can be said that such 
engagements ‘mirror’ the libidinal economy that flows in and through collective relations in our 
negotiations with the Other for a place in sociosymbolic order. In this respect, the transferability 
of findings – the affective flows of desire, abjection, anxiety, fear as these pertain to ‘places’ 
of affluence and poverty in the data – may offer some sense to contexts beyond the research. 
This reiterates Wetherell’s (2013, p. 23) point that affective  practice is ongoing, sustained by 
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habitual practice or ‘affective citation’ where we “endlessly plagiarise our own and others’ past 
practice”.  
 
However, the disrupting logic of a Lacanian-inflected analysis should guard against the 
‘pinning down’ of meanings (Saville Young & Frosh, 2008). In this respect, new revisions and 
possibilities for belongings can also be opened up. Donmeyer (2000) adds that the research 
findings from case study approaches can function as a heuristic, offering more enriching ways 
to expand “the repertoire of social constructions” or the range of interpretations available. 
Opening up interpretation advances further modes of inquiry rather than providing answers 
(Donmeyer, 2000, p. 52). It is necessary to acknowledge, however, that the Lacanian lens 
applied in this research might have constrained other ways of looking at the data; in this 
respect, reproducing another form of ideological power. Much is written about of the potential 
role that psychoanalysis has played, at least traditionally, in colonising the ‘other’ (Frosh, 
2013). Moreover, interpretation can easily slip into forms of colonisation over particular ways 
of knowing, for example, based on pre-determined notions of the ‘defended subject’ (Frosh & 
Saville Young, 2013; Saville Young, 2009).  
 
Similar criticisms can be levelled at Lacan’s (1977; 1998) theory of subjectivity, as founded on 
fundamental alienation, which presupposes lack to be a universal feature. Radhakrishnan 
(2003) writes in “Theory in an Uneven World”, we cannot claim a condition as universal 
because it always “bears the burden of multiple and uneven histories before it” (p. x). The 
research focused on how our relationship to the big Other is played out relative to small others 
to (re)produce patterns of uneven belongings.  
 
The recourse here is to acknowledge that the findings highlighted above are always tentative 
and subject to revision, rather than definitive (Saville Young & Frosh, 2008). Rather than 
analysing a singular piece of text and apply multiple readings to it (e.g., Saville Young & Frosh, 
2009), the analysis, various extracts were selected to form fragments of the latticework. Given 
this, I acknowledge that the selection of extracts for analysis  – in particular, those that 
illuminated questions, struggles and negotiations of belonging – may at the same time 
‘misrepresent’ the data as a whole. As Saville Young (2014) highlights, the act of sampling 
has weighty implications for the way meaning is read in the text, particularly from a Lacanian 
stance which holds that signifiers only have meaning in relation to other signifiers. More 
significantly, what is held as meaningful from a particular analytical lens to yield ‘findings’ may 
say more about the intimate relationship between the text and the reader of the text (Saville 
Young, 2014). Therefore, as Saville Young (2014) notes, meaning is not intrinsic, but 
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contingent and dynamically unfolding in how the text and researcher converge to produce the 
interpretation. 
 
8.3.1  Subverting the gaze: Implicating Lacan as alien in South Africa 
The question posed here is what motivated the choice of a Lacanian framework for this thesis? 
As put by Ranjana Khanna (2003) in Dark Continents: Psychoanalysis and Colonialism, what 
conflict is being worked through or evaded in authoring a text in a specific way? Khanna poses 
this question in reference to Wulf Sachs’ writing of Black Hamlet. Wulf Sachs, a Lithuanian 
Zionist fleeing an anti-Semitic Europe, settled in South Africa to co-establish with Fritz Perls, 
the International Association of Psychoanalysis. John Chavafambira was a black South 
African traditional healer “living in a Johannesburg slum”. Sachs, who psychoanalysed 
Chavafambira, proclaimed him as the “black  Hamlet”. Through his analysis, Sachs argued for 
universal applicability of psychoanalysis enacted as an Oedipal struggle (Crewe, 2001, p. 2).  
 
Ironically, postcolonial scholars point out that what is mirrored back is an elitist theory that fails 
to account for the brute sociopolitical conditions (Crewe, 2002). Efforts to apply 
psychoanalysis to contexts with histories quite removed from the western conditions of its 
making seems to reside in as Parker (2008, p. 114) points out: 
 
the search for authenticity and identity – an apparent solution to the political-economic 
conditions of insecurity and meaninglessness – directed inward, deep inward to be 
equated with sexuality in something Freud discovered a name for, the unconscious.  
 
As with Black Hamlet, it might be asked then what in recourse to Lacanian psychoanalysis, is 
being worked through? The research, in its Lacanian inflexion, departs from a Freudian (1919; 
1996) model of ‘inner conflict’ grounded on Oedipal neuroses, looking instead to the relation 
between the psychical and social. Despite Lacan having a more radical edge, it nevertheless 
might be accused of imposing a universal structure that has been derived from European 
forms of subjectivity (Winnubst, 2004, p. 28). The application of Lacanian psychoanalysis to a 
context so structurally removed from the theory’s originating context is jarring. Despite the 
critical inflexions of the research, might the Lacanian mirror as a mode of seeing, be the same 
operative force that corresponds with, as one reviewer to this thesis has pointed out, ‘The 
Gated Community’ and ‘The Township’? Achilles Mbembe (2004) argues that spatial 
topographies are inseparable from psychic life. The Johannesburg city, for example, as a 
postapartheid metropolis is being spatially written akin to the operations of the unconscious 
that “the ghost dances and the slave spectacles at its foundation” (Mbembe, 2004, p. 375). 
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Might this spectral quality (Khanna, 2003; Mbembe, 2004) pervade the conceptualisation and 
writing of this thesis in psychical, social and spatial ways? Perhaps the use of Lacan as an 
informative resource operates in unconscious ways to reinscribe (South) Africa as the 
absolute Other, as seen through the White racial gaze (Gibson, 2003). Khanna (2003, p. 235; 
emphasis in original) emphasises here that the “specters of colonialism” relates not just to a 
colonial legacy; it is a “haunting [of] the world” that belongs to the past as much as to the 
future. The caveat here is that the Lacanian framing to this thesis may have inadvertently 
produced a ‘distorted’ gaze, a twisted recognition in acquiescence to the colonial mirror 
(Gibson, 2003). There is cogency in Lacan’s account that affords its ideological status, adding 
to its explanatory appeal. As Winnubst (2004) states, its seductive power on our culture lies 
in its reliance on optics to map the symbolic. Challenging the Lacanian mirror as distorted, 
Fanon (1967, p. 111) argues that what is seen as human are those bodies registered as whole. 
The black man, never seen as simply human, is made into meaning through “a thousand 
details, anecdotes, stories” written through the invisible gaze of whiteness.  
 
Perhaps the orienting framework has inadvertently colonised the data, or perhaps, the writing 
of it is symptomatic of a writer whose mind has been colonised. Perhaps, what haunts the 
writing is my own socially indeterminate positionings that seek resolve. In its obscurantism, 
Lacan’s written works have been accused as elitist, accessible only to those in the ‘inner circle’ 
(Žižek, 2006). Perhaps, by ‘assimilating’ to Lacan, I seek to qualify my humanness. In this 
sense, gaining access to Lacanian theory is likened to seeking entry into a gated community. 
This European gated community is an intellectual one and highly inaccessible. Moreover, it is 
at odds with my social location as a woman, a person of Asian heritage, originating from South 
Africa. Perhaps, by proving a ‘proficiency’ in an inflated theory, I imagine myself as whole; that 
I can acquire an “identity, subjectivity, value and power” (Winnubst, 2004, p. 35) and legitimacy 
as a researcher in the psychosocial studies field. However, even this reflexive mode leans 
onto a (Lacanian) psychoanalytic logic that becomes hard to escape.  
 
As Khanna (2003) notes, the haunting relates to the past that carried to the present as 
something lost. What remains lost are the remnants of fractured identities (my own and the 
participants) outside of the dominant colonising frame that seeks to be known outside the 
dominant co-ordinates of a colonial mirror. How can we become subjects as opposed to 
objects of the gaze? How do we salvage ourselves as fully human without creating the abject 
through the ‘other’? Reiterating Satre, Fanon (1967, p. 69) states that “it is the anti-Semite 
who makes the Jew” and by extension the White man the Negro. The challenge is to unhinge 
ourselves from a subjectivity that is constituted outside of the dominant co-ordinates that 
define what it means to be fully human. This thesis itself is perhaps at the limits of the Lacanian 
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meaning frame imposed. What remains as haunting of the thesis is a melancholic “loss of 
something irretrievable” (Khanna, 2003, p. 244).  
 
In resorting to this reflexive overturn, by no means do I suggest that psychoanalysis is an 
inappropriate lens to explore the (post)apartheid and (post)colonial condition. Rather, as 
Crewe (2002) suggests, the purpose is to self-problematise and subject psychoanalysis to trial 
to realise its limits. The origins and developments of psychoanalysis seem to rest on 
alienations and indeterminate social positionings. For example, in an effort to salvage Jews 
from anti-semitism, Freud positioned them as “the truly civilised people” (Frosh, 2013, p. 147). 
Sachs, as the ‘wandering Jew’, found refuge and purpose in establishing psychoanalysis in 
South Africa (Crewe, 2002). Moroever, Lacan’s expulsion from the psychoanalytic academy 
led him to formulate a distinct theory of psychoanalysis (Bambrough, 2014). In all these 
instances, the use of psychoanalysis as an expert tool seems to cover over these 
indeterminacies. This points towards the need for an ethical use of psychoanalysis. It can 
function as a subversive tool to speak ‘from the margins’. At the same time, it cautions us to 
the dangers of epistemic violence (Frosh, 2013; Khanna, 2003). 
 
As Frosh (2013) notes, psychoanalysis is afforded a unique place assist in remapping 
contemporary power relations given that its potential to reenact colonial power, at the same 
time, disrupting it. There remains a space for new concepts to emerge in novel research. Such 
would risk interpreting data through a lens that claims to have its own legitimacy and status 
outside an accepted and dominant mode of looking. The challenge is to find alternative co-
ordinates to remake our humanity outside of predefined co-ordinates. This opens the 
possibility for a third space. The third space is a shared intersubjectivity that transgresses the 
oppositional logic (e.g., white-black, us-them, inside-outside) to make room for something else 
unknown (Jackson, 2002). This has implications not only for how we relate and ‘be – long’ to 
ourselves and others, but also how we look at the data to produce new knowledges. 
 
8.4. Implications  
There are many varieties of ‘solution’ we offer to the problem of belonging, for example, 
activism and advocacy, dispelling myths and stereotypes, or cultivating diversity to overcome 
difference. To follow from Jackson (2002), these are in themselves ideological. This may leave 
us with a rather bleak outlook on ways to think about social change. The struggle here, from 
a Lacanian perspective, is that the obstinacy of ideas, beliefs or cognitions, such as hatred 
towards foreigners, lies not in knowledge but desire (Martin, 2015).  A ‘social logics’ helps us 
understand the what (norms, rules, self-understandings) and a ‘political logics’ answers how 
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such practices emerged historically. A ‘fantasmatic logics’, alternatively, asks why we are 
gripped into social practices and regimes and helps account for our resistance to social 
change lies (Glynos, 2008).  
 
What does it mean to be ‘at home’ in a post-colonial/apartheid world when belonging is 
founded on our fears and desires, yet perpetually haunted by what we have left behind? 
Lacan’s psychoanalytic account conjoins the bodily, visual and symbolic domains to frame an 
ontological account of being (Winnubst, 2004). This ‘arrival’ into being is premised on a 
foundational lack, a nostalgic longing (desire) for what once was. This somewhat ‘stable’ and 
defeated view of subjectivity (Mansfield, 2000), however, closes down future possibilities for 
becoming, and ‘be – longing’. Moreover, because of its disavowal of race, it inadvertently 
installs whiteness as an unconscious signifier of being (Seshadri-Crooks, 2000). In this 
omission, psychoanalysis overlooks the sociohistorical basis of its claims to universality 
(Winnubst, 2004).  
 
Interrogating Lacan’s account in this way, nevertheless, opens up possibilities for exploring 
empirically the “many places and ways for an ‘eye’ to behold ‘reality’” (Winnubst, 2004, p. 42). 
Both mould and are moulded by the sociopolitical conditions that come to (in)form these 
perspectives. At the same time, what are the possibilities for resignification and revision 
(Hoedemakers, 2010) and can these ever be materialised given our “history of belongings” 
(Georgis, 2007)? 
 
Lacan offers through the notion of traversing the fantasy that we need to reavow our subjective 
responsibility.  Thus entails going behind the veil of fantasy that structures our world to see 
how we are implicated and responsible for how we come to experience it (Sharpe, n.d.). The 
findings of the research show belonging as simultaneously a desiring and anxiety-ridden 
process. We are thus invited to think about self-other relations in critical and compassionate 
ways. Perhaps this encourages a more humbling and contemplative stance that leads us to 
recognise lack – our own, others and simultaneously a lack in the social order itself that we 
lean on for ‘completion’ (Wardle, 2016). It invites us to reflect on the social spaces and 
positionings we occupy, our strivings for belonging, as well as the imaginary fictions that prop 
up our identities and the stories we tell. Despite our (conscious) intentions, they reinscribe the 
historically embedded power asymmetries that continue to define our relations with others. It 
further asks us to interrogate that which we abject of ourselves. 
 
From a Žižekian perspective, the research asks us to scrutinise the question as to whether we 
can ever be at home in the world (Gunder, 2014). As the research suggests, the promise of 
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‘being at home’ is a fantasy construction that functions as an ideological practice. However, 
the idea is not to reject the fantasy, or remove its ‘veil’ so that we can see, as would a Marxian 
perspective suggest, the world for what it is. From a Lacanian position, the fantasy is what we 
need to allow us to bear reality. Therefore, ridding the fantasy altogether would, as Žižek 
(2000, as cited in Davidson, 2012, p. 24) notes, propel us into a “loss of reality”, one in which 
our world becomes nightmarishly ‘unreal’. What is left between these seeming polarities? 
 
The psychoanalytic (and simultaneously political) intervention entails a focus ‘between the 
lines’ on our jouissance how it constitutes our desire to inform sociopolitical projects (Glynos 
& Stavrakakis, 2008).  Žižek (2009) proposes that we traverse the fantasy, not to abandon 
fantasy, but to detach from it, recognising that we collectively invest in it. At the same time, 
taking distance means coming to terms with the source of our desire (or lack). It entails 
awareness of our trauma and the fantasmatic narrative we weave to cover it over (Davidson, 
2012; Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2008). This implies ‘seeing’ the processes of social construction 
as contingent, thereby diminishing our over-investment in fantasy (Glynos, 2001). We need to 
“reavow subjective responsibility”; that is, to go behind the veil of fantasy that structures our 
world to see our own implications and responsibilities in how we come to experience it 
(Sharpe, n.d.). In the language of logics, Glynos (2008) offers that we target, not the content 
of norms that regulate social practices. Rather, in recourse to the logic of fantasy, we should 
look to the way we, as desiring subjects, relate to norms to escapes its confines (Glynos, 
2008). Confronting our struggle with this lack initiates a mode of being which Lacan (1997, p. 
1022) linked to the ethical –a “return to the meaning of the action”. Thus, as Vieira (2015, p. 
120) translates, involves going back to “what the Other made of us”, reflecting on what we 
have done with it, and opening up new ways of relating.  
 
This signals a ‘choice’ between two modes of enjoyment. A mode of enjoyment associated 
with closure (fantasy as ‘completion’) sustains its grip through transgression or guilt. In this 
respect, overzealous political causes in efforts to ‘right the wrongs’ rest on what Brown (1996, 
as cited in Glynos, 2008, p. 18) calls ‘wounded attachments’. This over-investment in fantasy 
entails substituting the contents of one fantasy for another. In this way, the past is remade into 
the present, inevitably restitching old injuries to validate a “punishing recognition [that] assures 
us … of our own place (identity)”.  Alternatively, a mode of enjoyment associated with 
openness allows a detachment, a critical distance from fantasy that, rather than seeking 
completion, recognises the “possibilities of the new in contingent encounters” and alternative 
becomings (Glynos, 2008, p. 18). Glynos (2011) likens this to a mourning process, where we 
mourn the loss of the Other as the guarantor for our completeness and allow ourselves to 
experience our vulnerability and dependence on one another.  
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Applied to the questions of belonging and making home, this entails an ‘unbinding’ of the 
fantasies that affectively give rise to abjection, a defensive manoeuvre towards managing our 
survival and reinstating a troubled subjecthood (Georgis, 2007; Kristeva, 1982). To recap, the 
abject (‘i’) hovers hauntingly on the fringes of our constructed identities, meanings and 
belongings (‘I’) – threatening to undo our fragile boundaries to dissolve egoic and spatial 
distinctions between ‘me’ and ‘not me’ (Kristeva, 1982). Thus, critical distance involves moving 
towards a place of ambiguity and uncertainty (Glynos, 2011). From a stance of ‘unsettling 
whiteness’, Straker (2013) suggests a model of mourning that permits the experience of 
confusion and sadness. As Straker (2013, p. 106) notes, this allows “us to ponder our losses” 
as opposed to “trying to make good our losses”. The latter resorts to ‘good deeds’, the use of 
fetish to cover over (privileged) guilt. 
 
How would the oppressed come to terms with this fundamental lack if lack itself is a privilege 
of ‘Whiteness’? As Oliver (2014, p. 16) notes, the oppressed is faced with the burden of 
‘double alienation’, of arriving too late in of “arriving too late into a white world”. The oppressed 
is not only shamed by the dominant norms of the White Other. It is also a repository for the 
guilt and shame of the dominant culture to shore up its own privilege. If the work of mourning 
for a privileged subjectivity entails coming to terms with the loss of the White ideal (Straker, 
2013), this implies that the work of mourning for the oppressed is a double task of coming to 
terms with a ‘double exclusion’. Most poignantly articulated by Fanon in Black Skin, White 
Mask (1986, p. 114), the alienation is not only psychoexistential but viscerally and bodily-
sensed: 
 
My body was given back to me sprawled out. Distorted, recolored, clad in mourning in 
that white winter day 
 
Fanon’s (1986, p. 181) final prayer is to the body: “O my body, make of me always a man who 
questions”. If, as the findings suggest, we can only experience the ‘other’ through the lens of 
abjection, what would this mean for belonging? Kristeva’s (1982, p. 18) proposes, at least 
from the task of aesthetics, that a cultural shift is possible in “a world in which the Other has 
collapsed”. The task as, Foster (1996, p. 115) elucidates, is no longer to sublimate nor elevate 
the abject, but to “plumb the abject” – that is, to fathom the bottomless primacy, to “retrace the 
fragile limits of the speaking being” at the boundary where meaning has collapsed (Kristeva, 
1982, p. 18).  
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Perhaps the places of instability, rupture, collision, and collapse – where we fall out-of-
belongings – offers new possibilities “what is assimilable, thinkable” (Kristeva, 1982, p. 18). At 
these moments of floundering, we are induced to anxiety and shame at our destitution and 
loss of meaning (Bistoen, 2006). Perhaps it is in this ‘in-betweenness of being’, where we are 
unanchored and stranded, that invites a rethinking of possibilities of becoming. Through these 
momentary ‘shifts’, the surprise openings of the unconscious become apparent that as Parker 
(2015, p. 250) notes “disturbs our consciousness of ourselves in our place”.  I argue that it is 
in these blurred, ambiguous spaces where the boundaries (conceptual, symbolic, physical, 
bodily) of our identity are shaken, revealing ourselves as fragmented, alienated from ‘home’, 
as “strangers to ourselves” (Kristeva, 1991, p. 13). Home, to reiterate Kamala Visweswaran’s 
(1994, p. 111) assertion, therefore becomes “a place we’ve never before been”. 
 
Translated to the socio-material making of home, this invites us towards new, yet unknowable, 
spaces guided beyond a rationalist, technocratic knowledge; that is from the unquestioned 
stance of the “subject [who is] supposed to know” (Stavrakakis, 2003, p. 57). Gunder (2005) 
offers that spatial planning requires a transcendence of accepted (often depoliticised, silently 
hegemonic) norms and desires of what constitutes the ‘good society’. What tends to be held 
as the ‘good society’ is often a technical and quantified solution defined in relation to society’s 
premised lack (e.g., safety, order, cleanliness). A traditional ethical position is to fill or bypass 
lack, but this consequently yields to phallic enjoyment (Stavrakakis, 2003b). Alternatively, an 
ethics of the Real foregrounds the awareness of lack and its politicisation to allow “space for 
an inclusive acceptance of strife or agonism” (Gunder, 2005, p. 190). This entails a different 
mode of enjoyment, a feminine jouissance that seems to suggest a productive tension 
between struggle and resolve; the inclusion and acceptance of strife and “the Others’ voice 
attempting to articulate their desires and wants” (Stavrakakis, 2003b, p. 331). 
 
8.5.  Recommendations 
The research opens up questions about meanings and performances of home in a post-
colonial world where belonging connotes ‘access’ to fullness, as signified by ‘Whiteness’. This 
research leaves little surprise as to these racial significations in a post-apartheid context. 
However, it does offers insights into why and how we are complicit (re)producing uneven 
belongings (Rus, 2006). What emerges as ‘surprise’ are those aspects in the data that point 
to ‘ruptures’ in the meaning-making frame. These surprises catch both the participants and 
researcher off guard, having the effect of disrupting sense (Saville Young & Frosh, 2008), and 
resulting in a loss of bearings. Thus, the symbolic co-ordinates that structure our belonging by 
promising us a place in the social order seem to fail us. The outcome is a troubled subjecthood 
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viscerally and materially sensed on the body (Glynos, 2001; Kristeva, 1982).   Perhaps then, 
these ruptures in meaning – the collapse of the symbolic frame – where we are exposed to 
our alienations in ‘be – longing’ that offers a fruitful avenue for future research. Scholars 
advocating the critical use of psychoanalysis have stressed the importance of not pinning 
down meanings. Instead, meanings should emerge as ‘indeterminacy’, ‘surprise’ and 
‘unpredictability’  (Saville Young & Frosh, 2009). Key is how analysis of these disturbances 
could provide avenues for thinking about transformation, revolt and resignification (Parker, 
2015b; Hoedemakers, 2010). Future research into questions of home that are designed to 
allow these moments of disturbance, ambiguity and vulnerability, might offer new ways of 
thinking about doing belonging.  
 
The research adopted a ‘both-and’ stance towards the data interpretation. It drew attention to 
belonging as a narrative construction, made out of traumatic histories and collective memory 
(Bloom, 2016; Georgis, 2007; Hook & Vanheule, 2016) ’ to allow us to be ‘at home. At the 
same time, it offered a critical reflection of the jouissance in our belongings, where our desires 
(re)produce hierarchical belongings (Back et al., 2012). This, however, raises further 
questions as to how we can engage with these tensions in creative and productive ways that 
do not lean back onto stasis and complacency. 
 
8.6.  Reflection   
Having lived in many different homes across contrasting contexts and circumstances, the 
question of belonging and finding home has always deeply resonated. The stirrings of this 
research arose at a time when I felt ‘homesick’ living as a student in the United States. 
Separated from my birthplace, South Africa, at the same time feeling alienated from my 
cultural ‘roots’ and Chinese ethnicity, I longed for home. At the same time, I felt at a loss; not 
understanding this longing for ‘home’ in South Africa that always felt alienating. Doing this 
research has allowed me to ‘visit’ home, perhaps for the first time in a profoundly intimate 
way. In unexpected ways, the research process seems to have mirrored my parallel process 
in a very personal way. This research journey started with an awaited conception, a 
welcoming birth, evolving into traumatic interruptions, surprise detours and culminated in 
endings that seemed forever elusive. Thus, the somewhat pessimistic tone arises out of my 
losses - of homes and their associated belongings. Rowe (2005, p. 17) writes that “we 
encounter collision ... when our belongings are stripped from us”. The unfolding of this 
research is akin to my search for coherence, structure, to find new bearings and co-
ordinates to shape new belongings. My interpretations and meaning frames I have put onto 
the text, I may be forced to accede, may have arisen from my own pressing need to find new 
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meaning in my world that I felt had temporally collapsed. I, therefore, draw caution to my 
interpretive frame, despite grounded in critical Lacanian psychoanalysis, to highlight the 
disruptions in meaning. Thus, I may have inadvertently re-imposed my imaginary frame to 
insist on a particular view of the world, and simultaneously to re-imagine, perhaps 
romanticise, an alternative one. 
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Appendix 2: Participant Information Sheet  
 
Dear _______________________ , 
 
My name is Ursula Lau. I am a Psychology student studying towards a PhD degree at the University of KwaZulu-
Natal.  
 
I would like to invite you to participate in a study about ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ in contemporary South Africa. The 
purpose of the research is to explore your meanings and experiences of ‘home’ as it is lived in your past, 
experienced in your present and imagined in your future: Where have you come from? Where are you now? Where 
you are going to? I am interested in how these meanings and experiences influence how you navigate your world, 
how you place and position yourself in the world and how and where you feel you belong (or don’t belong). I will 
conduct the study in two different communities, an informal township and a gated community where I will recruit 
five participants each.  
 
If you choose to take part, I would like to accompany you on a ‘go along’ (walking, driving, etc.) to the spaces near 
your home that are personally meaningful for you. Depending on what you feel comfortable with, this could be a 
‘tour’, led by you, of the community/area in which you live, or I could accompany you as you go about your ordinary 
day-to-day activities in your community. While doing this, we can have conversations about the spaces you 
frequent in/around your home, why you chose your place of home, what it feels like to live in these surroundings, 
and what’s important to you about these spaces. The ‘go along’ could last one hour or more depending on the time 
you wish to spend.  
 
I would also like to listen to your personal story about your life as it relates to ‘home’ and ‘belonging’ (however you 
wish to define it). I’m interested in understanding your meanings of ‘home’ as you live and experience it now, and 
as you have lived, experienced and remembered it in the past. This can take place in a space that is comfortable 
to you – your home, a community centre, or other facility that is located in or near your home. This can be on the 
same day as the go-along or another day depending on your time. After this, I will ask you some questions related 
to some of the topics/events you spoke about in your story. The story exercise could last more than an hour or 
two, depending on the time you wish to spend.  
 
At a later stage, I may ask you for a follow-up interview to ask further questions about your story. You will have the 
opportunity to talk more about the things that came up for you since our first meeting. 
 
The study may create some benefits for you. Telling your story could be valuable for self-awareness, personal 
insight, stress relief, and self-expression particularly in a space where you feel respected and listened to. Because 
the study is interested in your meanings and experiences of ‘home’ and ‘belonging’, the research does not 
specifically focus on the vulnerable or stressful aspects of your life. However, if you choose to share aspects of 
your life story that are vulnerable for you, this may or may not trigger feelings of discomfort. If you do experience 
discomfort, you have the option to discontinue or withdraw from the study as a whole. Your decision will be 
respected and you will not be disadvantaged in any way. At the end of the research, you will be debriefed and 
given the opportunity to share your feelings and reflect on your experience of the research. If you feel that the 
research process may have triggered deeper issues or concerns that may be emotionally difficult for you, please 
let me know. If you feel you require further help, you are welcome to contact the Emthomjeni Centre at the 
University of the Witwatersrand (Tel: 011-717-4513) to set up an appointment for free counselling.  
 
There are no incentives for participation in this study, but as a token of appreciation for your time, you will be 
compensated with a small grocery/shopping voucher. Participation in this research is voluntary and you may, at 
any point, withdraw your participation without being disadvantaged.  
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Should you choose to participate, any information you volunteer will be treated as confidential. With your consent, 
the interview will be audiotaped. This would allow me to transcribe the details of your story and our interactions 
with accuracy. The interview material (recordings and transcripts) will be viewed, heard and processed by myself. 
Your identity remains anonymous and a pseudonym of your own choosing will be used in place of your name. To 
ensure that I interpret the results accurately, my supervisors may also have access to the anonymised transcripts. 
The audio files and interview transcripts will be encrypted and securely stored in a locked cabinet and will be 
destroyed within 5 years after the research has been written up. Although parts of the interview material may be 
quoted directly in the write-up of the research, your chosen pseudonym will be used to disguise your identity. Your 
identity will not be matched to the site/place of your residence. As a measure of precaution, it is important that you 
are aware of the limits to confidentiality. If you chose to disclose your intention to harm yourself or another, I am 
ethically bound to report this to the relevant authorities so that your safety and/or those of others are assured. 
 
Your contribution to this study is highly valued. Your participation will provide an enriched understanding of how 
people in contrasting socioeconomic contexts experience, talk and make sense of ‘home’ and their belonging in 
the post-apartheid era. These insights may provide direction in generating new ways of thinking about home, 
belonging, identity, space and place for diverse individuals living in contemporary South Africa. If you are interested 
in getting feedback on the findings of this research, I will make this available to you a summary report of key 
findings through email or post. Please provide your contact information and email and/or postal address in the 
consent form.  
 
I hope that the information I have presented will encourage you to participate. If you would like to know more before 
you decide to participate or have any concerns or questions, I would be happy to provide more information at our 
initial meeting. Alternatively, you may contact me through email or telephone (see details below). If you have 
decided that you would like to participate, please complete the attached consent form. 
 
If you have any further questions/concerns or queries related to the study, you may contact me at 
Ursula.lau@gmail.com or 078 985 8327. 
 
This study has been ethically reviewed and fully approved by the UKZN Psychology Department Research Ethics 
Committee (HSS/1465/014D). If you have any questions or concerns about your rights as a study participant, or if 
you are concerned about an aspect of the study or the researchers then you may contact: 
 
HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES RESEARCH ETHICS COMMITTEE 
Research Office Ethics 
University of KwaZulu-Natal 
Govan Mbeki Building 
Westville Campus 
KwaZulu-Natal, SOUTH AFRICA 
Contact: Ms Phume Ximba 
Tel: 27 31 260 3587 
Fax: 27 31 260 4609 
Email: XIMBAP@ukzn.ac.za 
 
The research is co-supervised by: 
 
Prof. Kevin Durrheim   Dr. Lisa Saville Young 
School of Psychology  School of Psychology 
University of KwaZulu-Natal  Rhodes University  
Email: durrheim@ukzn.ac.za   Email: l.young@ru.ac.za  
Tel: +27332605348  Tel: +27(0)46 603 8047 
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Appendix 3: Consent Form 
 
 
 
Consent Form 
 
Full name of participant: _________________________________ 
 
Chosen pseudonym: ____________________________________ 
 
Email address: _______________________ 
 
Residential address: 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Contact number: ________________________ 
 
 
 
 I _______________________________ (Full Name) have been informed about the study entitled,  Home 
and Spatial Belonging by Ursula Lau. 
 
 I have read and understood the information sheet related to the study and understand the purpose and 
procedures of the study. 
 
 I have been given an opportunity to ask questions about the study and have had answers to my 
satisfaction. 
 
 I declare that my participation in this study is entirely voluntary and that I may withdraw at any time without 
any negative consequences. In addition, should I wish not to answer any particular question(s), I am free to decline. 
If I choose to withdraw from the study, I may contact the researcher at any stage of the research.  
 
 I understand that my personal information and responses I volunteer will be kept confidential and my 
name will not be not identified or be identifiable in any research reports or publications that result from the study. I 
also understand the limits to confidentiality if I choose to reveal an intention to harm myself and/or others.  
 
 I give consent for the interviews and conversations held between myself and Ursula Lau be audiotaped. 
 
 I give consent to take part in the above research. 
  
I would like to receive a copy of the results posted/emailed to me. 
 
____________________      ____________________ 
Signature of Participant                              Date 
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Appendix 4: Ethics Amendment Clearance  
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Appendix 5: Interview Schedule  
 
Semi-structured Narrative Interview Schedule  
Adapted from Wengraf (2001) and Kvale (1996) 
 
Pre-Interview Framing 
Greetings, orientation, warm-up. 
Overview of ethics. 
Overview of interview sessions. 
 
Subsession 1: Initial Elaboration of Story Around Topics 
‘I would like you to tell me your life story about home, your experiences of home and how you have made your 
home. Maybe you could start by telling me about the home of your past, your childhood or any other time that was 
important to you. Then you could continue telling how home is for you now at this point in your life, what it is like 
and how you came to live here. So in a nutshell, I would like to hear your story about home, where you have come 
from, where you are now, and where you are going1.’  
 
‘Start wherever you like. You have as much time as you like to tell it. I won't ask any questions for now. I will just 
make some notes on the things I would like to ask you about later. If we haven't got enough time today, perhaps 
in a second interview.’ 
 
Subsession 2: Follow-up Probes / Questions  
Based on topics that have spontaneously arisen in Subsession 1, questions are asked generate more narrative 
about specific happenings, occasions, incidents, or examples, or to illuminate contradictions, provoke self-
reflexivity, etc. 
 
The questions are asked following the same sequential logic that they were presented in the Subsession 1. For 
example: ‘You said XXX. Can you tell me more about how that happened’.  
 
 
1 Opening question is based on Avtar Brah’s (2012) conceptualisation of ‘home’ as a moving signifier: your point 
of origin ("where you are from") but also “where you move towards socially, politically and psychically”, and as 
“constructed and transformed in and through social practices, cultural imaginaries, historical memories and our 
deepest intimacies" (p. 173).  
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Appendix 6: Transcription Notations 
 
CAPS   :  raised volume in speech 
underline   :  spoken emphasis 
↑    :   rising intonation 
↓    :  falling intonation 
/    :  stutter or word correction without a pause 
(.)  :   pauses in seconds 
:    :  extension of previous sound  
.hh   :   audible breath 
hh    :  laughter 
(hh)   :  laughter punctuating speech 
=   :  absence of discernible gap in speech 
<< >>   :   spoken in a noticeably softer volume, or having a   
whisper quality 
((sound))   :   external sounds punctuating speech 
§    :   speech having a smile quality 
~x~x    :   speech expressed in a quivering voice 
><    :   spoken in rushed or compressed speech 
<>    :   markedly slow speech 
???   :   inaudible 
 
Adapted from: Durrheim and Dixon (2005), (Gee (2014), Paltridge (2007) 
 
 
